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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis interrogates the political effects of sustainable development discourse as 
seen through the lens of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD), held in Johannesburg, South Africa. By approaching sustainable 
development from the perspective of Michel Foucault’s work on power, discourse and 
government, it argues that negotiations at the Summit re-orientated sustainable 
development in terms of cooperation, consensus and voluntary partnerships. By 
showing how summits are more than just institutional mechanisms for producing 
agreement but are also stages on which theatrical and symbolic modes of exemplary 
politics are performed, the thesis draws attention to how the WSSD functioned as a 
key technique of exemplary governmentality. Yet the Summit also facilitated the 
emergence of new constellations of political actors, and provided a stage for myriad 
political protests and demonstrations. One of these protests – a mass march on 31 
August 2002 – was the largest anti-government protest in South Africa since the end 
of Apartheid. By approaching these protests as Foucauldian ‘counter-conducts’ rather 
than ‘pure’ acts of resistance or revolution, the thesis shows how they were implicated 
within forms of advanced liberal rule. As such the thesis contributes to a discursive 
understanding of sustainable development in the post-Johannesburg era; to an 
appreciation of the evolving role of global summits as forms of theatrical exemplary 
government; and to the political effects of resistance and protest. It concludes that the 
WSSD worked to make politically sustainable a global order which is manifestly 
unsustainable – whilst also providing opportunities for the status quo to be protested 
and resisted.  
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The highest parts of the loftiest peaks seem to be above 
the laws that rule our world below, as if they belonged 
to another sphere.  
 
Conrad Gesner, 1541 1 
 
 
 
There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more 
dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer 
than to introduce a new order of things. 
 
Niccolò Machiavelli, 1532 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 C. Gesner, Swiss naturalist and bibliographer, quoted in R. Macfarlane, Mountains of the Mind: A 
History of a Fascination, (London; Granta Books, 2003), p. 201. 
2
 N. Machiavelli, The Prince, (tr. P. Bondanella), (Oxford; OUP, 1984), p. 21. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
In the last thirty years the torch of sustainable 
development has travelled from Europe to the Americas, 
and through Asia and it now burns in Africa. After a 
protracted journey, it now arrives in a continent that is 
the cradle of humanity. The fact that we have convened 
at this cradle of humanity emphasizes the obligation we 
all face to respond with all seriousness and urgency and 
to adopt a meaningful Johannesburg plan of 
implementation, in the interests of all humanity and our 
common planet. 
Thabo Mbeki, Johannesburg 2002 1 
 
 
 
With these words South African President Thabo Mbeki opened the 2002 United 
Nations (UN) World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), welcoming the 
assembled global community to the pinnacle of global politics. By invoking the image 
of the ‘torch of sustainable development’ coming to banish the darkness and give 
hope of a shared and sustainable future he reminded his audience of their common 
origin in the Cradle of Humankind caves, located just outside Johannesburg. The task 
of the WSSD, however, was to agree on a common future – a plan of action for our 
“global village”, since “the survival of everybody in this village demands that we 
develop a universal consensus to act together.”2 The common origins and common 
future of the human race were thus recurring themes at the WSSD, as part of a 
broader emphasis upon partnership, solidarity and consensus. 
Between 26 August and 4 September the WSSD brought together world 
leaders, UN luminaries and bureaucrats, scientists, activists, lobbyists, the press and 
technical advisors in order “to reinvigorate the global commitment to sustainable 
development.”3 Scattered in and around the central conference venue at Sandton in 
tents, halls, hotels, exhibition centres and a cricket ground it felt as though the global 
                                                 
1
 Thabo Mbeki’s opening statement to the WSSD, in UN, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August – 4 September 2002, (New York; UN, 2002), p. 
155. 
2
 Ibid, p. 156. 
3
 UN, Resolution 55/199: Ten-year review of progress achieved in the implementation of the outcome 
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 20/12/2000, (New York; UN, 
2000), #1. 
 
 2 
community was assembled in miniature, ready to take on the task of securing the 
broader planetary community as well as safeguarding the future of unborn 
generations. The sense of drama, of standing on a world stage at a pivotal moment in 
time, was heightened by the awareness that the hosts had not even been present at the 
Rio Summit in 1992. The overthrow of the Apartheid regime and the emergence of an 
apparently unified and peaceful ‘Rainbow Nation’ from the ruins of the old South 
Africa was regarded as an auspicious sign for the potential for the global community 
to put aside their differences and cooperate in striving for a new political order. For 
ten days in Johannesburg, one could be forgiven for feeling that ‘one world had come 
to one country’, and that a new and united world order could emerge, inspired by the 
South African example.4 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
This thesis is an investigation into the politics of sustainable development at 
the WSSD, and a critical interrogation of the claims of global unity, consensus and 
partnership that characterised it. It is motivated by a desire to understand how 
sustainable development fits into global power relationships: to what degree is it a 
force for reform, revolution, or stabilisation of the status quo? Has the counter-
cultural environmental movement been co-opted into a pacified discourse of 
sustainable development, or are there still spaces for resistance and progressive 
politics in sites such as the WSSD? The varied and heterogeneous dimensions of the 
Johannesburg Summit are used as lenses for the analysis of the broader politics of 
sustainable development. The research question which drives this thesis is therefore: 
what were the political effects of the Summit and the way it constructed sustainable 
development? 
In answering this question a theoretical perspective inspired by Michel 
Foucault is adopted in order to show how sustainable development constitutes a 
discourse which establishes particular relationships of power and knowledge. Many 
contemporary treatments of the concept of sustainable development are deeply 
unsatisfying, treating it either as an unproblematic universal goal or public good 
                                                 
4
 The phrase ‘one world comes to one country’ has been adapted from V. Munnik and J. Wilson, The 
World Comes to One Country: An Insider History of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
Johannesburg 2002, (Johannesburg; Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2003). 
 3 
behind which everyone can unite, or alternatively as a cynical rhetorical device for 
legitimising continued inequitable and ecologically damaging economic development. 
A Foucauldian perspective seeks to avoid these twin traps of apparent neutrality and 
mystifying ideology, instead approaching sustainable development as an assemblage 
of practices of government which produces its own particular ways of seeing, 
knowing, acting and being. The discourse of sustainable development governs global 
politics in certain ways, through techniques and sites such as the WSSD, and this 
thesis is directed at highlighting how, and with what effects, this is achieved and 
resisted. 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
The focus on the WSSD is part necessity and part a reflection of the way in 
which UN summits stand as landmark moments within the discourse. Since it was 
popularised in the 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future, 
and elaborated at the Rio Earth Summit and Agenda 21, the concept of sustainable 
development has produced a forest of texts, commentaries, institutions, programmes, 
policies, strategies, scientific investigations and technical projects. It would be 
impossible to adequately cover the entire scope of sustainable development in all its 
manifestations, so this research uses the WSSD as a lens through which to examine 
the broader discourse.5 Within this discourse UN summits have been constructed as 
authoritative and epoch-defining moments at which sustainable development is 
produced, manifested and renewed. The WSSD was a continuation of the process that 
began at the Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm in 1972, 
and continued with the Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) – 
also known as the ‘Earth Summit’ – in Rio in 1992, and the General Assembly 
Special Session (UNGASS) in New York in 1997, also known as ‘Rio+5’ or Earth 
Summit II. Johannesburg in 2002 was therefore a key moment for re-defining the 
place and role of sustainable development in the early twenty-first century. Following 
                                                 
5
 There are, of course, many ways of examining the politics of sustainable development other than 
through UN summits, and as Mark Whitehead notes, “actually existing sustainabilities do not simply 
represent local manifestations of UN-sanctioned models of sustainable development – nor should 
they.” M. Whitehead, Spaces of Sustainability: Geographical Perspectives on the Sustainable Society, 
(London; Routledge, 2007), p. 212. 
 4 
Paul Wapner, we can use the WSSD “as a benchmark for gauging the character of 
world environmental affairs.”6 
 As well as its usefulness as a lens through which to examine sustainable 
development, the WSSD merits detailed analysis as a historical event in its own right. 
Whilst a number of academic studies have discussed certain dimensions of the 
WSSD, this thesis provides a sustained, critical and theoretically informed account of 
its political significance. In particular it brings together discussions on three 
dimensions of the Summit. First, the Summit stands as a conventionally important 
‘high’ political moment; secondly it represents a significant landmark in the evolution 
of summitry as a form of global governance; and thirdly it was a potential turning-
point in the politics of post-Apartheid South Africa.  
The WSSD was the largest ever UN conference and plausibly the largest ever 
political meeting in world history, at least in terms of the number of states 
represented. One recent collection describes it as “an event of great significance with 
global ramifications.”7 Representatives of over 190 countries, 100 world leaders and 
about 22,000 other participants attended the main conference, whilst a further 15,000 
attended one or more of the many side-events.8 South African sources claim as many 
as 80,000 people attended the Summit.9 The official history of the politics and 
negotiations at the WSSD, Ten Days in Johannesburg, by Pamela Chasek and Richard 
Sherman stands out as a comprehensive and balanced account.10 A more critical 
assessment is provided by Neil Middleton and Phil O’Keefe in Rio Plus Ten.11 Both 
publications discussed the significance of the Summit debates and their impact on the 
broader discourse of sustainable development in the immediate aftermath of the 
Summit. 
Yet the WSSD came at the end of one of the busiest periods of summits in 
world history, and at a time when their value was increasingly being questioned. The 
                                                 
6
 P. Wapner, ‘World Summit on Sustainable Development: Toward a Post-Jo’burg Environmentalism’, 
Global Environmental Politics, 3, 1, (2003), p. 1. 
7
 A. C. Kalhauge, E. Correll and G. Sjöstedt, ‘The Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development: 
Past, Present and Future’, in A. C. Kalhauge, G. Sjöstedt and E. Correll (eds.), Global Challenges: 
Furthering the Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development, (Sheffield; Greenleaf, 2005), p. 16. 
8
 P. Chasek and R. Sherman, Ten Days in Johannesburg: A Negotiation of Hope, (Pretoria; DEAT and 
UNDP, 2004), p. 117.  
9
 JOWSCO, Report of the Economic Impact of the World Summit on Sustainable Development on 
South Africa, (Johannesburg; JOWSCO, no date), pp. 20 – 21. 
10
 Chasek and Sherman, Ten Days in Johannesburg.  
11
 N. Middleton and P. O’Keefe, Rio Plus Ten: Politics, Poverty and the Environment, (London; Pluto 
Press, 2003). 
 5 
general feelings of “summit fatigue” at the WSSD have given way to more profound 
doubts about their function in global politics, such that in 2004 the UN Cardoso report 
pronounced that “the era of global conferences is largely over.”12 In June 2003 “the 
UN General Assembly voted to end what had become a practice of automatic five-
year reviews of UN conferences”, and the absence of a ‘WSSD+5’ anniversary 
conference in 2007 seemed to confirm this ebbing of enthusiasm for multilateral 
summits.13 Whilst many authors have discussed these developments, few have given 
explicit and sustained attention to the impact and politics of the WSSD itself, as well 
as its effects on broader patterns of global governance.14 
The WSSD was also significant because it marked an apparent turning-point 
in South African politics. The Summit was marked by heightened tension both within 
the ruling Alliance and between the state and civil society, and on 31 August the 
largest anti-government protest in the post-Apartheid era marched in Johannesburg.15 
Such protests have become an inescapable accompaniment to global summits, and 
those of the WSSD have acquired a landmark status for South African politics. The 
tensions during the Summit build-up and the marches themselves have been 
excellently discussed by Victor Munnik and Jessica Wilson in their report The World 
Comes to One Country, which also provides an insider’s perspective on the UN 
negotiations.16 
This thesis builds on these existing accounts of the WSSD, whilst illuminating 
new and alternative aspects through a Foucauldian perspective on the politics of 
sustainable development, the nature of summitry and global governance, and the 
                                                 
12
 F. Cardoso, We the peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance: Report of the 
Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, (New York; UN, 2004), p. 71. 
See also Chasek and Sherman, Ten Days in Johannesburg, p. 163; G. Seyfang and A. Jordan, ‘The 
Johannesburg Summit and Sustainable Development: How Effective are Environmental Mega-
Conferences?’, in O. S. Stokke and O. B. Thommessen (eds.), Yearbook of International Cooperation 
on Environment and Development 2002/2003, (London; Earthscan, 2002), pp. 19 – 26; Wapner, 
‘World Summit on Sustainable Development’, p. 2; and J. M. Witte, C. Streck and T. Benner, (eds.), 
Progress or Peril? Partnerships and Networks in Global Environmental Governance: The Post-
Johannesburg Agenda, (Washington DC; GPPi, 2003). 
13
 M. G. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, (London; Routledge, 2005), p. 11; C. Death, 
‘No WSSD + 5? Global Environmental Diplomacy in the twenty-first century’, Environmental Politics, 
17, 1, (2008), pp. 121 – 125. 
14
 An exception is J. Martens, The Future of Multilateralism after Monterrey and Johannesburg, 
(Berlin; Friedrich Ebert Siftung, 2003); and J. Martens, Multistakeholder Partnerships – the Future of 
Multilateralism?, (Berlin; Friedrich Ebert Siftung, 2007). See also Schechter, United Nations Global 
Conferences, pp. 187 – 194. 
15
 P. Bond, Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest, (London; 
Merlin Press, 2002), chapter 7; P. Bond, Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global 
Reforms, (Pietermaritzburg; UKZN Press, 2006). 
16
 Munnik and Wilson, The World Comes to One Country.  
 6 
relationship between protests, resistance and power. In particular, by drawing upon 
the Foucauldian notion of “governmentality” it shows how power at the WSSD 
operated not only as a capacity exercised by one actor over another, but also through 
techniques of “rule at a distance” in which the scope, forms and identities of 
governmental action – conceived as “the conduct of conduct” – were determined.17 A 
governmentality perspective questions many of the binary divisions on which 
conventional political thought has been based: international and domestic, power and 
resistance, government and freedom, public and private, and state and civil society. It 
draws attention to the multiplicity of ways in which rule is exercised through a 
heterogeneous assemblage of sites and actors, incorporating but going far beyond the 
traditional limits of the state, through which the conduct of free, rational and 
responsible actors is channelled and guided. The contribution of this thesis is 
therefore to provide a Foucauldian governmentality perspective on the politics of the 
WSSD in three areas: as a moment of ‘high politics’ in which the discourse of 
sustainable development was defined and shaped; as a technique of global 
government highlighting evolutions in the role of summitry; and as a site of resistance 
and political protest which had particular political effects in South Africa. 
Such a perspective acknowledges, but differs from, the ways in which global 
summits have conventionally been studied in the social and political sciences. A 
number of prevailing perspectives have shaped how summits are viewed as political 
events. What might be called the liberal institutionalist perspective asserts that they 
“simply provide multilateral fora to coordinate efforts for solutions” to self-evident 
problems such as underdevelopment or environmental degradation.18 For Peter Haas, 
for example, summits’ outputs are part and parcel of a “broader process of multilateral 
governance and may contribute to stronger and more effective environmental 
                                                 
17
 M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984, Vol. 3, (ed. J. 
D. Faubian, tr. R. Hurley), (New York; The New Press, 2000), pp. 201 – 222. See also M. Dean, 
Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, (London; Sage, 1999); C. Gordon, 
‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 1 – 51; 
N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, (Cambridge; CUP, 1999); and N. Rose and 
P. Miller, ‘Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government’, The British Journal Of 
Sociology, 43, 2, (1992), pp. 173 – 205. 
18
 M.-C. C. Segger, A. Khalfan, M. Gehring and M. Toering, ‘Prospects for Principles of International 
Sustainable Development Law after the WSSD: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, 
Precaution and Participation’, RECIEL, 12, 1, (2003), p. 67. See also P. S. Chasek, Earth Negotiations: 
Analyzing Thirty Years of Environmental Diplomacy, (Tokyo; UNUP, 2001); Kalhauge et al, Global 
Challenges; and Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences. 
 7 
governance by states.”19 James Meadowcroft argues that the Rio Summit “contributed 
to altering the perception of development and environmental issues” as well as giving 
“rise to institutional reform and adjustment.”20 In contrast a Foucauldian perspective 
draws attention to the ways in which regimes of power/knowledge are deeply 
implicated in the framing of particular problems, and in the authorities, techniques, 
institutions and actors which are established as necessary for their solutions. Whilst 
problem-solving approaches to sustainable development and global governance are 
important and necessary, this thesis emphasises the fact that summits are not neutral 
tools for solving self-evident problems but are rather bound up with the production 
and re-production of global power relations. 
Another angle on summitry is provided by what can be termed the liberal 
cosmopolitan perspective, from which it is argued that whilst summits may be weak 
institutional mechanisms for solving problems, they represent a political ‘good’ which 
should be promoted, such as the democratisation of global politics.21 Thus Jacques 
Fomerand points out that whilst the texts produced have no formal coercive power, 
summits are “not meant to be arenas for making authoritative decisions” but rather 
perform the function of “collective legitimisation.”22 From this perspective summits 
have “facilitated the emergence of a global civil society”, and provided “an arena 
where people can express themselves freely, organise associations, and try to 
influence decision-makers.”23 Whilst not denying the importance of opening up 
spaces in which more democratic forms of politics can take place, a Foucauldian 
perspective cautions that even civil society spaces are not free from power relations, 
and indeed modern techniques of advanced liberal rule work precisely through the 
creation of certain expectations of the correct standards and codes of conduct for 
‘civilised’ and responsible actors. Furthermore, the assumption that the state and civil 
society are separate spheres of life is one that unduly constricts our views of what 
politics and resistance are, and where they can be located. Foucault urged that “we 
                                                 
19
 P. M. Haas, ‘UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment’, Global 
Governance, 8, (2002), p. 74. 
20
 J. Meadowcroft, ‘Taking Issue with UNCED’s Critics’, New Political Economy, 1, (1996), pp. 408 – 
412. 
21
 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, p. 16. 
22
 J. Fomerand, ‘UN Conferences: Media Events or Genuine Diplomacy?’, Global Governance, 2, 
(1996), p. 371. 
23
 M. Pianta, UN World Summits and Civil Society: The State of the Art, (Geneva; UNRISD, 2005), p. 
1; and M. Kaldor, H. Anheier and M. Glasius, ‘Introduction’, in H. Anheier, M. Glasius, and M. Kaldor 
(eds.), Global Civil Society 2004/5, (London; Sage, 2005), p. 13.  
 8 
must resist the division of labour so often proposed to us: individuals can get 
indignant and talk; governments will reflect and act.”24 
Realist and historical perspectives have also drawn attention to the centrality 
of power in international politics, and have provided valuable analytical tools for 
analysing negotiations between competing delegations at summits.25 This rationale 
underpins the approach of many negotiators, diplomats and politicians, whose 
attention is focussed on the power struggles within and between state representatives. 
Thus, according to former British diplomat Tony Brenton, whilst non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) can act as lobbyists and interested parties the “centres of 
decision remain in national capitals.”26 Such a perspective tends to represent summit 
outcomes in terms of victories for particular national or regional interests, such as ‘the 
North’ or ‘the South’.27 In contrast a Foucauldian perspective adopts a broader 
understanding of power as going beyond state-centric, material and sovereign forms, 
drawing attention to the pervasiveness of power relations in the very constitution of 
states, knowledge, experts and authority in global politics. Categories such as ‘North’ 
and ‘South’ which have dominated accounts of environment and development 
conferences are shown to be particular discursive constructions with particular effects, 
rather than objectively existing entities with pre-discursive interests. 
A more critical perspective on summitry is provided by Marxist-influenced 
political economy accounts. From such positions summits are regarded as structures 
(or super-structures) which cement dominant political and economic interests through 
ideological and rhetorical means, creating legitimacy and consent through their nod to 
environmental and development concerns, but doing little to change the material 
                                                 
24
 M. Foucault, ‘Confronting Governments: Human Rights’, in Power, p. 475. 
25
 G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, (Basingstoke; Palgrave, 2005), chapter 11; D. H. 
Dunn, The Lure of Summitry: International Dialogue at the Highest Level, (Leicester; Centre for the 
Study of Diplomacy, 1996); D. H. Dunn, ‘What is Summitry?’ in D. H. Dunn (ed.), Diplomacy at the 
Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry, (Basingstoke; Macmillan, 1996), pp. 3 – 22; J. 
Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis, (Dordrecht; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1988); R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 
International Organization, 42, 3, (1988), pp. 427 – 460; D. Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings that 
Shaped the Twentieth Century, (London; Allen Lane, 2007). 
26
 T. Brenton, The Greening of Machiavelli: The Evolution of International Environmental Politics, 
(London; RIIA and Earthscan, 1994), p. 8. 
27
 A. Najam, ‘Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to 
Participation to Engagement’, International Environmental Agreements, 5, (2005), pp. 303 – 321; A. 
Schroeder, Rio to Jo’burg and Beyond: The World Summit on Sustainable Development, South African 
Institute International Affairs Report #25, (Johannesburg; SAIIA, 2002). 
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balance of power.28 For example, Chatterjee and Finger argued that in 1992 “UNCED 
has co-opted some, divided and destroyed others, and promoted the ones who had the 
money to take advantage of this combined public relations and lobbying exercise.”29 
In a similar vein, Patrick Bond’s conclusion on the WSSD is that it “will be 
remembered, at best, as just another site for UN blahblah, and at worst, as the 
amplification of corporate control over both nature and everyday life.”30 Feminist and 
political ecology critiques have extended this argument, showing how hegemonic 
forms of power and knowledge bound up in UN summits work to suppress women 
and nature as well as the poor.31 Such perspectives have been invaluable in 
highlighting the centrality of power and ideology in global politics, and in focusing on 
the effects of seemingly neutral institutions and discourses. Whilst drawing closely on 
their insights however, a Foucauldian perspective conceptualises the relationship 
between power and resistance somewhat differently. Whereas these critical accounts 
oppose hegemonic (and often, in the last instance, material) forms of power to the 
possibility of liberation or emancipation through revolutionary resistance, Foucault 
was sceptical of this possibility. He argued that “I do not think it is possible to say that 
one thing is of the order of ‘liberation’ and another is of the order of oppression.”32 
This is not to doubt the possibility – even necessity – of resistance and struggle, but 
rather to doubt the ontological possibility of a fundamentally liberated or 
unencumbered human subject. Indeed the free individual subject at the heart of these 
notions of emancipation and liberation is itself a product of techniques of advanced 
liberal government. Providing a Foucauldian perspective on the WSSD thus resists 
interpreting it in terms of dominating global elites suppressing enlightened grassroots 
resistance movements, but rather shows how practices of government and protest 
intersect and overlap in the constitution of global power relations.  
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While there is therefore much of value in these intellectual traditions of 
approaching sustainable development and summitry, this thesis argues that they are 
rooted in particular understandings of power, resistance and politics, with the result 
that certain aspects, dimensions and effects are emphasised and others missed. Whilst 
a Foucauldian approach also inevitably has its biases and omissions, it is shown to 
cast an original and perceptive light on moments like the WSSD, and has much to 
contribute to our understanding of the political effects of the discourse of sustainable 
development. 
 
 
 
Sources and Interviews 
 
A Foucauldian approach does not preclude the utilisation of other 
methodologies and tools since, as Foucault noted, discourse “is so complex a reality 
that we not only can but should approach it at different levels and with different 
methods.”33 The thesis therefore draws on the existing secondary literature on the 
WSSD which, as well as the books by Chasek and Sherman, Middleton and O’Keefe, 
and Munnik and Wilson, includes a number of academic articles.34 This secondary 
literature is supplemented by analysis of both familiar and new primary material – 
reports, statements, speeches, legal texts, position papers, policy documents, 
pamphlets, media coverage, published interviews, websites and reviews – and a large 
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number of semi-structured interviews. This new material is an important dimension of 
the thesis’ originality. 
The analysis of sustainable development is based on a number of key primary 
texts including the 1987 Brundtland Report, Our Common Future; the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN), UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
Worldwide Fund for Nature’s (WWF) 1991 publication Caring for the Earth; and the 
outcomes of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration.35 These 
texts have been chosen because of their authoritative and foundational status, and the 
frequency to which they are referred within the discourse. The analysis of the WSSD 
draws on the extensive documentary output produced throughout the Summit process, 
including official UN records of proceedings from Johannesburg and the preparatory 
meetings in Bali and New York, the outcome texts, speeches delivered by delegations 
and accredited groups and the record of negotiations provided by the Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin. The competing discourses at the WSSD are charted through 
these documents and position papers such as the Danish and South African proposals 
for a new Global Deal.36 Prominent partnerships such as the Johannesburg Climate 
Legacy were analysed through promotional material and the online UN database.37 
These documents were selected for their influence and prominence at the Summit, as 
well as the coherence of their visions for how sustainable development should be 
governed and implemented. The analysis of the protests in Johannesburg tended to 
rely less upon published texts given the often transitory and oppositional nature of the 
demonstrations, analysing instead film footage, media reports, pamphlets, images and 
unpublished minutes. Documents available on the internet are indicated in the 
bibliography, and some unpublished material was obtained from the South African 
History Archive in Johannesburg and private collections. In order to maximise both 
the depth and breadth of the analysis, the conduct of a range of global and local 
organisations who protested at the Summit was included, such as Greenpeace, WWF, 
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Friends of the Earth, the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa 
(WESSA), the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), GroundWork, 
Earthlife Africa, the Social Movements Indaba, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the 
Landless People’s Movement.  
This documentary material was supplemented by 50 semi-structured 
interviews conducted in the UK, South Africa and New York, listed in appendix A. 
From August 2006 to January 2007 research was conducted in Johannesburg, Cape 
Town and Durban, including participant and non-participant observation, small group 
discussions and semi-structured interviews.38 Interviews with UN personnel involved 
in organising the Summit took place in New York in October 2007. A small number 
of phone and email interviews were also conducted. These were elite interviews 
(rather than a representative sample), selected on the basis of participating in the 
Summit preparations, organisation, negotiations, lobbying and/or protests. 
Interviewees included activists, academics, organisers within the UN and the South 
African Government, members of state delegations and negotiators, politicians, trade 
unionists, professionals within the environmental sector and NGOs. Whilst further 
interviews would have doubtlessly contributed fresh perspectives, fifty interviews 
were sufficient to provide a broad and diverse range of details, anecdotes and 
reflections. Given the time and space limitations of the research, the law of 
diminishing returns was applied to the interview process. 
Interviews were structured around a prepared list of questions and topics, 
designed around the specific area of expertise and experience of the interviewee. 
These accordingly varied from interview to interview, but included common 
questions such as ‘What was the most important legacy of the WSSD, in your 
opinion?’, and ‘What is your view of the concept of and prospects for sustainable 
development?’ Interviews were recorded where the interviewee consented, and 
transcripts were prepared from these recordings or from interview notes. The 
transcripts were communicated to interviewees for their comments and clarifications. 
This research is indebted to the openness and frankness of the majority of my 
interviewees, and the ethical implications of this fieldwork were a constant subject of 
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reflection and consideration.39 The variety of interviewees and the triangulation of 
their accounts with primary and secondary sources have enabled their inevitably 
partial and historically distanced memories of the WSSD to be placed in context. The 
manner in which these accounts have brought to life the often dry official records of 
the Summit was invaluable, especially for a researcher who was not present in 
Johannesburg in 2002. 
 
 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
 The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first sets out the theoretical 
approach and the second accounts for the production of sustainable development from 
Stockholm to Johannesburg, whilst chapters three, four and five focus on the WSSD 
itself. Chapter one argues that a Foucauldian perspective on power/knowledge, 
discourse and governmentality entails rethinking some of the binaries that have 
structured conventional political thought: state and civil society, the international and 
the domestic, and power and resistance. It maps out how discourses such as 
sustainable development establish certain views of ‘a problem’ and authorise certain 
actors, techniques and systems of truth as solutions. Drawing on Mitchell Dean’s 
“analytics of government” it establishes a framework for analysing and comparing 
rationalities of government based on the fields of visibility they open up, the regimes 
of knowledge they invoke, the techniques they mobilise and the forms of subjectivity 
and identity they produce.40 In response to claims that Foucauldian discourse theory 
lacks a consciously articulated ethical perspective, chapter one argues that a 
governmentality approach explicitly entails an ethical attitude of criticism and 
politicisation. This is a stance of aiming “to enhance the contestability of regimes of 
authority that seek to govern us in the name of our own good.”41 
Chapter two argues that sustainable development can be understood as a 
Foucauldian discourse, manifested in texts such as the Brundtland Report and Agenda 
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21 and at moments such as the Stockholm and Rio conferences. It argues that 
interpreting sustainable development as a discourse, rather than as a precise concept 
or mystifying ideology, shows how it makes some things visible and others invisible, 
and how it empowers certain experts and forms of truth, mobilises concrete practices 
and techniques and produces particular authoritative actors and subjects. Whilst it is a 
discourse with many different articulations and internal tensions, what unites these 
different visions of sustainable development is that they have a common rationality of 
government – they all attempt to ensure the proper conduct necessary to secure a 
sustainable future. Rather than explicitly chart the evolution of the concept, this 
chapter shows how eco-governmentality analyses have highlighted the disciplinary 
and bio-political continuities within the discourse.42 Building on these approaches 
chapter two argues that sustainable development also entails productive, subject-
creating and politically ambiguous power relations, and points towards how such 
perspectives could be extended in the light of the WSSD. 
 Chapter three turns to the Johannesburg Summit, and argues that the 
negotiations can be understood as contests between competing rationalities of 
government: the disciplinary and bio-political visions of government embodied in 
proposals for a new Global Deal, and the advanced liberal governmentality of the 
Type II voluntary partnership approach. More than simply disagreements over forms 
of implementation, these approaches rested upon fundamentally different attitudes 
toward the purposes, means and ends of government. The eventual Summit outcomes 
were clearly weighted toward an advanced liberal rationality of government which 
relied upon the voluntary and responsible conduct of self-selecting partners operating 
at a distance from traditional centres of power. This framing produced particular 
political effects, such as focussing sustainable development on a narrow and de-
contextualised vision of poverty eradication and on successful partnerships rather than 
broader structural issues, the prioritisation of scientific and technical forms of 
knowledge and risk assessment, and the empowerment of partners based on their 
effectiveness and expertise, rather than more politically democratic, socially just or 
ecologically sustainable criteria. The need to demonstrate auditable success through 
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compartmentalised partnerships militates against solving complex structural 
problems, such as climate change, poverty and gender inequality, in favour of isolated 
technical solutions, such as carbon credits and trading, technology transfers and 
quotas for major group participation. By highlighting these effects this chapter seeks 
to re-politicise a sustainable development discourse that has been increasingly framed 
in terms of partnership, consensus and efficiency. 
 Chapter four directs attention toward the significance of the theatrical 
performance of sustainable development at the WSSD. Modern summits must be 
understood as more than just institutional techniques for producing negotiated 
outcomes, and their processes, rituals, symbolism and choreography all have political 
effects. Inspired by Clifford Geertz’s work on the theatre-state in nineteenth century 
Bali, this chapter argues that the WSSD can be read as a form of political theatre in 
which Johannesburg was an “exemplary centre” that projected a particular order and 
way of governing far beyond the immediate environs of the Summit itself, illustrating 
“the power of grandeur to organize the world.”43 As such it contributes to an 
understanding of the mechanisms by which advanced liberal government operates at a 
distance and through the creation of responsible, self-governing subjects. These 
mechanisms include the mobilisation of public relations strategies, brand management 
and advertising, and the empowerment of a new and diverse cast of actors for 
sustainable development, including international institutions, NGOs, businesses, as 
well as the familiar leading players in international politics, states and their 
representatives. The WSSD is thus part of a shift from state-centric to more 
polyvalent and dispersed models of governance.44 This is not to argue that states have 
been eclipsed as political actors, however, and South Africa, in particular, used the 
Summit stage with great success to perform its national brand as ‘the negotiating 
capital of the world’ and the ‘custodians of sustainable development’. Rather, the 
ways in which states and state institutions function within broader assemblages of 
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governance is changing. Through schemes such as the Johannesburg Climate Legacy 
initiative businesses and private actors have been inserted into these regimes of 
governance, becoming reconfigured as central actors for sustainable development 
through their ability to stimulate “change in behaviours and attitudes of peoples 
around the world.”45  
 Chapter five introduces a note of dissension in the hitherto relatively smooth 
extension of advanced liberal government at the WSSD. The Summit was also the 
occasion for heated protests, dissent and clashes on the streets of Johannesburg, and 
this chapter argues that these are essential to any analysis of the political effects of the 
WSSD and sustainable development. By viewing these protests as examples of what 
Foucault terms “counter-conducts” – struggles “against the processes implemented for 
conducting others” – rather than as instances of ‘pure’ resistance, it is possible to 
show how they simultaneously subverted and reinforced modes of advanced liberal 
government.46 As such this chapter reflects the way Foucault showed how “the history 
of the governmental ratio, and the history of the counter-conducts opposed to it, are 
inseparable from each other.”47 Yet the political effects of the forms of resistance 
adopted were significant. Whilst groups like Greenpeace, Earthlife Africa and 
Groundwork managed to successfully negotiate the relationship between resistance 
and partnership at the Summit, others who contested the rationality of consensus and 
partnership more vociferously found themselves beyond the limits of not only Summit 
politics but also the dominant framing of democratic politics in South Africa. The 
limits of advanced liberal government were accordingly revealed, and groups like the 
Landless People’s Movement and the EJNF were variously vilified, marginalised or 
repressed at the WSSD and thereafter. These events confirmed that in order to 
participate in the politics of sustainable development as legitimate actors, discourses 
of cooperative partnership and consensus had to be observed. 
The thesis conclusion therefore shows how the WSSD re-orientated the 
discourse of sustainable development toward forms of advanced liberal 
governmentality; demonstrates how summits operate as techniques of exemplary 
government; and highlights how the political status of participants and protestors was 
decided according to norms of partnership and consensus. It situates the political 
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effects of the WSSD in the context of broader power relationships and the global 
politics of environment and development, concluding that the WSSD worked to make 
politically sustainable (perhaps only temporarily) a global order which is manifestly 
unsustainable, whilst also providing opportunities for the status quo to be protested 
and resisted. Whilst the partnership approach threatens the compartmentalisation of 
the broader sustainable development discourse, it has also politicised its 
implementation by provoking myriad protests and demonstrations. As such this thesis 
contributes not only to our understanding of the WSSD and summitry, the evolution 
of the discourse of sustainable development, and the politics of resistance in South 
Africa, but also to broader debates about the radical or counter-cultural potential of 
sustainable development politics.48  
This concern with the role and future of critical environmentalism is a timely 
one. It is commonly accepted that environmental degradation and social inequalities 
present significant problems in many parts of the world, and that progress on 
resolving them has been slow or non-existent.49 The UN Resolution mandating the 
WSSD noted with deep concern that 
 
despite the many successful and continuing efforts of the international community 
since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment … and the fact that 
some progress has been achieved, the environment and the natural resource base that 
support life on earth continue to deteriorate at an alarming rate.50 
 
Paradoxically however, this trend of worsening environmental degradation has been 
paralleled by increasing global environmental awareness, concern and political 
activism. As such Wapner has argued that the Johannesburg Summit signalled a 
disjuncture between rising public support for environmental agendas and falling 
effectiveness of environmental movements in challenging contemporary ways of life, 
indicating that “environmentalism, as a reliable public sensibility, is itself in 
trouble.”51 For Ingolfur Blühdorn and Ian Welsh, the discourse of sustainable 
development has been deeply implicated in this disjuncture, playing a key role “in 
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obtaining the status of a ‘non-controversial public concern’ for the environment.”52 
The blunting of the radical potential of the earlier ecological movements through their 
insertion within mainstream political culture implies that we have entered an era of 
what they call “post-ecologism.”53 This era, they assert, demands new lines of 
enquiry, including: “How do advanced modern capitalist consumer democracies try 
and manage to sustain what is known to be unsustainable?”54 In the context of this 
evolving debate around the counter-cultural potential of the environmental agenda this 
thesis shows how the WSSD functions as a technique for sustaining the unsustainable, 
whilst also throwing such techniques into question. Whereas many have argued that 
the concept of sustainable development and its integration into the processes of UN 
diplomacy have neutralised the radicalism of environmental movements, this thesis 
argues that it is always possible to destabilise conventionally accepted 
understandings, to problematise the ways in which the government of conduct is 
attempted, and to politicise and re-radicalise the politics of environment and 
development. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Power, Discourse, Government:  
A Foucauldian perspective on Sustainable Development and Summitry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The political vocabulary structured by oppositions 
between state and civil society, public and private, 
government and market, coercion and consent, 
sovereignty and autonomy and the like, does not 
adequately characterise the diverse ways in which rule 
is exercised in advanced liberal democracies. 
 
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, 1992 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The Johannesburg Summit was a complex, multi-layered event, and there are 
many ways in which it can be approached. This chapter argues that a Foucauldian 
perspective highlights different facets to other theoretical approaches. Such a 
perspective questions many of the binaries which have conventionally structured 
political thought: the domestic and international, the state and civil society, power and 
freedom, government and resistance. 
The chapter proceeds by explaining how Michel Foucault used and defined the 
concepts of power/knowledge, discourse, and governmentality, and demonstrates their 
implications for concepts such as civil society, summitry, and political resistance. 
These concepts provide the tools for a Foucauldian analysis of the politics of 
sustainable development and a methodological approach for the thesis which, drawing 
on the framework established by Mitchell Dean, analyses rationalities of government 
according to the field of visibility they establish, the regimes of knowledge they 
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invoke, the techniques and technologies they mobilise and the subjectivities and 
identities they produce.2 
The fundamental reason for employing a Foucauldian approach is a desire to 
understand sustainable development as something more than a neutral concept or 
scientific term employed on behalf of the public good, but also to avoid reducing it to 
an ideological mystification or piece of cynical hypocrisy that merely entrenches 
existing power relationships. It is mobilised by a desire to examine what sustainable 
development and the WSSD actually do, and how they fit into contemporary relations 
of power and government. It is not enough merely to bemoan the failure of 
sustainable development summits to solve environmental and development problems 
– it is important to also ask what is served or produced by their failure, and how they 
structure global politics in certain ways.3 A more sophisticated understanding of the 
mutually constitutive interaction between forms of knowledge and relationships of 
power is therefore required, as is a scepticism to starkly binary accounts which oppose 
power to resistance, and ‘Truth’ to ideology.  
 
 
 
Power/knowledge 
 
The relationship between truth, power and knowledge is at the heart of a 
Foucauldian approach. Foucault argued that “‘truth’ is linked in a circular relation 
with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it 
induces and which extend it”; thus “truth is already power.”4 In Discipline and Punish 
he argued that we should try to rid ourselves of the idea that true knowledge can only 
exist in the absence of power, and that power corrupts knowledge. He suggested that 
 
we should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by 
encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that 
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power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that 
does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.5 
 
This formulation of the mutually dependent relationship between knowledge and 
power provides the basis for a Foucauldian approach to sustainable development. 
There are two implications which stem from this. First, we can reject the somewhat 
simplistic assumption that sustainable development is a scientifically objective 
transcendental ‘Truth’, free from entanglement in power relations. Secondly, a note of 
caution is sounded with respect to more sophisticated ideological interpretations 
which apparently oppose the hypocritical or misleading ‘truth’ of sustainable 
development to deeper ‘Truths’ about society and politics. As an example of the 
latter, in Neil Middleton and Phil O’Keefe’s study, Redefining Sustainable 
Development, they “look at the ways in which the word [sustainable development] is 
used by theorists and practitioners in development and at some of the principal 
agendas these uses conceal.”6 In their chapter entitled ‘Polite Meaningless Words’ 
they set out how linguistic strategies on behalf of transnational capital have reinforced 
existing power relations, arguing that controlling elites “tinker with our 
consciousness” in order to conceal their real agendas, and conclude that sustainable 
development “is often used to conceal a disagreeable reality.”7 
A Foucauldian perspective throws doubt on these positivist claims to directly 
access reality or identify more fundamental truths, since these forms of knowledge are 
always produced by and through particular power relationships.8 For many 
environmentalists, for example, it is a basic truth that the Earth is a closed system 
with finite limits to growth, yet the discourse of sustainable development counter-
poses the truth that human ingenuity has the potential to extend those limits and create 
new resources. That both of these assertions are, within their own regimes of 
power/knowledge, “in the true” as Foucault would say, implies that there is no 
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overarching or fundamental ‘Truth’ on which all else depends.9 Thus the analysis of a 
discourse, for Foucault, “does not question things said as to what they are hiding, 
what they were ‘really’ saying … it is a description of things said, precisely as they 
were said.”10 As Roxanne Lynne Doty explains, the task is “not deciphering the texts 
to get at the true intentions of the authors”, but rather, texts “are intertexts linked with 
a wide array of discourses and representational practices … In this sense, the meaning 
and significance of the texts cannot be limited to the purposes and intentions of the 
authors.”11 
 This is often described as a post-positivist epistemological perspective, which 
asserts that reality as such is unknowable except through the meaning we ascribe it.12 
Whilst conventional approaches treat language as a “transparent” link between 
thoughts and things, poststructuralists treat language as “opaque”, incapable of 
illuminating any deeper truth or reality.13 Instead of directly studying unmediated 
reality, social science inevitably studies various representations of reality, including 
language, art, institutional structures and conceptual frameworks.14 
Contrary to the claims of skeptical detractors, this is not to deny the existence 
of reality. Clearly things happen independently of thought and representation, but 
even ‘natural’ events like global warming or species extinction are unknowable 
except through the meanings we ascribe them.15 Whether they are understood as acts 
of God, arbitrary natural phenomena, or the result of man-made climate change is due 
to socially and discursively constructed structures of meaning.  
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These structures of meaning both produce, and are produced by, relationships 
of power. Power relations are central to the Foucauldian approach; indeed he 
famously asserted that “power is everywhere.”16 Foucault’s approach to power is 
markedly different from the way it is conventionally used to imply a capacity or 
strength possessed by a particular actor. For Foucault, “power is not a substance … 
Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals … The characteristic 
feature of power is that some men can more or less entirely determine other men’s 
conduct – but never exhaustively or coercively.”17 Power is “a set of actions on 
possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult” – it 
is the “‘conduct of conducts’ and a management of possibilities.”18 In The History of 
Sexuality Foucault explains that, 
 
by power, I do not mean ‘Power’ as a group of institutions and mechanisms that 
ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, 
either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. 
Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group 
over another.19 
 
Rather, power is “the multiplicity of force relations” in a certain sphere, characterised 
by the strategies, tactics, manoeuvres and struggles that social relationships involve.20 
Thus “power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength 
we are endowed with; it is a name one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society.”21 Power is not something that is possessed, located or transferred, 
“it must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather a something which only 
functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s 
hands.”22 Whilst power clearly has effects, and the field of power relations favours 
some and disadvantages others, Foucault cautions that “this does not mean that 
[power] results from the choice or decision of an individual subject; let us not look for 
the headquarters that presides over its rationality.”23  
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This view of power as a relationship rather than a substance is central to the 
Foucauldian approach, and explains the claim that power is everywhere. Power is 
everywhere because any type of society is suffused with and constituted by power 
relationships. Thus “relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect 
to other types of relationship (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual 
relationships), but are immanent in the latter.”24 As a result, Foucault’s view of power 
questions the opposition between power and freedom; it is impossible, according to 
Foucault, to dissolve or escape power relations entirely. 
Some regard this pervasiveness of power as a depressing and pessimistic 
element of Foucault’s thought.25 However, one of Foucault’s most important 
reformulations of the concept of power was to deny the repressive hypothesis: the 
notion that power only works to dominate, discipline and limit.26 He argued that this 
is a very limited view and that power must also be understood as productive, since it 
“induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.”27 For example, in The 
History of Sexuality he showed how, from the seventeenth century, discourses 
produced certain forms of sexuality, both norms and deviations.28 It is the productive 
element of power that allows us to see it at work far beyond relations of domination 
and repression, and even within liberal practices of freedom and civic participation. 
The production of the free, rational, individual subject is a result of certain power 
relationships, just as the production of the medieval serf or classical slave was the 
result of specific power relationships. 
It is in this respect that the Foucauldian view of power differs most 
dramatically from the ways it is most commonly used in political theory. Barry 
Hindess has shown how Steven Lukes’ three views of power – the power to achieve 
something against open resistance; the power to covertly determine the political 
agenda; and “instances of the exercise of power in which its victims fail even to 
recognise that their real interests are at risk, and consequently make no attempt to 
defend those interests” – all depend upon a view of power as a capacity possessed by 
pre-constituted actors.29 Similarly, Marxist and Gramscian views of power and 
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hegemony, where the oppressed consent because they cannot perceive their 
oppression, also rely upon seeing power as capacity.30 In contrast a Foucauldian 
conception of power as a strategic game, as a set of relations, allows for a productive 
view of power in which actors’ subject positions, interests and identities are produced 
through power relations.31 
Foucault’s historical work famously investigated the forms of knowledge and 
power relations by which particular subjects such as ‘the mad’, ‘the sexual deviant’, 
and ‘the criminal’ were produced.32 Such an attitude towards subjectivity is one of the 
key insights which, for Jenny Edkins, allow the “de-centering of the subject” in 
poststructuralist political theory, a move which rejects the idea of a sovereign, unified 
human subject, pre-existing discourse.33 As a result, identity is viewed as relational 
and discursively constructed, rather than pre-given, timeless and fixed. This applies to 
both individual identities as well as the identities of international actors such as states, 
and Jutta Weldes, for example, has shown how “the US” is created as a political 
subject with a “national interest” through discursive forms of power.34 One 
implication of this is that the familiar agent/structure debate with respect to power is 
displaced. For Foucault, power both creates and works through individuals and 
structures, since “the individual which power has constituted is at the same time its 
vehicle.”35 As Doty explains, “both agency and structural understandings of power 
presuppose that agents and structures exist prior to power, rather than themselves 
being effects of power.”36  
  Bringing a Foucauldian perspective on power/knowledge to bear on 
sustainable development enables an analysis of the ways in which new actors, 
relationships and regimes of knowledge are produced and resisted. Rather than a 
neutral concept to be utilised by certain actors for instrumental purposes – or an 
ideological strategy deployed to mystify and obscure the exploitation of particular 
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classes – a Foucauldian perspective on power argues that the discourse of sustainable 
development has particular effects, and produces new forms of knowledge and 
political agency.  
 
 
 
Discourse 
 
Formations of power/knowledge such as sustainable development are referred 
to by Foucault as discourses, and they constitute certain ways of thinking about, 
representing and acting upon the world. Within discourses particular things are made 
visible and others invisible, ‘truths’ are created and regimes of knowledge established, 
practices and technologies are concretised and subjects are produced. For Foucault, 
“discursive practices are characterised by the demarcation of a field of objects, by the 
definition of a legitimate perspective for a subject of knowledge, by the setting of 
norms for elaborating concepts and themes.”37 Discourses are thus more than just 
language or words; they are systems of representation that produce meaning itself.38 
Foucault famously described discourses as “practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak.”39 Discourse, knowledge and power are all inextricably 
linked and mutually re-producing. As he explained, “discourse is not simply that 
which translates struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and 
by which there is a struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized.”40 
Foucault’s concept of discourse is however somewhat enigmatic, and in his 
work he admitted he had treated the concept in different ways at different times, 
“sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable 
group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain 
number of statements.”41 Yet, when pressed, he defined discourse as “the group of 
statements that belong to a single system of formation.”42 Central to this notion of a 
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discursive statement is the question of who is speaking, who is qualified or has the 
right to speak through that discourse. Foucault noted that  
 
medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, their efficacy, even their 
therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, their existence as medical statements 
cannot be disassociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to make 
them, and to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and death.43  
 
As Robert Young explains, Foucauldian statements “are both events and things, as 
well as pieces of language.”44 The idea of a statement to the police captures this – it 
consists of language, but acquires its meaning through its location and the institutional 
setting. Thus discourses are constituted through texts, authoritative actors, forms of 
knowledge and prioritised sites and institutions. As Arturo Escobar makes clear, 
“discourse is not just words … Discourse is not the expression of thought: it is a 
practice, with conditions, rules and historical transformations.”45 The development 
discourse, for example, “results in concrete practices of thinking and acting through 
which the Third World is produced.”46 
Discourses such as development coexist and compete with multiple other 
discourses and our overall world-view is therefore a product of multiple and varied 
discourses interacting, clashing, overlapping and fracturing. This plurality has been 
termed the “play of practice” or, for Foucault, the “tactical polyvalence of 
discourses.”47 As such, according to Doty, discourses 
 
are constituted by other discourses that are themselves also open, inherently unstable, 
and always in the process of being articulated. This understanding of discourse 
implies an overlapping quality to different discourses. Any fixing of a discourse and 
the identities that are constructed by it can only be of a partial nature. It is the 
overflowing and incomplete nature of discourse that opens up spaces for change, 
discontinuity, and variation.48 
 
It is this element of radical plurality within discursive fields that militates against the 
tendency to attribute an overly restrictive, dominating or oppressive logic to 
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Foucauldian discourse theory. Young notes that even an individual “discourse rarely 
possesses a set of concepts that form a logical totality or coherent whole; its concepts, 
moreover, are not static but always changing, in a state of transformation.”49  
Despite this, some have read Foucauldian discourses as unitary, monolithic 
and impenetrable.50 John Dryzek, for example, interprets Foucault as seeing 
discourses as “mostly oppressive”, and as denying the possibility of counter-
hegemonic discourses and spaces for resistance.51 He suggests an alternative reading 
of discourse as “powerful” but “not impenetrable.”52 Such a reading of Foucault 
imputes to individual discourses an overly oppressive status, as well as missing out on 
the dynamic tension within discourses between the ever-present possibility of 
resistance, and the fact that subjectivities – the positions from which resistance is 
thinkable and possible – are themselves products of discourses and power 
relationships. Certainly, when it comes to specific discourses, such as sustainable 
development, a Foucauldian perspective does not imply a monolithic or hegemonic 
totality that denies the possibility of resistance. In The Archaeology of Knowledge 
Foucault stressed that his approach differed from conventional approaches to the 
history of ideas in that “the history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its 
progressive refinement”, but rather is one of discontinuity, rupture and contingency.53 
Furthermore, he made it clear that “it was possible for men [sic], within the same 
discursive practice, to speak of different objects, to have contrary opinions, to make 
contradictory choices.”54 Purvis and Hunt agree that “discourses ‘channel’ rather than 
‘control’ the discursive possibilities, facilitating some things being said and others 
impeded.”55 And as Milliken observes, “the open-endedness and instability of 
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discourses means that they are liable to slip and slide into new relationships via 
resistances that their articulation and operationalisation may engender.”56  
This account of Foucauldian discourse theory is similar to sophisticated 
articulations of the Gramscian-derived concept of ideology within Marxist theory, 
where ideological structures form the background to our experiences of the world.57 
However, Purvis and Hunt note that the Marxist concept of ideology goes beyond this 
positive ‘world-view’ to a more critical claim which asserts not only that “all thought 
is socially constructed – which is true but insufficient”, but that “ideology exhibits a 
directionality in the sense that ideology always works to favour some and to 
disadvantage others.”58 Whilst discourses also can be said to have ‘directionality’, and 
certainly have a constitutive role in power relationships, it is here that ideological 
approaches can tend towards notions of false consciousness or mystification. Foucault 
was reluctant to use the concept of ideology as it appeared to rest on three problematic 
assumptions. First, ideology “always stands in virtual opposition to something else 
which is supposed to count as the Truth.”59 Secondly, it relies upon an individual 
human subject, pre-existing discourse and power relations, able to manipulate and 
purposively deploy ideology. Thirdly, “ideology stands in a secondary position 
relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic 
determinant.”60 For Foucault, discourse is not merely the ideological manifestation or 
legitimisation of material structures, and it has a constitutive and determinative role in 
producing social reality. 
 This thesis approaches sustainable development as a Foucauldian discourse 
which represents issues and problems in a certain way, authorises and establishes 
certain forms of knowledge, is made manifest in particular techniques and 
technologies, and produces particular subjects. Discourses have particular effects and 
structure power relationships in certain ways. In so doing this thesis is situated in 
relationship to a growing body of Foucauldian-influenced work in political and 
international studies, within which seminal texts have analyzed the discourses of, 
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among others, colonialism, development, South African Apartheid, Orientalism, 
International Relations theory and United States foreign policy.61 A growing body of 
work has also emerged applying Foucauldian discourse theory in some form to the 
analysis of environmental politics.62 
 
 
 
Governmentality 
 
The specific form of discourse analysis deployed in this thesis focuses on the 
Foucauldian concept of governmentality. Foucault’s historical work investigated the 
different formations and rationalities of power/knowledge and discourse in various 
periods of history – specifically through the discourses of criminality, sexuality, and 
madness. Through these analyses Foucault came to argue that there were three central, 
co-existing but distinct, historical forms of power: sovereign or juridical power, 
disciplinary power, and governmental power.63  
The first of these is that associated with the law, the highest executive power, 
and the right of the sovereign to take life, power as seizure.64 It works through the 
prohibition – “you must not kill, you must not steal” – and the subsequent 
punishment.65 Sovereign power was rarely absolute as even a divinely-appointed ruler 
was expected to rule wisely, but its ultimate justification was the security and safety 
of the ruler or the state. This is the raison d’etat of Machiavelli’s prince.66 In its more 
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modern form, Foucault explains, sovereign or juridical power is “exercised mainly as 
a means of deduction, a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the 
wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labour and blood, levied on the 
subjects.”67 
Since the classical and medieval ages, Foucault argued, this deductive form of 
power has become merely one means among many and is no longer the primary 
expression of power. Wars, taxes and the death penalty still exist, but they are no 
longer primarily justified through raison d’etat. Beginning in the seventeenth century 
new forms of power emerged which sought primarily to “foster life” rather than take 
it.68 Disciplinary forms of power were focussed on regulating and structuring the 
actions of individual bodies, whilst bio-political forms of power operated at the level 
of the population or species-body.69 Famously Foucault showed how the criminal 
justice system produced disciplined and docile individual bodies through powerful 
surveillance techniques such as Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon.70 
The third form of power, governmental power, emerged in the eighteenth 
century in Europe and worked to regulate the “conduct of conduct” and ensure “the 
right disposition of things”, rather than rule directly over territory or bodies.71 The 
‘conduct of conduct’ implies the shaping or guiding of possible actions; according to 
Foucault “to govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of 
others.”72 Foucault termed this form of power “governmentality”, or the rationality of 
government.73 Government is used in its broadest sense here as ‘the conduct of 
conduct’, which during the sixteenth century was applied to the regulation of oneself 
(morality), of souls and lives (pastoral religion), of children (pedagogy), of the family 
(economy), as well as of the state (politics).74 ‘Government’ is therefore defined by 
Dean as  
 
any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of 
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, 
that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and 
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beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable 
consequences, effects and outcomes.75 
 
Rather than replacing sovereign or disciplinary power, these forms were re-articulated 
within a governmental rationality to form a triangle: “sovereignty, discipline, and 
governmental management, which has population as its main target and apparatuses 
of security as its essential mechanism.”76 
The analysis of governmentality was in part a response to the Marxist critique 
that Foucault’s work on disciplinary mechanisms failed to account for macro-political 
structures.77 Instead of focussing on specific injunctions, laws and punishments, or 
centralised surveillance and disciplinary techniques, a governmentality analysis 
addressed how certain forms of power sought to influence the conduct of free subjects 
“at a distance” through the advice of experts and the establishment of particular 
norms.78 Government at a distance is predicated upon encouraging and facilitating the 
self-government of others, and is a form of rule that “seeks to establish institutional 
spaces – government departments, community organisations, service deliverers – as 
self-managing local centres”, governed according to formal standards of 
accountability and conduct.79 For Foucault this marked a clear break from earlier 
forms of power since  
 
whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and gets its instruments from itself 
in the form of law, the end of government is internal to the things it directs; it is to be 
sought in the perfection, maximimisation, or intensification of the processes it 
directs, and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than 
laws.80 
 
Therefore the purpose of a governmental rationality is the welfare of the population 
itself – “to increase its wealth, its longevity and its health” – rather than the security 
of the state or sovereign; and the tools of government are immanent to the population, 
including measures to stimulate the birth rate or provide incentives for investment or 
migration to certain regions or activities.81  
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 This approach to government clearly draws on the ideas of liberal economists 
such as Adam Smith. Foucault explained that, within such a governmental rationality 
of power, 
 
it will be necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to laisser faire, in other words to 
manage and no longer to control through rules and regulations. The essential 
objective of this management will be not so much to prevent things as to ensure that 
the necessary and natural regulations work, or even to create regulations that enable 
natural regulations to work. Natural phenomena will have to be framed in such a way 
that they do not veer off course, or in such a way that clumsy, arbitrary, and blind 
intervention does not make them veer off course. The fundamental objective of 
governmentality will be mechanisms of security, or let’s say, it will be state 
intervention with the essential function of ensuring the security of the natural 
phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to the population.82 
 
This notion of laisser faire is predicated upon the liberal assumption that state power 
needs certain limitations. The spheres of both civil society and the economy are 
regarded as inherently self-governing and self-sustaining, and just need governmental 
oversight rather than direct intervention; this is the creation of ‘regulations that enable 
natural regulations to work’. Thus a governmentality analysis draws attention to the 
establishment of the economy and civil society as autonomous spheres of self-
government in modern forms of rule, beyond the necessity of direct and constant state 
intervention. At the heart of both these spheres is the modern, rational, free individual. 
Free citizens are thus vehicle for governmental forms of power; as Rose makes clear, 
“to govern is to presuppose the freedom of the governed.”83 
As such the extension of centralised sovereign state power directly over 
society and the economy is viewed as irrational within a governmental rationality of 
power, not because it is an abuse of power as such, but rather it is “ignorance of how 
to govern properly.”84 On these lines Hindess explains how the free market functions 
as a powerful metaphor for good government.  
 
In Foucault’s view, what particularly distinguishes liberalism from governmental 
rationalities of other kinds is its commitment to governing as far as possible through 
the promotion of certain kinds of free activity and the cultivation among the 
governed of suitable habits of self-regulation. According to this account, the image of 
the market is emblematic: it is seen by liberalism as a decentralised mechanism of 
government that operates at two rather different levels. At the first and most 
immediate level, individuals are thought to be governed, at least in part, by the 
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reactions of others with whom they interact and, at least among more civilised 
peoples, their interactions are normally expected to take a peaceful form – the market 
itself providing the most obvious example. … Secondly, over the longer term, 
interaction with others is thought to influence the internal standards that individuals 
use to regulate their own behaviour – by affecting, for example, their sense of good 
and bad conduct, of what is acceptable or unacceptable in particular contexts, and so 
on.85 
  
Similarly Graham Burchell notes that modern forms of governmentality are “a 
question of extending a model of rational economic conduct beyond the economy 
itself, of generalising it as a principle for both limiting and rationalising government 
activity.”86  
As such the form of power Foucault identified as governmentality is closely 
linked to the emergence of neo-liberal political and economic philosophies in the late 
twentieth century. Both neo-liberal and governmental forms of power are wary of 
overly interventionist government, they both rely upon the rational self-government of 
individuals within a suitable framework, and they both support the extension of 
market principles to politics and civic life. As McCarthy and Prudham describe it, 
neo-liberalism is premised on extending the market as a governing principle for life, 
rolling-back the state, and on “shifts from binding to increasingly voluntarist, neo-
corporatist regulatory frameworks involving non-binding standards and rules, public-
private co-operation, self-regulation, and greater participation from citizen 
coalitions.”87 This particular insertion of neo-liberalism within a governmental 
rationality of power is referred to here as advanced liberal governmentality. Thus 
advanced liberal government is not synonymous with neo-liberalism, since, as Dean 
notes, “while neo-liberalism might be characterised as the dominant contemporary 
rationality of government, it is found within a field of contestation in which there are 
multiple rationalities of government and a plurality of varieties of neo-liberalism.”88 
The broad field of modern rule across considerable swathes of the globe is 
characterised as advanced liberal government, within which competing neo-liberal, 
conservative, radical and communitarian rationalities co-exist. 
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The freedom of the economic sphere within advanced liberal forms of 
government is paralleled and mirrored by the freedom of civil society. Civil society is 
constructed through the empowerment of free, responsible and self-governing subjects 
at a distance from central institutions of rule. Subjects are produced who will live 
their lives according to the advice of doctors, social workers, teachers, psychologists, 
fertility experts and urban planners. Nikolas Rose describes how liberal rule relies 
upon “technologies of responsibilisation.”89 Thus 
 
to be free, in this modern sense, is to be attached to a polity whose certain civilised 
modes of conducting ones existence are identified as normal, and simultaneously to 
be bound to those ‘engineers of the human soul’ who will define the norm and tutor 
individuals as to the ways of living that will accomplish normality.90 
 
In this respect, “power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens 
as of ‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom.”91 
One of the effects of a governmentality analysis is to highlight the constructed 
nature of the liberal division between the state and civil society. Much of political 
theory has relied on this separation, with states representing the public and political 
realm whilst civil society inhabits the private realm of voluntary association.92 For 
Cohen and Arato civil society is a space of potentially “unconstrained discussion”, 
consensus and social justice.93 Similarly John Keane has described global civil society 
as being non-governmental (i.e. non-state, for Keane, but including profit-seeking 
businesses, individuals, families, ethnic and religious identities) and marked by 
“civility” and “respect for others expressed as politeness towards and acceptance of 
strangers.”94 On the other hand, a more critical, Gramscian perspective on civil 
society draws attention to how it can act as a bulwark for the state, as well as being 
the source of resistance.95 As Robert Cox explains, “civil society, in Gramsci’s 
thinking, is the realm in which the existing social order is grounded; and it can also be 
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the realm in which a new social order can be founded.”96 This perspective sees civil 
society as more contested, and less characterised by ‘civility’.  
Further developing this Gramscian conception in which civil society is 
potentially inserted within hegemonic structures, a Foucauldian governmentality 
perspective shows how ‘government’ in the broadest sense is a function of multiple 
social actors, both state and non-state. It suggests that, rather than a unitary actor, ‘the 
state’ is actually a constellation of different governmental practices, technologies and 
sites.97 Charities, trade unions, research institutes, schools, religious bodies, the print 
and broadcast media, industry regulators and so on all also govern through the 
conduct of conduct. ‘The state’ and ‘civil society’ are not therefore ontologically 
separate categories, but are the product of particular power relations. In modern forms 
of governmental power they are both agents of self-government and the government 
of others. As Rose and Miller explain,  
 
diverse parts are played in technologies of rule by the political actors who hold 
elected office, make authoritative pronouncements as to policy and priorities, create 
legislation and get it enacted, calculate national budgets, raise taxes and adjust their 
levels and incidence, disburse benefits, give grants to industry and charities, 
command and direct bureaucratic staffs, set up regulatory bodies and organisations of 
all sorts, and, in certain cases, set in action the legitimate use of violence.98 
 
Rather than a sovereign centre of power, a governmentality perspective draws 
attention to how government and the conduct of conduct is carried out at a distance by 
a multiplicity of actors transgressing conventional barriers such as state/non-state and 
international/domestic.  
 Given this orientation, a governmentality perspective is well-suited to 
capturing the complex heterogeneity of the ways rule is exercised in many post-
colonial societies, despite its evolution within European political thought.99 In much 
of the world the sovereign, centralised and impartial state is even more of an 
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abstraction than it is in Europe or North America, and rule is exercised through a 
diverse and transnational constellation of international donors, foreign banks, aid 
agencies, multinational corporations, local civic and church groups, elite patrons and 
state institutions.100 In contemporary African politics, for example, Chabal and Daloz 
note the constant “interpenetration” or “straddling” of the state and civil society 
spheres, and Comaroff and Comaroff view any narrow, formal distinctions between 
state and society, private and public as “a cheerful illusion.”101 As a result the 
governmentality perspective aptly captures the way in which, as Jean-François Bayart 
has noted,  
 
the postcolonial state operates as a rhizome rather than a root system … it is not one-
dimensional, formed around a single genetic trunk … It is rather an infinitely variable 
multiplicity of networks whose underground branches join together the scattered 
points of society.102 
 
Similarly, in post-Apartheid South Africa Ran Greenstein explains that “the conflict 
between two mutually exclusive and internally homogeneous camps has given way to 
the interpenetration of partially opposing and partially collaborating forces, which are 
internally heterogeneous.”103 
A governmentality perspective can also be applied to contemporary forms of 
power relations which extend beyond nation-state boundaries.104 The conduct of 
conduct and rule through a diverse multiplicity of actors and sites is just as much a 
feature of global power relations as it is within the domestic realm; indeed a 
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governmentality perspective throws such distinctions between national and 
international into question.105 A developing field of study has thus taken up Wendy 
Larner and William Walters’ “challenge of relating governmentality to the 
international, the global and the supra-national.”106 Examples of detailed studies 
include analyses of how governance is exercised by and through actors including 
international institutions like the UN, World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Bank, 
and International Monetary Fund, international NGOs and social movements, states 
with varying capacities, regional organisations, scientific bodies, transnational 
businesses and industry bodies and so on, as well as through discourses of corporate 
social responsibility, humanitarian intervention, democracy and ‘good governance’, 
and international partnerships.107  
This orientation towards global governmentality has much in common with 
the larger field of ‘global governance’ studies.108 According to Dingwerth and 
Pattberg, “the study of global governance acknowledges that a plethora of forms of 
social organisation and political decision-making exist that are neither directed toward 
the state nor emanate from it”, and that “local, national, regional, and global political 
processes are inseparably linked.”109 Foundationally in this field James Rosenau 
famously described these new patterns of global rule as “governance without 
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government.”110 According to Rosenau, the rise of non-state actors and transnational 
issues such as globalised finance and environmental degradation has diminished the 
governance capacities of nation-states.111 An increased role for NGOs or transnational 
corporations is regarded as a loss of power or erosion of state sovereignty. Nation-
states are now rarely, it is claimed, the final arbiters of global politics.112 
Yet the global governance literature has tended to inadequately address the 
role of power in international politics, either ignoring it or reducing power to a zero-
sum struggle between states and non-state actors for material resources or sovereign 
authority.113 Sending and Neumann identify three further limitations of the global 
governance literature which a governmentality perspective can help address. First, 
they argue that “while the literature on global governance highlights governance as a 
set of interrelated processes, it does not provide the analytical tools to study these 
processes.”114 Studies of global governance tend to focus on institutions and their 
legitimacy and authority, whilst  
 
the concept of governmentality is aimed at investigating the practices of governing as 
an empirical phenomenon but also to identify the ‘mentality’ – the rationality 
characteristic of the systematic thinking, reflection, and knowledge that is integral to 
different modes of governing.115  
 
Secondly, whereas the global governance literature frequently suggests that global 
politics is characterised by a “zero-sum conception of power where an increase in the 
power and influence of nonstate actors is ipso facto defined as a simultaneous 
reduction in state power and authority”, a governmentality perspective instead sees a 
“changing logic or rationality of government (defined as a type of power) by which 
civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon and 
into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government.”116 Thirdly, most 
studies of global governance remain paradoxically trapped in the state-centric 
framework they are attempting to escape. As Sending and Neumann note,  
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by tying the analysis of the processes of governance to a concern with authority, 
studies of global governance inadvertently perpetuate the very state-centric 
framework that they seek to transcend: the focus is negatively defined in relation to 
sovereignty, aimed at analyzing to which actors power and authority have flowed 
from the state. The more recent interest in how to render global governance more 
legitimate and accountable is a testament to this feature of studies of global 
governance.117 
 
Whilst also concerned with non-state actors and their insertion in global power 
relations, a governmentality perspective seeks to understand power as working 
through a plurality of mechanisms of facilitating the conduct of conduct which do not 
necessarily remain tied to (or opposed to) the state, or to state-centric notions of 
authority and legitimacy. 
 Overall therefore, a governmentality perspective encourages us to dissolve the 
fundamental binaries that have structured the way we think about politics and rule: 
“state and civil society, economy and family, public and private, coercion and 
freedom.”118 To this list we can add the analytical separation between ‘the 
international’ and ‘the domestic’. The mechanisms of rule in modern global politics 
transgress these boundaries, and multiple actors in a plurality of spaces are implicated 
in the conduct of conduct. 
 
 
 
Summitry 
 
A global summit like the WSSD may appear an unusual focus for a 
Foucauldian approach, which often focuses on the micro-political exercise of 
capillary power through decentralised sites. A conventional interpretation of summitry 
is that it represents a sovereign form of government in which states meet at the 
highest level to agree on the laws and regulations that will dictate the direction of 
international politics, and conflicts are played out between ‘billiard-ball’ states 
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arranged in broad alliances of East against West or North against South.119 State-
centric International Relations perspectives and diplomatic histories tend to regard 
summits as continued evidence of the determining role of ‘great men’ and major 
states in international politics.120 Talk of diplomatic “two-level games” and multiple 
boards may seem to blur boundaries between the international and the domestic, but 
as Ian Clark has argued, these analyses remain “very much at the level of mutual 
influence between the two domains which remain separable in theory, even if not 
always separate in practice.”121 As a discipline International Relations has had, as 
Roland Bleiker notes, a “masculine preoccupation with big and heroic events: wars, 
revolutions, diplomatic summits and other state actions that are imbued with 
international significance.”122 Such scholarship is informed by what Rob Walker 
describes as “discursive economies of scale that inform our understanding of what and 
where power is.”123 Despite the claims of the global governance literature that 
international politics is no longer primarily determined by heads-of-state, many 
accounts of summits continue to view them as where “skilled and self-assured men” 
have “climbed high and dangerously in the belief that at the summit they can change 
the world.”124 
By approaching summits from a Foucauldian governmentality perspective it is 
possible highlight new ways of understanding multilateral diplomacy as one set of 
techniques among many in global patterns of advanced liberal government. Through 
their participation in summits new assemblages of actors have been empowered and 
produced as agents of both self-government and the government of others. Sovereign 
and disciplinary forms of power have been recast and mobilised at the summit in the 
service of governmental rationalities. Summits therefore function as a crucial 
technique of enabling ‘rule at a distance’ in forms of global advanced liberal 
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government. As well as their traditional role of agreeing new treaties and conventions 
summits are moments of political theatre, and provide a stage on which the principal 
actors of world politics can perform their roles, and certain norms, standards and 
examples are conveyed to a wider audience. Summits are attempts to govern the 
conduct of conduct in global politics, through the example they set and the techniques 
of rule at a distance they establish.  
The importance of theatrical and symbolic forms of power was famously 
conveyed by Clifford Geertz in his classic study of the theatre-state in nineteenth 
century Bali, in which he describes how the royal court – the Negara – functioned as 
an “exemplary centre” of theatrical ritual and symbolism.125 Court life was centred on 
pageantry and pomp, and these “were not means to political ends: they were the ends 
themselves, they were what the state was for.”126 Thus 
 
the state ceremonials of classical Bali were metaphysical theatre: theatre designed to 
express a view of the ultimate nature of reality and, at the same time, to shape the 
existing conditions of life to be consonant with that reality; that is, theatre to present 
an ontology and, by presenting it, to make it happen – make it actual.127 
 
Geertz’ study draws attention to facets of power and statecraft that are often ignored 
or marginalised in contemporary political analysis, such as the ways in which 
“statecraft is a thespian art.”128 He argues that status and stateliness are just as 
important facets of the state as commanding and administrating, and it is mistaken to 
dismiss such features as mere “artifices, more or less cunning, more or less illusional, 
designed to facilitate the prosier aims of power.”129 His famous conclusion was 
therefore that the “dramas of the theatre state, mimetic of themselves, were, in the 
end, neither illusions nor lies, neither sleight of hand nor make-believe. They were 
what there was.”130   
As this nineteenth century example shows, the symbolic and theatrical 
dimensions of politics are neither unique to advanced liberal government nor to 
modern summitry. The political importance of ritual, performance and ceremony has 
been discussed by theorists such as Raymond Cohen, who noted how “international 
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politics is increasingly being conducted on a great stage, as it were, under the eyes of 
a watchful audience.”131 Murray Edelman famously argued that “the most 
conspicuously ‘democratic’ institutions are largely symbolic and expressive in 
function”, and that “decision-making at the highest levels is not so much literal 
policy-making as dramaturgy.”132 For Edelman symbolic politics serves to promote 
political quiescence and stability, and he argued that “voting may be the most 
fundamental of all devices for reassuring masses that they are participants in the 
making of public policy.”133 This approach to political theatre and symbolism rests 
upon a distinction between ‘real politics’ and illusionary ritual.134 
In contrast, recent discussions of sustainable development and ‘post-
ecologism’ have drawn attention to different ways of understanding symbolic 
politics.135 Blühdorn has stressed that “that the common distinction between symbolic 
politics that is staged for the media and real politics that brokers hard interests behind 
closed doors is too simplistic.”136 The performative dimension of politics, and the 
symbolism and dramaturgy of diplomacy, can be understood not as illusions or masks 
for power but as actually reifying particular subjectivities and relationships. Costas 
Constantinou echoes Geertz when he observes that “the fictions and the dramas of 
diplomacy never end … they become the world of diplomacy, they are what there 
is.”137 
From a governmentality perspective the symbolic, theatrical and exemplary 
dimensions of the WSSD can be interpreted as techniques and technologies of 
advanced liberal government. Through international summit diplomacy particular 
roles are diligently performed on a carefully constructed and choreographed stage to a 
specific audience. The performance of a certain type of conduct worked to govern the 
conduct of other watching actors at a distance. The exemplary governmentality of the 
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WSSD was thus more about communicating an inspirational model of sustainable 
politics that would be copied by free and responsible subjects, rather than law-giving 
or treaty-making forms of power. As such, summits function as ‘exemplary centres’; 
by acting as an ideal model for the conduct of international society they are, like 
Geertz’ Balinese court, “an illustration of the power of grandeur to organize the 
world.”138 
One of the ways in which summits work to govern and order global politics is 
by reifying those who participate in them and establishing their primacy as political 
actors. The performativity of diplomatic exchange works to constitute and produce 
international actors. As Adam Watson observes, a fundamental characteristic of 
nation-states, and indeed the states system, is that states “are not content merely to 
observe one another at a distance. They feel the need to enter into dialogue with one 
another.”139 Thus it is “the ability to deal with other states, and therefore to conduct a 
dialogue with them, [which lies at] the very heart of ‘sovereignty’.”140 Constantinou 
stresses the inter-subjectivity of diplomacy, “in the sense that the diplomatic process 
takes place between two constructed subjects whose very construction relies on the 
intercourse and mutual recognition of diplomacy.”141 It is at least partially through 
participating and communicating in international events like summits that 
organisations – and not just states, but also international institutions, agencies, and 
NGOs – are actually constituted as political actors.142 The importance and primacy of 
those who perform on the summit stage is asserted through hierarchical metaphors of 
politics: the summit is represented as where power is located; above the heads of most 
and where only the brightest and the best are capable of accessing it.143 Thus David 
Dunn’s definition of a summit is “diplomacy at the highest level.”144 As Constantinou 
suggests,  
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this metaphor fosters conventional ways of ordering the world, celebrates hierarchy 
and works to shape the global imaginary by recollecting popular stories or images of 
mountaineering, of high or noble objective, or control, of progress, of fortitude, and 
of human mastery.145 
 
The summit is constructed as the source of guidance and security. As Winston 
Churchill asked the British House of Commons in 1953, “if there is not at the summit 
of the nations the wish to win the greatest prize of peace, where can men look for 
hope?”146  
Summits also work to create the impression that they are somehow ‘above’ 
normal politics, and that they represent a domain where everyday rivalries and 
differences can be put aside in the interests of common humanity.147 Through 
countless rituals, symbols and ceremonies summits produce a space within which 
‘high politics’ can be pursued. Symbolically, the pole held aloft by Sherpa Tenzing 
Norgay at the summit of Everest in 1953 displayed the flags of the UN, Great Britain, 
Nepal and India, in that order. He later said he was “glad the UN flag was on top. For 
I like to think that our victory was not just for ourselves – not only for our own 
nations – but for all men everywhere.”148 The idea that the UN can rise above the 
political intrigues of states, and that the summit represents a place above the normal 
run of events where the interests of all mankind can be reconciled, are both themes 
central to the way summits conduct global politics. 
Approaching summits in terms of political theatre should not imply that they 
are ephemeral diversions or unimportant spectacles. Often, calling something a 
performance or piece of theatre implies that it is merely aesthetic and has no 
connection to reality, or that it serves to mask or draw attention away from ‘reality’.149 
This is not the sense in which the theatrical metaphor is used here, since it relies upon 
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a distinction between representation and reality that a post-positivist Foucauldian 
approach throws into question. By viewing summits as examples of political theatre, 
attention is focussed on the rituals, symbols, role-playing and pageantry that they 
involve. These things are not disguises or distractions from ‘the reality of power’, but 
rather they actually constitute an important technique for the exercise of rule in 
advanced liberal government.150 
 
 
 
Resistance 
 
Summits are thus a key technique of advanced liberal government. Yet they 
are also important potential moments of political resistance. Indeed, since at least ‘the 
Battle for Seattle’ in 1999 global summits have become one of the quintessential sites 
for protest politics.151 The Johannesburg Summit had its own protestors on the streets 
condemning ‘the W$$D’ and the South African government. Such forms of resistance 
are often conceptualised as a denial of power, an assertion of freedom, or a refusal of 
government. In contrast, a Foucauldian approach to governmentality suggests that in 
modes of advanced liberal rule the lines between power and freedom, state and 
society, and domination and resistance are thrown into question. Rather than power 
being opposed by freedom, governmentality works through processes of freedom. 
Such an approach problematises not only how we think of power and government, but 
also how we think about political resistance at moments like the WSSD. 
Most attempts to think about resistance have been predicated upon a binary 
between the rulers and ruled, the strong and the weak. Within the Marxist tradition 
resistance has been primarily located in the poor, the working class, the ruled and the 
governed, who have opposed power through revolutions, counter-hegemonic 
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struggles, or myriad acts of foot-dragging opposition.152 Social movement theory has 
attempted to understand how such resistance movements have emerged, under what 
conditions they have been successful, and what effects they have had.153 Building on 
such traditions, postcolonial political theory has tended to look for resistance in the 
global South and the ‘subaltern’.154 More recently there has been a wave of interest in 
the so-called ‘new social movements’, groups who fit uneasily into the category of 
working class or liberation movements, but whose varied forms of resistance invoke 
identity, sexuality, cultural, religious or ecological struggles. Drawing inspiration 
from the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999 and movements like the Zapatistas in 
Mexico, many of these groups have linked up in broad global networks as elements of 
an “anti-globalisation movement” or global justice movement.155 These accounts 
stress the diversity, trans-nationalism, network and “rhizome” structures and 
“carnavalesque” elements of the new social movements.156 However, in general such 
accounts of resistance have continued to rely on the binary between power and 
freedom, ruler and ruled that has structured conventional political thought.157  
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A Foucauldian governmentality perspective destabilises these binaries. 
Foucault was sceptical of the idea that a ‘pure’ form of resistance against power could 
exist, or that there was a theoretical basis for the notion of complete liberation. In one 
of his later essays he reflected that  
 
I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because if it is 
not treated with precautions and with certain limits, one runs the risk of falling back 
on the idea that there exists a human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain 
historical, economic, and social processes, has been concealed, alienated, or 
imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression.158 
 
Emancipatory projects have no place therefore within a Foucauldian approach; 
however, this does not mean that he believed resistance was impossible. On the 
contrary he was very clear that “where there is power, there is resistance.”159 Indeed, 
“there is no power without potential refusal or revolt.”160 However, “these points of 
resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single 
locus of great refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
revolutionary.”161 This desire to get away from a binary view of politics as either 
domination or resistance reflects the messiness and complexity of contemporary 
politics. For example, in Sending and Neumann’s study of Norwegian policy-
formulation on land mines, NGOs conceded that “we were opponents and 
collaborators at the same time.”162 Amoore and Langley discuss the contradictions 
and ironies thrown up by video footage of a Seattle ‘anti-globalisation’ protestor 
kicking a Nike sign whilst wearing Nike shoes.163 Rather than seeing these as 
anomalies or lamentable lapses from ‘pure resistance’, a Foucauldian perspective 
recognises they reflect the inevitably compromised status of resistance in assemblages 
of rule where government works through freedom and at a distance.  
Instead of searching for grand acts of ‘essential’ or revolutionary resistance 
therefore, a study of technologies of governmentality draws attention to the way the 
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practices of NGOs, social movements and even states are simultaneously both 
expressions of power and of resistance. Discourses produce power relationships, but 
they are also the means through which dominant power relationships can be resisted 
and subverted. As Foucault explains, “discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile, and makes it 
possible to thwart it.”164 Power and resistance are thus inseparable, and they often 
mobilise the same forms, strategies and technologies on the field of power relations.  
In one of his lectures in the series ‘Security, Territory, Population’ at the 
Collège de France in 1978 Foucault discussed how we might describe resistance to 
processes of governmentality.165 He considers and rejects terming them “revolts” (too 
precise and too strong); “disobedience” (too weak); “insubordination” (perhaps, but 
linked to the military); and “dissidence” (very close, but too associated with Soviet 
dissidents).166 Eventually he fixes on the term “counter-conduct”: a “struggle against 
the processes implemented for conducting others.”167 Foucault observed how, in the 
explosion of concern with the art of government in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, there was an accompanying rise of concern over ‘how not to be governed’.  
 
I do not mean by that that governmentalisation would be opposed by a kind of face-
off by the opposite affirmation, ‘we do not want to be governed and we do not want 
to be governed at all.’ I mean that, in this great preoccupation about the way to 
govern and the search for the ways to govern, we identify a perpetual question which 
would be: ‘how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, 
with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like 
that, not for that, not by them.’168 
 
This is “the art of not being governed quite so much”, or “the will not to be governed 
thusly, like that, by these people, at this price.”169  
As he makes clear however, such counter-conducts rely upon and are even 
implicated in the strategies, techniques and power relationships they oppose.170 Thus 
the task of mapping acts of resistance involves demonstrating how the fields of 
visibility established by certain discourses are compromised or reinforced, how forms 
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of knowledge are challenged or legitimised, how particular techniques are discarded 
or merely reversed, and how identities are subverted, re-appropriated and inverted. 
This focus on the links between conduct and counter-conduct reminds us that 
government always has gaps, fractures and inconsistencies. Discourses are never 
entirely hegemonic or impenetrable, and forms of government can be subverted, 
evaded or mocked. Indeed, advanced liberal government is predicated on the freedom 
of citizens to question and dissent – although they are encouraged to act responsibly, 
rationally and productively. Paradoxically however, this reliance of forms of 
advanced liberal government upon practices of freedom means that assertions of that 
freedom – through the right to protest, resist and dissent – can end up reinforcing as 
well as challenging the system. 
This interaction between the extension of government through freedom and at 
a distance, and practices of counter-conduct, is at the heart of modern forms of rule. A 
Foucauldian governmentality perspective demands paying serious attention to the way 
forms of government are challenged and resisted. As Walker wryly observes, “from 
the regal heights of statecraft, social movements are but mosquitoes on the evening 
breeze, irritants to those who claim maturity and legitimacy at the centre of political 
life.”171 This was certainly the view of many at the WSSD, who viewed the protestors 
as troublemakers and as a distraction. However, by regarding these protests as 
counter-conducts they form a necessary corollary to sustainable development and 
summit forms of government and, as Walker recognises, they present “challenges to 
established accounts of where and what politics must be.”172 
 
 
 
Analytics, ethics and politics 
 
In this thesis the concepts of power/knowledge, discourse, government and 
resistance constitute the major theoretical referents for approaching the political 
effects of sustainable development and the WSSD. These concepts can be combined 
in an analytical framework for studying formations of power, rule and government, 
based around Dean’s “analytics of government”, which “takes as its central concern 
                                                 
171
 Walker, ‘Social Movements/World Politics’, p. 669. 
172
 Ibid, p. 678. 
 51 
how we govern and are governed within different regimes, and the conditions under 
which such regimes emerge, continue to operate, and are transformed.”173 He draws 
attention to four dimensions of government: the fields of visibility it creates and the 
ends to which it aims; the forms of knowledge it draws upon; the particular 
technologies and apparatuses it governs through; and the subjectivities or identities it 
produces.174 These dimensions are present within every regime of government, and 
each “presupposes the other without being reducible to them.”175 This framework 
enables the comparison of different rationalities of rule and resistance, including those 
which rely more upon sovereign or disciplinary forms of power as well as techniques 
of advanced liberal government. 
First, “to govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which 
government is to be exercised”, and to conceptualise the ends of government.176 
Governing thus depends on the production of an intelligible field, and this produces 
particular political effects since when mapping “salient features are identified and 
non-salient features rendered invisible.”177 Whereas sovereign or princely forms of 
power ruled territory, the new forms of power analysed by Foucault sought to regulate 
and order individual human bodies (disciplinary power) or the population as a totality 
(bio-power).178 The population has remained the field of visibility for modern 
rationalities of government, and its health, wealth and security are the ends for which 
government exists.179 However, which population is envisaged, which aspects are to 
be governed, and how these aspects relate to other fields of visibility are all important 
questions for understanding how particular regimes of government operate. 
Secondly, in order to know and govern these fields, specific regimes and 
ensembles of knowledge are invoked. An analysis of these forms of knowledge 
involves asking “what forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of 
calculation, or rationality are employed in these practices of governing?”180 Foucault 
drew attention to the way that from the sixteenth century the development of statistics 
– literally the “science of the state” – enabled the population to be known, rendered 
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intelligible and brought into being as an object of government.181 As Rose and Miller 
note, “government has inaugurated a huge labour of enquiry to transform events and 
phenomena into information: births, illnesses and deaths, marriages and divorces, 
levels of income and types of diet, forms of employment and want of employment.”182 
Other forms of knowledge are also central to ensuring the health, wealth and security 
of the population: medicine, epidemiology, criminology, economics, urban planning, 
social insurance, the law, public relations and many others. The key insight here is 
that government is “rational and thoughtful activity” and that particular governmental 
rationalities rely upon, and construct as authoritative, particular forms of 
knowledge.183 
Thirdly, government relies upon particular practices, techniques, technologies, 
apparatuses and programmes, and an analytics of government involves asking “by 
what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies 
and vocabularies is authority constituted and rule accomplished?”184 Whilst this does 
not seek to reduce government purely to a functionalist or technical operation, it does 
emphasise the degree to which government is not simply a manifestation of 
ideologies, concepts or worldviews. Forms of government rely upon techniques such 
as tax returns, registers of property, electoral rolls, and censuses in order to provide 
the data for constituting the population, and technologies such as hospitals, schools, 
prisons, social welfare schemes, transport systems and social insurance in order to 
regulate the conduct of conduct. These techniques might mobilise sovereign or 
disciplinary forms of power, such as laws, regulations, surveillance mechanisms or 
impact assessments, but they are invoked tactically within governmental forms of 
power.185 
Finally, government depends upon the creation of governable subjects. Here 
Dean asks “what forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different 
practices of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek?”186 
Disciplinary power relied on the creation of individual, docile subjects such as the 
deviant, the criminal or the insane. In advanced liberal government, however, power 
works through the creation of free, rational citizens/subjects. It also requires the 
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creation of authoritative experts with particular responsibilities, capacities and 
statuses. Certain forms of behaviour – efficiency, caution, entrepreneurship, 
patriotism, cooperation – are established as necessary within the broader regime of 
government, and “techniques of responsibilisation” work to produce subjects capable 
of self-government according to these criteria.187  
This Foucauldian analytics of government is primarily a descriptive approach 
rather than a normative agenda. Its primary aim is to analyse and compare rationalities 
of government, rather than to present a case for the best or most effective form of 
government. However, as a Foucauldian perspective on power/knowledge implies, all 
theories have inherent ethical and political assumptions. In response to those who 
have criticised Foucauldian theory for not making its ethical stance explicit, an 
analytics of government can best be described as having an ethos of continual 
criticism and politicisation.188 
For Dean, “an analytics of government attempts to show that our taken-for-
granted ways of doing things and how we think about and question them are not 
entirely self-evident or necessary.”189 It attempts to mark “out a space to ask questions 
about government, authority and power, without attempting to formulate a general set 
of principles by which various forms of the ‘conduct of conduct’ could be 
reformed.”190 This stance of continual criticism is one advocated by Foucault who 
argued that the task of the intellectual was “to bring assumptions and things taken for 
granted again into question, to shake habits, ways of acting and thinking, to dispel the 
familiarity of the accepted.”191 Such a perspective avoids adopting fixed perspectives 
‘for’ or ‘against’ certain constellations of power/knowledge. As Hansen and Stepputat 
point out, “the state and modern governance is not something that we can be for or 
against as such, for the simple reason that we cannot escape it.”192 Accordingly 
Foucault was reluctant to approach advanced liberal government from the point of 
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view of whether such forms of power were ‘good’ or bad’. For Foucault, “nothing, 
including the exercise of power, is evil in itself – but everything is dangerous.”193 
Thus Foucault’s position is not the apathy of nihilism, but a “hyper- and pessimistic 
activism” – since “everything is dangerous … the ethical political choice we have to 
make every day is to determine which is the main danger.”194 
This attentiveness to the dangerousness of certain rationalities of government 
can be regarded as a stance of politicisation, an attitude marked by an expanded 
definition of ‘the political’. Conventionally the field of politics is equated with 
political parties and state institutions in the domestic sphere, and states, wars and 
regimes in the international sphere. Power is possessed by actors, and politics is seen 
as the struggle for power between these pre-constituted actors. Certain dimensions – 
such as the family and the economy in liberal political thought – are regarded as 
private and non-political. In contrast, a Foucauldian approach entails a broader 
conception of ‘the political’ as the broader field of power relations that goes beyond 
these fixed identities and boundaries.195 This broadened conception of the political 
draws on the insights of other branches of political theory – notably feminist theory 
and Marxist political economy – which have contested the liberal distinction between 
the public and private spheres through slogans such as “the personal is political.”196 
Thus, for Edkins, an enlarged concept of “‘the political’ has to do with the 
establishment of that very social order which sets out a particular, historically specific 
account of what counts as politics and defines other areas of social life as not 
politics.”197 The political therefore encompasses more than just the contests between 
actors within a certain game of power – it also involves the constitution of those 
actors, the rules and aims of the game, and the field on which the game is played.198 
As Mark Wenman points out, “social identities do not exist prior to the moment of 
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politics. Politics – in its multifarious practices – is the very means by which the 
multiplicity of social identities are perpetually formed and reformed.”199 
The Foucauldian ethos of politicisation is therefore focussed on the exercise of 
power and the effects of particular regimes of government and constellations of 
power/knowledge. In particular it seeks to highlight how techniques which purport to 
be neutral, objective, technical and scientific can be forms of de-politicisation. For 
Edkins, strategies of de-politicisation work primarily through “a reduction to 
calculability” and the assertion that formations of knowledge are objective and 
neutral.200 As such “a way to repoliticise, a ‘political act’, would be to interrupt 
discourse, to challenge what have, through discursive practices, been constituted as 
normal, natural and accepted ways of carrying on.”201 
Whilst acknowledging that it is impossible to judge abstractly whether 
rationalities of government are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, several authors have drawn attention 
to the potentially de-politicising character of advanced liberal government. By 
working through the internalisation of rule and the creation of rational, consensual, 
free citizens, the task of government is conceived as the devising of proper forms of 
regulation in order to permit the natural productivity and efficiency of society and the 
market. There is a danger here that more adversarial articulations of democracy, such 
as those involving dissent, debate and conflict, are sidelined and the ‘responsible’ 
citizen becomes indistinguishable from that of the consumer, reducible to “the 
selection among functionally similar if not visually identical products on the ballot or 
supermarket shelf.”202 There is a danger that the vibrancy of agonistic democracy is 
reduced to a particular and limited type of permissible disagreement, expressed 
through voting and political parties.203 
Similarly, many critics of international summitry have argued that summits 
work to de-politicise global politics by attempting to remove issues of inequality, 
power and conflict to a domain ‘above politics’ where consensus can be reached. For 
Chatterjee and Finger, the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 depoliticised the environment-
development debate by first constructing the environment as a source of threat, and 
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then by advocating the ‘New Age model of politics’ as a response to this threat. This 
is a model which 
 
says that since we are all faced with an unprecedented threat and are equally 
endangered, we must all join hands as humans in order to overcome the threat. We 
have to, it is argued, work together for a common purpose. The more powerful 
among us will, quite logically, have to take the upper hand to lead the process.204 
 
Yet, whether such summits de-politicise or re-politicise is, of course, a fundamentally 
subjective evaluation. As Putnam and Bayne point out in their study of the G7 
summits, the impetus for summitry in the 1970s was partly a response to the 
perceived ‘bureaucratisation’ of politics. From many politicians’ perspectives, 
“international economics could no longer be considered ‘low politics’, left to 
bloodless diplomats, to cunning central bankers, to distant international organisations 
or to the haphazards of the market.”205 Therefore “it was natural that the particular 
politicians in power in the key countries in the mid-1970s would turn to summitry as a 
means for re-asserting their power and responsibility.”206 From the perspective of 
these politicians, such summits worked to re-politicise issues of environment and 
development.207  
 The perspective adopted here, in line with a Foucauldian ethos of constant 
critique, is that drawing attention to relationships of power, dissent, counter-conducts 
and conflicts is a form of re-politicisation. For Foucault, whilst he acknowledged that 
it is perhaps true that everything is political, he argued that what is more true is that 
“everything can be politicised, everything may become political. Politics is no more 
or less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the first uprising, 
the first confrontation.”208 In contrast, assertions of consensus, harmony and 
partnership work to sideline critique and de-politicise government. Since a vibrant and 
vital democracy relies upon a heterogeneous and plural exchange of views, and 
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requires spaces for agonistic conflict and dissent, the Foucauldian position of criticism 
and politicisation is therefore, at its heart, a democratic one.209 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that a Foucauldian framework allows an interrogation 
of the political effects of the discourse of sustainable development and the politics of 
the WSSD. By following Foucault in seeing power in terms of relationships rather 
than capacities, and as deeply implicated in the production of knowledge, it has 
moved away from seeing sustainable development as either a neutral and instrumental 
concept divorced from power relations, or as an ideological mystification that simply 
reproduces existing material relationships. Rather, sustainable development can be 
viewed as a discourse that works to govern politics in a certain way, and thereby 
establishes specific fields of visibility, authorises particular regimes of knowledge, 
concretises a range of practices and techniques, and produces certain subjects and 
legitimate actors. 
A governmentality perspective on sustainable development and the WSSD 
draws attention to the ways in which they work to regulate the conduct of conduct 
through the empowerment of free, responsible, rational subjects acting according to 
market logic. Familiar binaries of state and civil society, international and domestic, 
and power and freedom are destabilised and conventional assumptions about what 
constitutes government and resistance are questioned. As Foucault argued, 
 
we need to escape the dilemma of being either for or against. One can, after all, be 
face-to-face, and upright [debout et en face]. Working with a government doesn’t 
imply either a subjection or a blanket acceptance. One can work with and be 
intransigent at the same time.210 
 
This stance of standing upright and face-to-face is one of critical engagement and 
constant questioning, where “to do criticism is to make harder those acts which are 
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now too easy.”211 As such this thesis seeks to politicise and question the forms of rule 
established by sustainable development discourse at the WSSD. This is part of the 
broader ethical agenda of discourse analysis, which “seeks to make visible the 
political consequences of adopting one representation of social reality rather than 
another.”212
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Chapter 2 
 
Producing Sustainable Development: 
The Discourse from Stockholm to Johannesburg 
 
 
 
 
 
Modern man is an animal whose politics places 
his existence as a living being in question 
 
Michel Foucault, 1979 1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The discourse of sustainable development has dominated the fields of 
environment and development politics since the publication of the Brundtland 
Commission’s report, Our Common Future, in 1987.2 Whilst the concept has been 
criticised for being vague, full of contradictions and of doubtful scientific value, as a 
discourse it has established certain fields of visibility, constructed particular forms of 
truth as legitimate and useful, and empowered specific actors as necessary authorities 
for its implementation.3 It has been made concrete in innumerable projects, 
institutions, research programmes and deliberative forums, and it has structured 
thinking about environment and development for over three decades. As Dryzek 
notes, “it is arguably the dominant global discourse of ecological concern”, and Bill 
Adams acknowledges its capacity “to restructure development discourse and 
reorganise development practice.”4 This chapter shows how the discourse has been 
produced, and what some of the political effects of these constructions have been. 
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 Treating sustainable development as a discourse means side-stepping many of 
the conceptual debates about what, exactly, sustainable development is. This chapter 
does not seek to reveal an essential truth behind the concept, refine it, or formulate a 
better definition. Conceptually, sustainable development is, like the concepts of 
democracy or justice, essentially contested, in the sense that people will always 
disagree about exactly what it implies in both theory and practice.5 Adopting a 
Foucauldian approach to discourse as often fragmented and contradictory, this chapter 
does not seek to present a unitary, homogenous account of sustainable development or 
reduce it to some core truth, but rather to follow Dryzek in arguing that “sustainable 
development, like democracy, is a discourse rather than a concept which can or 
should be defined with any precision.”6 
 This chapter approaches sustainable development through key discursive 
statements such as the publications Our Common Future, Caring for the Earth and 
Agenda 21.7 Whilst sustainable development is neither static nor homogenous, rather 
than attempting to chart the changes in the discourse over time the following sections 
draw attention to some of the key themes and continuities that have shaped the 
parameters of environment and development politics. Some of these regularities 
include recurring lines of division and tension, which are also highlighted in order to 
demonstrate the variety of interpretations of sustainable development. Although 
debates continue to rage over exactly what is to be sustained, by whom, and for how 
long, articulations of the discourse have shared a common appreciation that modern 
politics necessarily involves the government and management of environmental, 
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social and economic issues. The final part of this chapter therefore shows how 
sustainable development can be regarded as a form of eco-governmentality. 
 
 
 
Fields of visibility 
 
The discourse of sustainable development explicitly brought the entire planet 
into focus as an object of government. The growing concern with environmental 
issues in the 1960s and 1970s coincided with the broadcasting of the iconic image of 
the planet Earth from space, and the discourse of sustainable development extended 
techniques of environmental management across the world.8 The Brundtland Report 
accordingly began with the image of ‘Spaceship Earth’, noting that “in the middle of 
the twentieth century, we saw our planet from space for the first time. … From space, 
we see a small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice but by a 
pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery, and soils.”9 In one of the key texts of sustainable 
development therefore, the entire planet (fragile, precious, and singular) is established 
as the field of visibility for government. As Escobar asserts, the report inaugurated “a 
period of unprecedented gluttony in the history of vision and knowledge.”10 This 
global and planetary focus was unique to the discourse of sustainable development, 
and in particular to the way it articulated the environmental and development agendas. 
Development discourse – at least in its modern form dating from point four of 
President Truman’s 1949 speech – was essentially binary rather than planetary, 
dividing the world into developed and underdeveloped societies.11 It was also 
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fundamentally state-centric, with articulations such as Walt Rostow’s Stages of 
Economic Growth envisaging national processes of economic modernisation through 
five stages: traditional society; pre-conditions for take-off; take-off; drive to maturity; 
and “the age of high mass consumption.”12 As Rostow’s work indicates, development 
discourse has commonly relied upon economic growth as a fundamental indicator of 
development – although more recent articulations have stressed ‘human 
development’, democracy and ‘good governance’.13 
The idea that natural limits might exist which would constrain the process of 
development was raised by the environmental discourses of the 1960s and 1970s, 
although their roots can be traced to at least the early twentieth century US 
conservation movement and individuals such as Gifford Pinchot.14 A seminal 
publication in the development of modern environmentalism was The Limits to 
Growth, published in 1972 by the Club of Rome, a group of economists who 
modelled the relationship between the rapidly growing world population and finite 
resources.15 A number of environmental publications around this period raised 
concerns about the impact of human development and industrial pollution on the 
environment, and began to question the basic assumptions of progress and growth 
behind the development ideal.16 The institutional emergence of environmental 
concerns onto the stage of global governance is commonly attributed to the 
Stockholm Conference of 1972.17 This was the world’s first major environmental 
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summit and resulted in the creation of the UNEP as well as paving the way for the 
future negotiation of many multilateral environmental agreements. Although 
environmental concerns dominated, developing countries argued that poverty and 
development were more pressing global concerns, and Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi famously stated that “poverty is the worst pollution.”18 Whilst sustainable 
development itself was not explicitly articulated, Stockholm was the first major 
international event to address questions of pollution and environmental degradation 
and discuss them in the same venue as developing countries’ concerns regarding 
poverty and under-development.19 
One of the first explicit references to sustainable development was in the 
World Conservation Strategy, published by the IUCN, UNEP and WWF in 1980.20 It 
defined sustainable development as “the integration of conservation and development 
to ensure that modifications to the planet do indeed secure the well-being and survival 
of all people.”21 It was the World Conservation Strategy that, as its authors 
retrospectively asserted, first argued “that conservation is not the opposite of 
development.”22 Rather, they could be mutually beneficial agendas, with respect for 
the environment contributing to a better quality of development, and development 
allowing people to escape the poverty trap that forced them to degrade the 
environment. This reframing has since been described as “one of the major 
intellectual breakthroughs of the twentieth century.”23  
Despite this, the World Conservation Strategy was widely perceived as just 
another piece of environmental scare-mongering and received relatively scant 
attention at the time.24 It was the 1987 Brundtland Report which brought sustainable 
development into focus as the dominant global paradigm for discussing environment 
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and development issues. Formed at the request of the UN Secretary-General but 
nominally independent of the UN, the 22-person World Commission on Environment 
and Development convened in 1984 and produced Our Common Future in 1987, 
referred to as the Brundtland Report after the commission’s chairperson, Norwegian 
Environment Minister and later Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland.25 It is Our 
Common Future’s definition of sustainable development which has continued to 
shape the debates on environment and development, famously asserting that 
“sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”26 This 
definition was followed by the clarification that it 
 
contains within it two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs,’ in particular the essential 
needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea 
of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the 
environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.27  
 
It is this combination of traditional development concerns (needs) with environmental 
concerns (limitations on the environment’s ability to satisfy those needs) which is at 
the heart of the sustainable development vision. The Brundtland Report argued that “it 
is impossible to separate economic development issues from environmental issues.”28 
Since the development agenda encompasses both economic and social issues, 
sustainable development is often described as incorporating three key pillars: 
environmental, social and economic.29  
The fusion of development and environmental issues in Our Common Future 
produced a field of visibility which tried to reconcile the optimism of development 
with the pessimism of environmentalism. Limits were not denied in the Brundtland 
Report, but they were reframed. It claimed that  
 
the concept of sustainable development does imply limits – not absolute limits but 
limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organisation on 
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environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of 
human activities.30  
 
This reconciliation was achieved by simultaneously recognising the seriousness of the 
environmental crisis, as well as urging that the crisis could be avoided. Caring for the 
Earth, a follow-up to the World Conservation Strategy, warned that “we are gambling 
with the survival of civilisation”, but went on to observe that “we need not lose.”31 
The language of sustainable development is that of desertification, nuclear disasters, 
chemical spills, resource and biodiversity depletion, global warming and population 
growth; but it is also that of scientific progress, public-private partnerships, renewable 
energy, recycling, democratic participation and progress. The Brundtland Report 
captured this dynamic between crisis and opportunity in its opening paragraphs. 
 
From space, we see a small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and 
edifice but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery and soils. Humanity’s inability to 
fit its doings into that pattern is changing planetary systems, fundamentally. Many 
such changes are accompanied by life-threatening hazards. This new reality, from 
which there is no escape, must be recognised – and managed. Fortunately, the new 
reality coincides with more positive developments new to this century … our 
technology and science gives us at least the potential to look deeper into and better 
understand natural systems.32 
 
From space, nothing was left invisible to the gaze of the scientist or environmental 
expert, and a specific, bounded field of visibility referred to as ‘the environment’ 
became integrated into the development vision.33 As Paul Rutherford asserts, 
“regulatory ecological science does not so much describe the environment as actively 
constitute it as an object of knowledge and, through various modes of positive 
intervention, manage and police it.”34 
The key texts of sustainable development therefore represented the articulation 
of familiar environmental concerns – pollution, population growth, resource 
depletion, biodiversity loss – within development discourse. Whilst attempting to 
balance the three pillars of sustainable development, the discursive focus was 
primarily upon these apparently ‘environmental’ issues. The key texts themselves 
prioritised environmental and conservation-orientated policies, with the Brundtland 
Report arguing that in order to conserve biodiversity “the total expanse of protected 
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areas needs to be at least tripled”, and invoking nuclear disaster as “undoubtedly the 
gravest” threat the world faced.35 Caring for the Earth explicitly stated that “the Earth 
has limits” and a “carrying capacity”, and instructed that “population growth must 
stop everywhere, and the rich must stabilise, and in some cases reduce, their 
consumption of resources.”36 It also proposed “a widespread and deeply-held 
commitment to a new ethic, the ethic for sustainable living”, which recognises we are 
all “part of the great community of life.”37 Agenda 21, one of the outcomes of the 
1992 Rio Summit, was also balanced heavily towards environmental issues, with the 
“social and economic dimensions” being dealt with in seven paragraphs and 71 pages, 
whilst “conservation and management of resources for development” were given 14 
paragraphs and 193 pages.38 The Rio Summit conventions were primarily 
environmental, addressing biodiversity and climate change, as well as a declaration on 
forests, and attendance was dominated by environmental organisations and 
departments.39 
 Sustainable development discourse therefore inaugurated a global vision in 
which the government of environmental, economic and social issues was necessary. 
The need for consensus and global unity were stressed, with Our Common Future 
concluding that “the unity of human needs requires a functioning multilateral system 
that respects the democratic principle of consent and accepts that not only the Earth 
but also the world is one”, and that “whilst interpretations will vary”, there must be a 
“consensus on the basic concept of sustainable development and on a broad strategic 
framework for achieving it.”40 This global vision led to the Rio Summit in 1992, 
which was attended by over 40,000 delegates and observers, and representatives of 
183 countries. Delegates agreed on Agenda 21; the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, which listed 27 principles for sustainable development; two 
legally-binding conventions on biodiversity and climate change; and a declaration on 
forests.41 The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was established as a funding 
mechanism for these agreements, and exists to promote projects which tackle 
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explicitly global issues. Few discourses therefore have been as successful as 
sustainable development in establishing the entire planet as a field of government and 
management, and none have been as influential in integrating environmental concerns 
into the political mainstream. 
 
 
 
Regimes of knowledge 
 
Having established this global field of government, the discourse of 
sustainable development relied upon certain forms of knowledge and expertise to 
police it. Central to the discourse was an essentially optimistic view of science and 
technology, as well as the necessity of economic management and environmental 
security. Through these forms of knowledge particular ‘truths’ about sustainable 
development were produced, and authoritative experts were created.  
Science and technology were regarded not only positively in mainstream 
sustainable development discourse, but as absolutely essential. This was both in their 
potential to help shift industrialised societies onto a more sustainable path as well as, 
through technology transfers, accelerating the development process in the rest of the 
world. Our Common Future recognised the “indispensable role” of the scientific 
community in “identifying risks, in assessing environmental impacts and in designing 
and implementing measures to deal with them.”42 The very perception of many social 
and environmental problems – such as climate change, the hole in the ozone layer, 
water pollution, carcinogenic chemicals and declining soil fertility – depend upon 
scientific measurement and assessment. Such scientific expertise has become central 
to the negotiation of sustainable development at summits like Stockholm, Rio and 
Johannesburg, lending authority and legitimacy to these processes.43 In term of 
implementation, scientific concepts such as the “maximum sustainable yield” of a 
renewable resource (such as fish stocks or forest timber) have been used to calculate 
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the rate at which resources could be consumed without depleting the capital stock, and 
such instruments were widely promoted in Agenda 21.44 
New technologies were seen in the Brundtland Report as an essential part of 
the implementation of sustainable development solutions, and the Report called for “a 
technological system that can search continuously for new solutions.”45 It argued that 
the promotion of sustainable development will have to be “based on the international 
exchange of technology: through trade in improved equipment, technology-transfer 
agreements, provision of experts, research collaboration and so on.”46 Agenda 21 also 
included a chapter on the role of the scientific and technological community, and 
sought to enable them “to make a more open and effective contribution to the 
decision-making processes concerning environment and development.”47 Sustainable 
development discourse thus incorporated discourses of ecological modernisation 
which emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s and envisioned clean, green and 
sustainable forms of industry.48 
Sustainable development was also influential in the rise of the discipline of 
environmental economics, and particularly the notion of ‘green accounting’ in which 
‘externalities’ such as pollution, adverse impacts on community health and the 
utilisation of non-renewable resources would be internalised into the costs of 
business. The Brundtland Report warned that “the process of economic development 
must be more soundly based upon the realities of the stock of capital that sustains 
it.”49 This rationality was articulated by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
at the Rio Summit in 1992. He argued that 
 
ecology comes from the Greek oikos-logos, that is, ‘the science of the home’; 
economy comes from the Greek oikonomia, that is, ‘good management of the home’. 
They amount to the same thing; ecology is, by its very nature, part of economy. … 
As nature is now entirely in man’s hands, it is quite normal to consider it, no longer 
as a given but as an acquisition, an investment which must constantly be rolled over, 
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amortised just like the other costs, salaries, financial expenditures and raw 
materials.50 
 
Whilst some economists have expressed scepticism about the usefulness of the 
concept of sustainable development, a majority have agreed with Pearce and Barbier 
that “most environmental problems have their origins in the misworkings of the 
economic system, and that their solutions therefore lie in the correction of these 
misworkings”, which fundamentally translates as the “monetarisation of the 
environment.”51 If natural resources are properly priced, according to this rationality, 
then the most efficient arrangement of resources, commodities and waste will 
inevitably follow.  
Given this predominance of economic forms of knowledge within the 
discourse it is not surprising that the Brundtland Report espoused greater economic 
growth as an imperative for achieving sustainable development.52 The first “critical 
objective” in the pursuit of sustainable development was therefore “reviving 
growth.”53 In line with this objective the Report called for “overall national income 
growth of around 5 per cent a year in the developing economies of Asia, 5.5 per cent 
in Latin America, and 6 per cent in Africa and West Asia.”54 Agenda 21 also called 
for the “reactivation and acceleration of development” after the ‘lost decade’ of the 
1980s.55 Furthermore, it urged that opening up and expanding international trade was 
essential in order to achieve the desired rate of economic growth. Agenda 21 
identified priorities for sustainable development including trade liberalisation, 
“making trade and environment mutually supportive” and “encouraging 
macroeconomic policies conducive to environment and development.”56 It instructs 
the international community to “facilitate, in a timely way, the integration of all 
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countries into the world economy and the international trading system.”57 Throughout 
Our Common Future and Agenda 21 there are references to the need to remove trade 
distortions and protectionist policies, liberalise trade, and increase the exports of 
developing countries.58  
Despite this call for reinvigorated economic growth and international trade, 
the Brundtland Report was clear that development as usual was not an option. It noted 
that “previously our main concerns centred on the effects of development on the 
environment. Today, we need to be equally concerned about the ways in which 
environmental degradation can dampen or reverse economic development.”59 
Furthermore, it gravely warned that “the risks increase faster than do our abilities to 
manage them”, and that “failures to manage the environment and sustain development 
threaten to overwhelm all countries.”60 The Report urged that new environmentally 
and socially sustainable development paths must be located in order to avoid disaster. 
This note of caution, often unheard when set against the optimism of the broader 
discourse, was reflected in the growing concern with environmental security. Our 
Common Future argued that “the deepening and widening environmental crisis 
presents a threat to national security – and even survival – that may be greater than 
well-armed, ill-deposed neighbours and unfriendly alliances”, drawing attention to the 
linkages between resource degradation, conflict and unsustainable development.61 An 
influential body of literature, stimulated by Thomas Homer-Dixon’s work within the 
University of Toronto’s ‘Project on Environment, Population and Security’ in the 
1990s, has emerged which frames environmental degradation and unsustainable 
development as a security threat.62 Especially in its more apocalyptic articulations, 
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such as that of Robert Kaplan, resource scarcity and over-population are a stimulus to 
conflict and pose an increasing security threat to nation-states and Western 
civilisation.63 These warnings of environmental instability and insecurity have 
reinvigorated the urgency of development, since now the very survival of the planet 
appears to depend on humankind’s ability to manage global development.64  
The dominance of natural scientists, technicians, economists, accountants and 
security experts in the discourse of sustainable development have established certain 
ways of speaking “in the true” for environmental, social and economic problems.65 
Specialised groups of experts are authorised to guide and advise societies on the most 
effective, secure and efficient paths to sustainable development. Legitimate 
interventions and productions of truth are channelled through particular academic 
disciplines and journals, and institutions such as the World Bank have re-defined their 
role as the leading global repository of environmental knowledge.66 Focussing on 
modern environmental management, Timothy Luke argues that graduate studies 
courses in the American academy function to  
 
routinely produce eco-managerialists, or professional-technical workers with the 
specific knowledge – as it has been scientifically validated – and the operational 
power – as it is institutionally constructed – to cope with ‘the environmental crisis’ 
on what are believed to be sound scientific and technical grounds.67 
 
This dominance of scientific experts is problematic for more democratic conceptions 
of politics. As Dryzek notes, this approach serves to legitimate “the idea that public 
policy is a matter for technical, expert choice, and not a question on which non-
specialists such as elected officials, still less any broader public have any rightful 
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say.”68 Through such constructions of power/knowledge the de-politicising potential 
of sustainable development is made evident. 
 
 
 
Techniques and technologies 
 
Although the precise meanings and conceptual implications of sustainable 
development have been disputed ever since Our Common Future popularised the 
phrase, the discourse has become concretised in innumerable projects, programmes, 
initiatives and technologies. Indeed the sheer diversity of projects apparently 
implemented in the name of sustainable development has prompted many critics to 
argue that the term is meaningless.69 However, the fact that many of these techniques 
and technologies explicitly situate themselves in relationship to Our Common Future, 
Agenda 21 and the Rio Summit, and reflect a “coherent set of ideas” regarding the 
interrelationships between economic, social and environmental issues, places them 
within the broader discourse of sustainable development.70 
Sustainable development policies have been characterised by an active and 
interventionist approach, as issues which had previously existed ‘naturally’ or 
autonomously are brought within governmental scope. For example, Our Common 
Future urges that, “with minerals and fossil fuels, the rate of depleting and the 
emphasis on recycling and economy of use should be calibrated to ensure that the 
resources does not run out before acceptable substitutes are available.”71 Issues such 
as the mix of energy supply, previously “allowed to flow together randomly”, is 
revealed to be far “too important for its development to continue in such a random 
manner.”72 In the field of population policy Our Common Future urged that 
 
governments must work on several fronts – to limit population growth; to control the 
impact of such growth on resources and, with increasing knowledge, enlarge their 
range and improve their productivity; to realise human potential so that people can 
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better harvest and use resources; and to provide people with forms of social security 
other than large numbers of children.73 
 
According to Caring for the Earth, “countries with high rates of population growth 
should give priority for achieving stability.”74 Our Common Future noted that this 
might require “direct measures to reduce fertility.”75 Thus sovereign and 
interventionist forms of power are invoked as necessary to manage sustainable 
development across the entire scope of human and natural life.76 
Within this interventionist rationality a plethora of technologies have 
constituted the discourse in practice: energy technology transfers, sustainable 
agriculture, the creation of bio-diversity regions, environmental citizenship schemes, 
strategic assessments and countless others. However, three types of technique for 
implementing sustainable development stand out: monitoring and assessments 
programmes; public participation processes; and multilateral negotiations and 
institutions. 
The scale of the sustainable development challenge and the need for a holistic 
approach to economic, social and environmental issues has made policy-makers 
aware of the lack of sufficiently detailed data on many aspects of the sustainable 
development agenda. Monitoring and assessment programmes at both national and 
international levels have thus proliferated since the Stockholm conference. 
Environmental impact assessments, national conservation or sustainable development 
strategies, environmental monitoring systems, sustainable development indicators, 
and watershed management plans have all multiplied.77 With regard to urban 
sustainable development for example, Agenda 21 states that  
 
all countries should undertake, with the active participation of the business sector as 
appropriate, pilot projects in selected sites for the collection, analysis and subsequent 
dissemination of urban data, including environmental impact analysis at the local, 
state/provincial, national and international levels and the establishment of city data 
management capabilities.78 
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NGOs and international agencies have fulfilled similar functions globally, with 
examples of assessments including the WorldWatch Institute’s State of the World and 
Vital Signs reports, the World Resources Institute’s Earthtrends programme, the UN 
Earthwatch initiative, and the UNEP’s World Conservation Monitoring Centre and 
Global Environmental Outlook reports.79 Even military satellites and surveillance 
technologies have been deployed in order to monitor sustainable development and 
environmental indicators.80  
As well as monitoring and assessment, the discourse of sustainable 
development has encouraged new participatory processes and ways of stimulating 
broader public engagement.81 The Brundtland Report asserts that sustainable 
development requires “a political system that secures effective citizen participation in 
decision-making”, which 
 
is best secured by decentralising the management of resources upon which local 
communities depend, and giving these communities an effective say over the use of 
these resources. It will also require promoting citizens’ initiatives, empowering 
peoples’ organisations, and strengthening local democracy.82 
 
Public enquiries and hearings, the engagement of Interested and Affected Parties in 
environmental impact assessments, freedom of access to information, and education 
for sustainable development are all stressed in the Report.83 The Rio Declaration 
included the principle that “environmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.”84  
An important stimulus for facilitating greater public participation in 
sustainable development has been Agenda 21 which asserted that that “one of the 
fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad 
public participation in decision-making.”85 Identifying nine “Major Groups” – 
women, children, indigenous peoples, NGOs, local governments, trade unions, 
business, science, and farmers – Agenda 21 resolved that “any policies, definitions or 
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rules affecting access to and participation by non-governmental organisations in the 
work of United Nations institutions or agencies associated with the implementation of 
Agenda 21 must apply equally to all major groups.”86 The inclusion of representatives 
from these major groups in all UN sustainable development processes and 
negotiations has functioned as an important technique of inserting civil society into 
political processes. As one NGO activist observed, “the UN has trouble seeing this 
abstract thing of civil society, and to put it into major groups makes it easier for the 
staff. It makes it easier for them to say I need to get these boxes filled.”87 The UN 
approach to securing representation for the major groups has been to allow a self-
selection process through which prominent organisations nominate each other, and 
usually the largest, best resourced, and most experienced organisations emerge as the 
“automatic choice.”88 According to one UN official, “we always went to organisations 
that seemed to have credibility, reliability, respect from their own community, and 
willing to act as facilitators for the participation of their community.”89 Examples 
include the Women’s Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO), 
Business Action for Sustainable Development (BASD), the International Federation 
of Free Trade Unions, and the International Council for Science. 
As well as the proliferation of public participation initiatives, sustainable 
development has also been implemented through more traditional techniques of 
international politics: treaties, conventions, summits and legal regimes. Summits and 
high-level diplomacy have been especially important techniques, as shown by the 
landmark status of Stockholm and Rio. Indeed it seems no account of the concept can 
avoid recognising their centrality, together with that of the Brundtland Report.90 Their 
prominence is due to the way sustainable development is an explicitly global 
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discourse, framed by Our Common Future as requiring “a new orientation in 
international relations”, which warned that “it is fundamental that the transition to 
sustainability be managed jointly by all nations.”91 As a result, between UNCED and 
the turn of the millennium there were nine major UN summits and review conferences 
linked to the sustainable development agenda. In 1994 there were summits on 
Population and Development (Cairo), and Small Island Developing States (Barbados); 
in 1995 on Social Development (Copenhagen) and Women and Development 
(Beijing); in 1996 on Human Settlements (Istanbul) and Food (Vienna). In 1997 there 
was a five-year review of the Rio Earth Summit in New York known as Earth Summit 
II and in 1999 there were General Assembly reviews of Cairo and Barbados.92  
The Rio Summit has come to occupy an almost mythical role in the discourse 
of sustainable development, and is remembered reverentially by many of those 
involved.93 It was in Rio, according to most histories of sustainable development, that 
the concept acquired global political significance, and the Summit was regarded as “a 
major advance for the cause of sustainable development throughout the world.”94 It 
established NGO involvement in the governance of global sustainable development, 
with over 1,400 NGOs officially registering with the UNCED Secretariat as observers 
and lobbyists.95 It is often asserted that many of the agreements and conventions that 
constitute the core of sustainable development in practice may not have come to 
fruition without the “political imperative” of the Rio Summit.96 Yet there were deeply 
conflicting contemporary assessments of the Summit, with critics suggesting that the 
Rio legacy was more akin to the creation of a “global apartheid.”97 For example, 
Chatterjee and Finger have argued that the Earth Summit  
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has boosted precisely the type of industrial development that is destructive for the 
environment, the planet, and its inhabitants. … as a result of UNCED, the rich will 
get richer, the poor poorer, while more and more of the planet is destroyed in the 
process.98 
 
The lack of implementation post-Rio also disappointed many involved in the politics 
of sustainable development, and the Earth Summit II in New York in 1997 was 
widely regarded as a failure.99  
 Yet despite these criticisms and doubts about the value of summits, they have 
continued to occupy a pivotal place in the mainstream discourse, suggesting they 
fulfil more than an instrumental function. Whilst Fomerand argues that “UN 
conferences do respond to the growing and evident need to deal with problems that 
can no longer be treated purely from a national perspective”, it is through their 
theatrical and symbolic function as moments when the global community can unite 
and stand ‘above politics’ in order to agree on sustainable development that they have 
become so central to the discourse.100 As such they have helped to construct a history 
of sustainable development, which, as Peter Doran observes, has become “a 
reassuring tale of recurrent moments of spectacular resolve to secure survival.”101  
 
 
 
Production of subjectivities 
 
Through these practices and forms of knowledge the discourse of sustainable 
development has empowered and produced new political actors and subjects. The 
mainstream vision of sustainable development has remained closely wedded to a 
state-centric model of international politics, and state institutions have been re-
invented and expanded as environmental protection agencies. Yet a broader cast of 
other actors have also been empowered as supporting and co-ordinating agents within 
the discourse. 
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As Agenda 21 makes clear, “successful implementation is first and foremost 
the responsibility of Governments.”102 The Brundtland Report re-affirmed the primary 
role of nation-states in the implementation of the discourse, and urges nation-states to 
“move from their present, often destructive, processes of growth and development 
onto sustainable development paths.”103 The active subjects of the Rio Declaration are 
almost uniquely states, who are urged to eradicate poverty, enact environmental 
legislation and so on, but ultimately with “the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies.”104 Since 
the Stockholm conference the impetus to develop national monitoring programmes 
and environmental departments has meant that many states have been empowered by 
the discourse as ‘environmental protection agencies’, responsible for their own 
sustainable development, and have concretised the discourse through national 
strategies, policy frameworks, government departments and legislative enactments.105 
Whilst the Rio principles recognised that states had “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”, rather than framing sustainable development as a 
competition between North and South the Rio Declaration urged states to “cooperate 
in a spirit of global partnership.”106 In order to achieve this global partnership the co-
ordinating roles of international institutions, and particularly the UN, was emphasised. 
Through summits, conferences, conventions, publications and commissions the UN 
has defined, championed and implemented sustainable development, acting as a focal 
point for drawing other actors into the discourse, in particular NGOs and the scientific 
community.107 As well as being an important producer of the discourse, the 
emergence of sustainable development has had an impact upon the structure and role 
of the UN itself, and Mark Imber suggested that “sustainable development may come 
to acquire the status of a new normative campaign within the UN” which could 
“create a definitive post-Cold War purpose for the organisation.”108 Following the 
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Stockholm Summit, for example, the UNEP was created as an “international 
environmental watchdog” and both UNEP and the much larger and better-funded UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) have become important actors for sustainable 
development within the UN, each publishing major reports embodying the 
discourse.109 
In order to assuage some of the mandate clashes between the UNEP and 
UNDP and to coordinate action for sustainable development within the UN, the Rio 
Summit created the UN Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) to which 
both the UNEP and UNDP were accountable. The CSD has become the focal point of 
the sustainable development discourse within the UN. Described alternatively as “a 
turgid talking shop” and a “pioneer in many areas”, it was nevertheless at the heart of 
both the preparations for and the follow-up to the WSSD and demonstrates how the 
discourse has produced new political actors and spaces.110 
As well as the UN, other international organisations have been empowered 
and legitimised by the discourse as supporting or facilitating actors in the 
implementation of sustainable development. The role of the World Bank has been 
reinvented as a champion of sustainable development, establishing its own 
Environment Department in 1987 and a Vice Presidency for Environmentally 
Sustainable Development in 1993. From only three technical environmental staff in 
the mid-1980s, by 1994 it had almost 300 and in 1996 the President of the World 
Bank stated that “we regard the promotion of sustainable development as one of our 
fundamental objectives.”111 A number of World Bank publications have contributed 
to the sustainable development discourse, including Making Development Sustainable 
(1994), Toward Environmentally Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(1996) and the World Development Report 2003: Sustainable Development in a 
Dynamic World (2003).112 In these reports the World Bank has set out its view of 
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sustainable development, which is that “without better environmental stewardship, 
development will be undermined; and without accelerated development in poor 
countries, environmental policies will fail.”113 Major World Bank projects now 
frequently involve environmental and social impact assessments, the creation of 
biodiversity zones, green development corridors, sustainable livelihood programmes 
and resource management initiatives.114 
The World Bank is also the trustee of GEF funds, and cooperates with the 
UNEP and UNDP in the implementation of projects. According to Zoe Young the 
GEF has become “a rope in the tug-of-war between UN agencies and the World Bank 
for the right to take the lead for ‘sustainable development’ and the global 
environment.”115 As well as these there are also many other international actors and 
institutions that have been empowered by the discourse, such as the World Health 
Organisation, UNESCO, the World Trade Organisation, the International Labour 
Organisation, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation.116 Indeed the international 
architecture of environmental and development governance is now largely structured 
by the sustainable development discourse.  
Integrated by these international institutions into the role of assisting states in 
the implementation of sustainable development projects, as well as increasingly 
taking on more diverse roles as lobbyists, technical experts, empowerment agencies 
and monitors, are a wide range of NGOs and other actors drawn from global civil 
society or Agenda 21’s major groups. Agenda 21 argued that these actors would be 
“critical to the effective implementation of the objectives, policies and mechanisms 
agreed to by states.”117 Some of the most prominent include the IUCN and the WWF, 
as well as other environmental organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth International. NGOs such as the Norwegian sustainable development think-
tank, ProSus, the London-based International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED), the Canadian-based International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) and the Washington-based World Resources Institute (WRI) 
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have been at the forefront of debating and implementing sustainable development.118 
Business lobbyists like the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) have set out the business case for sustainable development in influential 
publications such as Walking the Talk and Financing Change, and have advocated 
greater private sector participation in the discourse.119 Organisations nominated to 
represent a major group have assumed prominent roles in global governance through 
the sustainable development discourse.  
Overall, sustainable development discourse has attempted to re-frame political 
participation in terms of cooperation rather than conflict. North and South, citizens 
and states, environmentalists and developers are, according to the logic of sustainable 
development, now united in pursuit of the same overall goal. For Meadowcroft the 
concept’s greatest success was that it offered a way out of the older “growth versus 
environment” polarities by functioning as a “bridging concept.”120 Thus “sustainable 
development was not formulated as either a logical construct or an operational maxim 
– but rather as a potentially unifying political meta-objective, with a suggestive 
normative core.”121 According to David Pearce, the concept “survives because it 
appears to build bridges between the demands of environmentalists and 
developers.”122 Alan Holland observes that  
 
it is commonly agreed that the Brundtland Report broke the mould by replacing the 
confrontational and sometimes rancorous debates that had hitherto prevailed with a 
more constructive approach to environment and development issues. It offered 
people hope by purporting to show how existing, yet apparently conflicting, 
aspirations might be harnessed together, and how they might be framed as part of a 
common goal.123 
 
In this sense, the very lack of conceptual or scientific precision at the heart of the 
concept has had specific political advantages, what diplomats’ term “constructive 
ambiguity.”124 This lack of clarity has “allowed groups with different and often 
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conflicting interests to reach some common ground upon which concrete policies 
have been developed”, meaning that “sustainable development is a powerful tool for 
political consensus.”125 Yet the success of this reconciliation is always only partial 
and temporary.  
 
 
 
Tensions within the discourse 
 
The influence of the sustainable development discourse produced through 
statements like Our Common Future, the Rio Summit and Agenda 21 is pervasive and 
has structured how environment and development politics are imagined. Yet the very 
scope of these statements means they encompass a multiplicity of interpretations and 
emphases. Therefore assertions that sustainable development “is a ‘motherhood and 
apple-pie’ concept which everyone supports” can obscure many of the tensions within 
the discourse.126 As Whitehead stresses, “while sustainable development may be the 
dominant international vision of socio-ecological development, other more radical 
visions and interpretations of sustainability coexist with sustainable development.”127 
This section will draw attention to just two of the most prominent lines of tension 
within the discourse: between the ‘greens’ and ‘reds’; and between the local and the 
global. 
It is often argued that “it is high time that environmentalists and development 
activists put aside their differences and joined hands under the banner of sustainable 
development to tackle the myriad of problems facing us today.”128 But as Adams has 
shown, the fundamental reconciliation attempted by sustainable development – to see 
development issues and environmental concerns as not contradictory but compatible – 
is one that has had varying degrees of success.129 The label of ‘greens’ has been 
applied to those who prioritise the conservation or preservation of biodiversity and 
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ecosystems, whilst ‘reds’ refers to those whose primary concerns are more orientated 
towards development and combating social injustice.130 
Many greens were dismayed by the Brundtland Report’s espousal of renewed 
economic growth and its strongly utilitarian and anthropocentric tone, encapsulated 
by the chapter on biodiversity entitled “Species and Ecosystems: Resources for 
Development.”131 Striking a green note in one critique, Wolfgang Sachs has argued 
that sustainable development “emasculates the environmental challenge by absorbing 
it into the empty shell of development.”132 Many environmentalists similarly feel that 
the discourse of sustainable development has sidelined ecological concerns and has 
tamed the potentially radical critique of modern industrial society that the 
environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s posed.133 
Despite this, green organisations such as WWF, IUCN and UNEP have been 
at the heart of the discourse and summits such as Stockholm and Rio have tended to 
be dominated by environmental issues, experts and departments.134 The 
conservationist and resource management perspectives that have acquired such a sway 
over mainstream environmental management have a similarly prominent position 
within sustainable development practices.135 The driving role of national 
environmental departments within sustainable development discourse can be seen in 
South Africa, where the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) 
is the leading authority for sustainable development policymaking, and large green 
environmental organisations such as WWF-SA, IUCN-SA, the Wildlife and 
Environmental Society of South Africa (WESSA) and the Endangered Wildlife Trust 
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(EWT) have driven the implementation of sustainable development projects. The 
prominent position of these actors has given sustainable development a particularly 
green tinge in South Africa, with dominant concerns centring on conserving 
environmental resources such as areas of national parkland and wilderness in the 
interests of national and international tourism.136 As a result high value has been 
placed upon scientific and managerial forms of expert knowledge, particularly the 
disciplines of resource conservation and park management; and as a legacy of racist 
and authoritarian conservation policies under Apartheid and the social and economic 
exclusion of the black population from tourism, white, well-off, well-educated groups 
have tended to be over-represented in the sector.137 
Partly as a result of such characteristics there has been considerable scepticism 
that sustainable development apparently involves privileged groups (white Europeans 
and North Americans, scientists, tourists, and the wealthy) prioritising wildlife and 
trees ahead of the poorest and most marginalised sections of society. The ‘red’ 
critique was forcefully articulated by Albie Sachs, the South African anti-Apartheid 
hero and Constitutional Court judge, who observed in 1990 that “it is undeniably 
distasteful to spend huge sums on saving the white rhino when millions of black 
children are starving.”138 From this perspective the environmentalist assertion of 
limits and questioning of economic growth is angrily rejected, for example by David 
Pearce who argues that “anti-growth advocates are embarrassingly silent or unrealistic 
on how they would solve problems of poverty and unemployment.”139  
In this vein sustainable development summits have attracted critical 
assessments from both developing country politicians and many academics, with the 
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editors of one collected volume noting that “what is striking about UNCED is how far 
the agenda had been turned ‘green’ and anti-developmental in the five years from the 
Brundtland Report.”140 Middleton and O’Keefe argued that both Our Common Future 
and the Rio Summit had “fundamentally environmentalistic origins”, and that “the 
capitalist powers had brought off a sleight of hand by largely removing not only 
poverty from the Rio agenda, but even removing people from it.”141 
Yet this long-running tension between greens and reds has been at least 
partially reframed by the sustainable development discourse, which has sought to 
demonstrate that “ecology and economy are becoming ever more interwoven – 
locally, regionally, nationally, and globally – into a seamless net of causes and 
effects.”142 A similar re-framing has been attempted through ‘brown’ articulations of 
environmental justice, with American and South African movements in particular 
highlighting the connections between environmental degradation and social 
injustice.143 By re-defining the environment as ‘where we all live’, the brown agenda 
has focussed on the health impacts of mining, toxic waste, nuclear power, mercury 
poisoning, asbestos, poverty, water pollution, and urban and workplace issues.144 
Campaigns against toxic dumping, air pollution and the location of dirty industries 
have highlighted that environmental risks disproportionately affect the poorest 
sections of society.145 Similar charges are made by those who have drawn parallels 
between the exploitation of the poor, the exploitation of nature, and the exploitation of 
women, with Vandana Shiva claiming that “the marginalisation of women and the 
destruction of biodiversity go hand in hand.”146 
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In South Africa the emergence of the brown movement is often dated to the 
1992 Earthlife Africa Conference “What does it mean to be Green?”147 This 
conference drew heavily on Agenda 21 and gave rise to the EJNF which, together 
with Earthlife Africa and the Durban-based GroundWork, are regarded as “the key 
nodes or hubs” of the environmental justice movement.148 These groups have tended 
to be more confrontational and radical than the greens, sceptical of cooperation with 
private companies and more at home linking with social movements mobilising 
amongst the poorest sections of society.149 As a result, the political, ideological, and 
organisational tensions between the ‘greens’, ‘reds’ and ‘browns’ have constituted a 
long-running fault-line which the broader sustainable development discourse has 
continually re-negotiated with varying degrees of success. 
Another key line of tension within the sustainable development discourse is 
the relationship between the global and local. As shown above, mainstream visions of 
sustainable development have sought to bring the entire planet into view, claiming a 
common human interest and shared future at moments like global summits. For many 
environment and development activists however, these global claims are misleading. 
For Shiva the apparent globalism of sustainable development “does not represent the 
universal human interest, it represents a particular local and parochial interest which 
has been globalised through the scope of its reach.”150 In this vein some questioned 
whether the WSSD would work in favour of “the globalised rich” or “the localised 
poor.”151 Such concerns mirror those of political and global ecology perspectives, 
which often stress that “the reversal of ecological decline involves strengthening local 
rights.”152 
This scalar tension is reflected in the familiar slogan ‘Think Global, Act 
Local’. Despite the apparently global significance of the discourse many of those 
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involved in the study of sustainable development have chosen to focus on local or 
regional-level case studies.153 Agenda 21 promoted local initiatives through the Local 
Agenda 21 which was endorsed in chapter 28 and has been carried forward by the 
Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) association.154 Even the planetary 
vision of Our Common Future acknowledged that “no single blueprint of 
sustainability will be found, as economic and social systems and ecological conditions 
differ widely among countries.”155 
 These lines of tension therefore demonstrate the degree to which the discourse 
of sustainable development encompasses and reabsorbs critiques, continually being 
reinvented in different contexts and locations. Despite these variations and tensions 
between green, brown and red, global and local, sustainable development remains 
fundamentally a discourse which asserts the need to manage and govern social, 
economic and environmental issues for the good of people and planet. It is a response 
to the recognition that, as Foucault saw, “what might be called a society’s ‘threshold 
of modernity’ has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own 
political strategies.”156 From the perspective of the sustainable development discourse 
the survival of the human species now depends on the ability to manage social, 
economic and environmental relationships successfully. Different articulations of the 
discourse have different views on which techniques, according to what standards of 
truth, and by whom this should happen, but the overriding feature of the discourse is 
the assertion that global sustainable development needs to be governed and managed.  
 
 
 
Sustainable development as eco-governmentality 
 
The imperative to govern the social, economic and environmental aspects of 
modern life is at the heart of the discourse of sustainable development. This has 
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tended to produce academic engagements with the subject that focus on how this 
government can be managed most successfully or efficiently. For political scientists 
such as Lafferty and Meadowcroft, for example, “politics constitutes the key 
mediating mechanism through which human societies can self-consciously adjust 
social practices into less environmentally destructive patterns.”157 Whilst such 
problem-solving approaches remain popular and important, others have sought to 
examine more critically the assumptions and political effects of the discourse.158 By 
extending the Foucauldian focus on the population to a consideration of how the 
global environment is brought within the realm of government, a number of authors 
have approached sustainable development through eco-governmentality, green 
governmentality or environmentality perspectives.159 
Such approaches have shown how modern techniques of government have 
worked to bring an active ‘Nature’ under human management as the passive 
‘environment’. For example, Luke reads the work of the WorldWatch Institute as a 
“continuous attempt to reinvent the forces of Nature in the economic exploitation of 
advanced technologies”, and “the disciplinary construction of various modes of bio-
power in promoting the growth of human populations.”160 This leads him to raise 
doubts “about the apparently benign intentions of environmental actions, given the 
disciplinary propensities of the practices embedded in this new regime of 
environmentality.”161 For Luke such NGOs “operate as a green panopticon, enclosing 
Nature in rings of centered normalising super-vision”, in order to dominate, exclude 
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and repress people and the environment.162 In a similar vein, he suggests elsewhere 
that the environmental movement is the latest in a “solid series of statist practices 
beginning in the eighteenth century”, and is the means by which “the bio-power of the 
entire planet, not just human beings” has been brought under “the strategic ambit of 
state power.”163 He concludes by questioning whether “sustainable development 
discourse [is] anything more than an eco-knowledge of/by/for the modern capitalist 
mode of production”, arguing that “environments are spaces under police supervision, 
expert management or technocratic control; hence, by taking environmentalistic 
agendas into the heart of state policy, one finds the ultimate meaning of the police 
state fulfilled.”164 The model of eco-governmentality exposed here is, according to 
Luke, a repressive and exploitative one, which works to dominate people and nature 
in the interests of political elites, science and capital. 
In contrast to this view of eco-governmentality as a statist, repressive, 
dominating form of power, other discussions of eco-governmentality have drawn 
attention to how government operates through the production of particular subjects. 
Gupta, for example, shows how new “postcolonial spaces” are being created between 
the global and the local and how “the ‘unbundled’ space in which these forms of 
governance are exercised creates its own possibilities for opposition to coalesce.”165 
He discusses “environmentalism as a new disciplinary technology”, and concludes 
that “we may be witnessing the birth of a new regime of discipline in which 
governmentality is un-hitched from the nation-state to be instituted anew on the global 
scale.”166 Similarly Bryant draws attention to the ways in which different forms of 
subjectivity are produced in his analysis of NGOs in the Philippines, concluding that 
they “have been central to a process whereby hitherto ‘peripheral’ people and biota 
are brought within the remit of political rationalities of control and surveillance.”167  
These eco-governmentality approaches therefore draw attention to the bio-
political and disciplinary tendencies within the discourse of sustainable development: 
the bringing of “life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations.”168 
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Disciplinary forms of government produce regulated and monitored subjects over 
whom rule is exercised, and sustainable development is regarded as having extended 
statist, interventionist forms of rule to the planetary and ecological levels. However, 
these accounts do not exhaust the insights of a governmentality analysis, indeed they 
do not fully draw out the ways in which, for Foucault, governmental forms of power 
work through the creation of free, rational individuals and actors who are both the 
subjects and objects of government, and operate at a distance from traditional centres 
of authority.169 More along these lines, Agrawal sets out to explain “why, when, how, 
and in what measure people come to develop an environmentally orientated subject 
position” through community-based environmental management schemes in rural 
India.170 He describes in detail how forests and local communities have been 
governed in India through the creation of environmental subjects, “governmentalised 
localities” and “regulatory communities.”171 As such, rather than solely the 
disciplining and repressive effects of eco-governmentality, he is interested in the ways 
that the “very individuality that is supposed to be constrained by the exercise of power 
may actually be its effect.”172 In another account of how processes of eco-
governmentality are implicated in new forms of power and rule, Goldman has shown 
how World Bank development projects such as the Nam Theun II dam in Laos 
specifically target rural and marginalised communities, “compelling them to 
participate in the new neo-liberal process of eco-government.”173 Drawing attention to 
the production of fragmented, stratified and transnationalised environmental states in 
the global South, Goldman shows how World Bank programmes of capacity-building 
and knowledge transfer have produced a situation where “the modern eco-rational 
subject and the environmental state are being mutually constituted.”174 
A similar sensitivity to processes through which actors are empowered and 
subjects created is displayed by Oels in analysing the changing ways in which ‘the 
climate’ has been rendered governable. She suggests that “shifts in the discourses and 
practices of climate change should be understood in terms of a shift of 
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governmentality from bio-power to advanced liberal government in Western 
industrialised countries.”175 She clarifies that 
 
climate change as framed by bio-power creates the basis for justifying far-ranging 
policy interventions and even the extension of state power in the name of ‘survival’ 
of life on planet Earth. Advanced liberal government, on the other hand, renders 
climate change governable as an issue of state failure requiring market-based 
solutions or the creation of markets.176 
 
The form of governance represented by the Kyoto Protocol, Oels argues, relies on 
“market-based solutions that spur technological innovation and economic growth”, 
thereby constructing the broader population as active participants in governance-via-
markets, rather than as passive objects of discipline or regulation.177  
Whilst the analysis of Luke and others highlights the sovereign and 
disciplinary dimensions of sustainable development, the work of Agrawal, Goldman 
and Oels draws attention to the ways in which discourses of environmentalism and 
sustainable development empower free, economically and ecologically rational 
subjects as part of broader patterns of advanced liberal government. Rather than a 
linear progression through sovereign, disciplinary and governmental forms of power, 
an eco-governmentality perspective draws attention to the different balances and 
combinations between these rationalities of power in particular forms of rule.178 
Approaching sustainable development from an eco-governmentality 
perspective is therefore primarily analytical rather than normative, and means moving 
away from the strident condemnation of modern environmentalism as repressive and 
statist. Eric Darier notes as much in his discussion of the Canadian Green Plan from 
an eco-governmentality perspective, observing that “one cannot answer the abstract 
question whether the Green Plan is good or bad.”179 By showing how the Green Plan 
sought to produce environmentally responsible citizens who would take greater 
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ownership of their actions, he suggests that “the Green Plan could be one of the 
conditions for the subsequent emergence of radically different green subjectivities and 
a step toward the greater disciplining of the population on global scale.”180 
Environmentalists, or those deeply attached to the sustainable development project, 
might well regard such processes of eco-governmentality as necessary and desirable. 
An analytics of government perspective, however, would always be alert to the 
potential dangers implicit in such rationalities.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that sustainable development can be understood as a 
discourse, rather than as a precise concept or scientific term. By asserting that 
environmental degradation and economic and social underdevelopment are mutually 
re-producing sustainable development has redefined dominant approaches to these 
issues. Constituted through key texts such as Our Common Future, Caring for the 
Earth and Agenda 21, and moments like the Rio Summit, it has established certain 
ways of viewing global politics, authorised particular forms of knowledge and 
techniques for implementing sustainable development, and has empowered certain 
actors to achieve it. 
As conceived in Our Common Future, sustainable development is a discourse 
rooted in social democratic traditions of interventionist global government. The 
Brundtland Commission was influenced by the discussions of North-South economic 
development and international security in the Brandt and Palme reports of the early 
1980s, and they shared the internationalist and cosmopolitan outlook indicated by 
their similar titles.181 The Brundtland Report urged governments, supported by civil 
society and co-ordinated by international institutions, to take greater control of social, 
economic and environmental policies, thereby establishing a global field of 
governmental visibility. Population, pollution, energy and food supplies would all 
require active management according to this rationality of government. The discourse 
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of sustainable development therefore extended and expanded the remit of 
development, bringing new concerns and issues to light, but without fundamentally 
changing the state-centric, disciplinary, bio-political model of government on which it 
was based. The predominant focus of the discourse has been on environmental factors 
and it has been driven by authorised experts within the disciplines of environmental 
management and green economics. The natural sciences, economics, and security 
technologies have been enlisted to monitor, assess, regulate and manage sustainable 
development, and as such it has relied heavily upon disciplinary modes of power: 
surveillance, monitoring, economic planning and environmental legislation, to the 
degree that, according to Luke, “the bio-power of the entire planet, not just human 
beings” has been brought under “the strategic ambit of state power.”182 
Yet more governmental forms of power co-exist with these disciplinary 
technologies. Through techniques of public participation and the construction of 
major groups, civil society actors have been created and inserted into these policy 
processes and techniques of power. One site in which sovereign, disciplinary and 
governmental rationalities have been manifested has been the UN summit, established 
as an authoritative moment for the production of sustainable development discourse. 
For Chasek and Sherman, “these summits and conferences were intended to form a set 
of interconnected global plans to move the world towards a more sustainable 
future.”183 A united global community was constructed through moments like Rio, 
coming together to agree on ways to secure the fragile planet, above the petty 
differences of day-to-day politics. As Maurice Strong, Conference Secretary-General 
at Rio, later reflected, 
 
as an event in itself, the Earth Summit was clearly remarkable, perhaps even historic. 
Never before had so many of the world’s political leaders come together in one place, 
and the fact that they came to consider the urgent question of our planet’s future put 
these issues under an enormous spotlight. We arranged that I would have them for 
one hour without assistants, without support staff, without ministers, in a room – just 
the leaders and myself and Boutros-Ghali, who was then the Secretary-General. 
During that hour I had the sense that they really accepted the premise that the issues 
they had come to Rio to address were literally more important for the future of their 
people than most of the things that were actually preoccupying their own particular 
national agendas at the time.184 
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For Strong and many others it was only through such gatherings of state leaders, face-
to-face, that a sustainable future could be secured.  
Yet, as has been only too obvious at moments like Stockholm, Rio and New 
York, the politics of sustainable development implies contradictions, disagreements 
and heated disputes about exactly what is to be sustained, how, by whom and for how 
long. It is an essentially contested concept, since it advances “conflicting moral and 
political commitments between which reason cannot arbitrate.”185 Greens, browns and 
reds disagree over the balance between the three legs of the tripod, as well as the 
relationship between science and politics, consensus and conflict. Some articulations 
stress the need to think globally, others the priority of acting locally. Despite these 
tensions, the discourse has proved remarkably elastic, and as a broad rationality of 
government it remains an imperative which many institutions, programmes and 
groups adhere to. As Sachs has argued,  
 
Shell together with Greenpeace, the World Bank as well as the anti-dam movement 
invoke ‘sustainable development’; few outrightly deny the concept. On the contrary, 
the idea works like an all-purpose cement, gluing everybody together, friends and 
foes alike.186 
 
The degree to which this discourse is shared by diverse groups means that battles over 
its meaning and application are often intense and their results can have profound 
political effects. The WSSD was convened in Johannesburg, ten years after Rio and 
fifteen after the Brundtland Report, and it stood as a privileged and authoritative 
moment for the re-shaping of sustainable development. The next three chapters of the 
thesis show how the WSSD re-orientated the discourse of sustainable development, 
highlight the evolving role of summitry within global politics, and explore how 
dominant forms of government were contested and protested in Johannesburg. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Negotiating Sustainable Development:  
From a global deal to partnerships at the WSSD 
 
 
 
 
This Summit will be remembered not for the treaties, the 
commitments, or the declarations it produced, but for 
the first stirrings of a new way of governing the global 
commons – the beginnings of a shift from the stiff 
formal waltz of traditional diplomacy to the jazzier 
dance of improvisational solution-oriented partnerships 
that may include non-government organisations, willing 
governments and other stakeholders. 
Jonathan Lash, 20021 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The WSSD officially opened on 26 August 2002 in the Sandton Convention 
Centre, Johannesburg, and ran until 2 September. It was the culmination of a 
preparatory process that had begun well over two years previously and involved a 
multitude of participants, debates and competing agendas. The complex negotiations 
can be interpreted in terms of two alternative approaches to sustainable development: 
campaigns for a multilateral ‘Global Deal’ on the one hand, and flexible, bilateral, 
voluntary partnerships on the other. These were more than different negotiating tactics 
or competing preferences for mechanisms of implementation. Rather, they constituted 
alternative rationalities of government which articulated specific visions of the scope 
and ends of sustainable development, the purpose and means of implementation, and 
the types of actor and political agent required. Whereas Luke has characterised 
sustainable development as a disciplinary and bio-political form of government, this 
chapter argues that the predominance of the partnerships approach in the 
                                                 
1
 World Resources Institute, News Release: WRI expresses disappointment over many WSSD outcomes, 
(Washington DC, 04/09/2002). 
 96 
Johannesburg outcomes re-orientated sustainable development discourse toward 
forms of advanced liberal government.2 
 The WSSD was preceded by preparatory committee meetings (PrepComs) at 
which most of the negotiations were conducted. The first PrepCom meeting was held 
in New York in April–May 2001, and it was followed by regional PrepComs held in 
Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia. The second global PrepCom was held in 
January–February 2002 and PrepCom III was in March–April 2002, both in New 
York. PrepCom IV was held in Bali in Indonesia in May–June 2002. Delegates left 
Bali with almost a quarter of the text unresolved, and so substantive negotiations also 
took place in Johannesburg between diplomats, ministerial heads of delegation, and 
finally heads-of-state.3 The thematic content of the negotiations was based around 
reviewing progress since Rio, identifying new challenges, and renewing “political 
commitment and support for sustainable development.”4 In May 2002 Kofi Annan 
provided a more specific focus for the WSSD in the form of his WEHAB agenda, 
which identified water, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity as “five specific 
areas where concrete results are both essential and achievable.”5 
Debates over the form of the eventual Summit agreements emerged early in 
the process when a paper presented at PrepCom II by the Summit’s UN Secretariat 
proposed alternative ‘Type I’ and ‘Type II’ outcomes.6 The paper suggested that 
 
Type I outcomes would be in the form of documents to be negotiated by all States 
during the Preparatory Committee process and would assess overall progress 
achieved since Rio, identify major constraints and suggest measures to overcome 
these constraints.7 
 
The Type I outcomes were multilateral, consensually negotiated texts, specifically the 
Johannesburg Political Declaration, a 37-point document reaffirming the global 
commitment to sustainable development drafted primarily by the South African 
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Government, and the multilaterally negotiated Plan of Implementation, a 170-
paragraph global blueprint for the implementation of Agenda 21.8  
However, in addition to these negotiated texts, delegates agreed that a number 
of non-negotiated partnerships, or Type II outcomes, would be formally accredited as 
recognised outcomes of the Summit.  
 
Type II outcomes would consist of a series of commitments, targets and partnerships 
made by individual governments or groups of governments, at the regional and/or 
inter-regional level, as well as with involvement of or among major groups … this 
type of outcome would not have to be negotiated in the Preparatory Committee with 
involvement of all States, and would be developed and agreed upon only among the 
parties involved.9  
 
These partnerships were not new in the sense that such partnerships for 
implementation have long existed as tools of governance; however, their inclusion as 
official accredited outcomes of a UN summit was groundbreaking.10 
The UN position in Johannesburg was that these two types of outcomes were 
not competing alternatives, rather that Type II agreements should complement 
commitments made by governments instead of replacing them.11 Yet such a balanced 
view was not shared by many Summit participants, and the US delegation’s 
enthusiasm for partnerships and hostility to new multilateral agreements was 
undisguised. They were joined on many issues by what is known as the JUSCANZ 
group: Japan, US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. On the other hand G77 and 
EU delegations often tended to press for stricter multilateral commitments and targets.  
This chapter argues that the proposals for a Global Deal relied upon more 
regulatory, hierarchical and disciplinary forms of power, whereas the partnerships 
approach represented a form of advanced liberal governmentality, committed to 
governing through free, empowered, responsible actors. The eventual predominance 
of the latter at the WSSD reflected and encouraged broader trends in sustainable 
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development discourse and produced particular political effects. By highlighting these 
effects, this chapter seeks to draw attention to the inherently political character of 
these rationalities of government. 
 
 
 
A new ‘Global Deal’ at the WSSD?  
 
 Early in the diplomatic process proposals emerged for striking a new ‘Global 
Deal’ in Johannesburg which would involve restructuring global political and 
economic power relationships. These proposals never acquired a tight, structured 
coherence but rather constituted a looser ensemble of various visions which, despite 
their differences, shared a desire to reinvigorate commitments to sustainable 
development as articulated in Our Common Future and Agenda 21, and catalyse 
political action to secure the planetary population. 
The Danish delegation were the first to advocate a Global Deal during the 
PrepCom process and their non-paper (so-called in UN diplomacy because they are 
informal suggestions, rather than concrete negotiating proposals) was circulated at the 
European Regional Ministerial Meeting in September 2001 to an enthusiastic 
reception.12 It focussed on better market access for developing countries, improved 
development assistance and debt relief, and the transfer of sustainable technology.13 
Subsequently the South African government also began to champion the idea of a 
Global Deal, publishing two non-papers in 2002 entitled From Rio to Johannesburg 
and People, Planet, Prosperity.14 They called for “fundamental structural changes” in 
order to “define a new relationship between the north and south for sustainable 
development.”15 These structural changes involved “fair access for the South to the 
markets of the North”; “adequate instruments for countries in the South to manage 
adjustment costs of trade reform”; “measures to stabilise international financial flows, 
encourage longer-term investment in developing countries, provide debt relief where 
necessary to bring about sustainable development, and improve the quantity and 
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quality of ODA”; “more open and democratic multilateral agencies”; and 
“programmes to ensure that efforts to protect the environment in the North do not 
shift dirty or unhealthy production processes to the South.”16 Through its support for 
the New Economic Plan for African Development (NEPAD) and the vision of a 
proactive role for the African continent in driving its own development, the Global 
Deal proposals constituted part of the broader South African commitment to an 
‘African Renaissance’ in international relations.17 
 As well as the South African and Danish proposals, many non-state actors also 
endorsed the Global Deal proposals.18 For example, the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s 
publication, The Jo’burg Memo, authored by 17 leading academics, intellectuals, 
activists and diplomats and coordinated by Wolfgang Sachs, called for a Global Deal 
that would represent “a pact between the stronger and the weaker for a common, more 
secure future.”19 This Global Deal would involve “structural changes in the 
architecture of the transnational economy”, and it advocated proposals such as debt 
relief, fair trade, making WTO rules equal to or subservient to environmental 
regulations, establishing a legal convention on corporate accountability and creating a 
World Environment Organisation.20 It also emphasised the historic legacy of pollution 
and exploitation owed by the North to the South. The Jo’burg Memo concluded that, 
“in a nutshell, restraint (in resource use and the exercise of power), reparation (from 
North to South), and rights (for citizens, communities and national societies) are the 
conceptual coordinates for framing a global deal.”21 
 These proposals never crystallised into an explicit and coherent platform, and 
they often provoked a great deal of doubt, distrust and outright opposition.22 It 
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became clear relatively early that there was little chance of agreeing on a new 
overarching deal in Johannesburg, not least due to the prevailing international climate 
of pessimism and insecurity post-9/11, increasing US unilateralism, and a looming 
global economic downturn.23 Yet the rationality of government underlying the Global 
Deal proposals continued to underpin diplomatic efforts to secure the strongest 
multilateral agreements possible at the WSSD. The campaigns for binding targets, 
concrete timetables, firm pledges of resources and support and stronger legal regimes 
were all part of this approach to sustainable development. The following sections 
therefore describe the fields of visibility, regimes of knowledge, assemblages of 
techniques and technologies, and forms of identity and subjectivity which constituted 
this rationality of government. 
  
Fields of Visibility 
The Global Deal approach to implementing sustainable development explicitly 
articulated a global vision which invoked the planetary scope of Brundtland and Rio. 
It also established poverty as the primary focus of sustainable development, although 
in broad terms which allowed for social and environmental dimensions to be 
addressed in terms of poverty eradication. These two aspects constituted the central 
planks of the fields of visibility established by the Global Deal rationality of 
government. 
The broad global scope was evident in the South African non-paper which 
asserted that “the global community stands at the brink of one of the most significant 
events of the early Millennium” – the WSSD – which “could be the most significant 
global gathering in recent history for the world.”24 It argued that  
 
if the world continues along this unequal growth path, the combined threats of ill 
health and disease, conflicts over natural resources, underdevelopment, 
environmental degradation and economic instability will undermine even the 
prosperity and stability of the developed world. Poverty is not only a problem of poor 
nations but also negatively impacts on richer nations. The continued marginalisation 
of developing countries and the social exclusion of the vast majority of their people 
constitute a threat to global stability.25 
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The EU position paper on the WSSD argued that “sustainable development can be 
achieved only if it is recognised as a global objective: whatever is undertaken in one 
country or area will impact on the wider environment.”26 
The Global Deal proposals represented a holistic and comprehensive view of 
the nature of sustainable development, one in which the inter-relationships between 
environmental, social and economic issues required a multilateral, planetary approach. 
The Danish non-paper, for example, explicitly argued that the “purpose of ‘A Global 
Deal’ is to ensure a new balance between the global economic, social and 
environmental development with a view to furthering global sustainable 
development.”27 The EU position paper on the WSSD made clear “that environmental 
concerns cannot be treated as if they were separate from social and economic 
policies”, and “the legacy of this compartmentalised thinking is a series of grave 
threats to the viability of our way of life.”28 For the South African hosts “the need to 
integrate the three pillars of sustainable development”, and particularly to ensure that 
poverty eradication was at its heart, was one of the primary high-level reasons for 
hosting the Summit.29 They expressed their hope that the Summit would “find 
solutions to the current crises facing humanity today: poverty, conflict, economic 
instability, the negative effects of globalisation, the degradation of environmental 
resources and emerging pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.”30 Similarly, the The Jo’burg 
Memo adopted a comprehensive and holistic approach to sustainable development, 
with chapters on water, energy, urban livelihoods, genetic knowledge, trade and 
finance, biodiversity rights and values, and global governance and institutions.31 
This broad view of sustainable development was firmly within the Brundtland 
and Rio traditions. The Global Deal visions however represented an emerging 
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consensus that eradicating poverty was the primary focus of the discourse.32 It was the 
subject of the first chapter in the Plan of Implementation, which asserted that 
“eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge facing the world today and an 
indispensable requirement for sustainable development, particularly for developing 
countries.”33 As such, discussions of limits to growth, population and environmental 
catastrophes were relatively absent from the Johannesburg debates and only 23 
paragraphs of the Plan of Implementation were devoted to “protecting and managing 
the natural resource base of economic and social development”, out of 170 paragraphs 
in total.34 Whereas Agenda 21 devoted over a third of its paragraphs and over half of 
its pages to the “conservation and management of resources for development”, the 
Johannesburg outcomes prioritised poverty and socio-economic development.35 
This re-framing of the discourse towards traditional development concerns 
rather than ecological issues was also reflected in the changing titles of the 
Stockholm-Rio-Johannesburg summits, which progressed from the Human 
Environment; through Environment and Development; to Sustainable Development.36 
As Adil Najam explains, “the nomenclature of these mega-conferences is not just of 
semantic importance, it demonstrates a significant evolution in the very content of 
what constitutes the substance of global environmental governance.”37 Many 
environmentalists were frustrated by the apparent marginalisation of ecological 
concerns at the WSSD, and Shiva angrily alleged that there was an “official directive 
to the media to remove the term ‘Earth’ from all references to the World Summit in 
Johannesburg, and only refer to poverty or development.”38  
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Yet to interpret the WSSD as establishing the dominance of ‘Southern 
development’ ahead of ‘Northern environment’ priorities is simplistic and misleading. 
In fact, as Wapner has argued, the WSSD signalled the redundancy of the “idea that 
the North cares only about the environment while the South worries solely about 
development.”39 For Wapner, Johannesburg showed that “much of the South is 
increasingly concerned with environmental issues”, particularly the two-way link 
between environmental degradation and poverty; whereas conversely “Northern 
governments are now increasingly letting these concerns fall by the wayside in favour 
of, ironically, economic development.”40 Certainly, much of the pressure for 
international action on apparently ‘environmental’ issues, such as water, climate 
change and biodiversity, at the WSSD came from delegates from developing 
countries, although the EU retained its traditional enthusiasm in these areas. However, 
rather than seeing a simple reversal of the binary divisions between ‘South/North’ and 
‘environment/development’, what the Johannesburg Summit demonstrated was the 
increasingly doubtful value of these categories in analysing sustainable development 
politics. 
Rather than competing ‘environment’ and ‘development’ agendas, the Global 
Deal vision at the WSSD brought them together through a focus on poverty and its 
ramifications on a planetary scale. By framing poverty in broad terms as injustice and 
inequality, in which economic inequity, social disempowerment and environmental 
degradation were all implicated, the Global Deal vision allowed green, red and brown 
articulations of sustainable development all to frame their concerns in terms of 
poverty eradication and justice. The final texts confirmed this, with sections on energy 
access, production and consumption patterns, renewable energy, climate change, 
agriculture, desertification, biodiversity, forests, globalisation, and health, plus many 
more, all relating back to the primary challenge of eradicating poverty.41 
The Global Deal proposals therefore established a broad, planetary, inclusive 
vision of government, structured around the primary goal of poverty eradication. The 
task of sustainable development was envisaged, as in Brundtland, as the management 
of global development paths. The South African proposal argued that “the way that 
the First World nations have advanced – through industry – has been acknowledged 
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as deeply flawed and fundamentally unsustainable … we cannot go down the same 
path.”42 This global project was most strongly articulated at the Summit in the 
Johannesburg Political Declaration, which was committed to the “interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development – economic development, 
social development and environmental protection”, and “confirmed that significant 
progress has been made towards achieving a global consensus and partnership among 
all the people of our planet.”43  
 
Regimes of knowledge 
Within this global and holistic field of visibility, certain forms of knowledge 
were established and rendered authoritative in identifying unsustainable development, 
re-orientating economic and social practices, and monitoring their success. The 
natural and economic sciences were invoked as in the Brundtland Report and Agenda 
21, and a more political and ethical understanding of the relationship between science, 
public values and policy-making was stressed. 
Panels at the WSSD reported that “new research was needed on natural, social 
and economic systems and their interactions, as the status of observational data is 
worse than it was ten years ago”; and representatives of the scientific and 
technological community reiterated the “ever-increasing need for more accurate 
scientific data.”44 The Plan of Implementation demanded more sophisticated 
modelling and analysis techniques, “improved use of climate and weather information 
and forecasts”, “early warning systems”, “national monitoring networks”, “resource 
databases” and “remote-sensing and satellite technologies”; in sum to “build greater 
capacity in science and technology for sustainable development.”45 Surveillance 
technologies were urged, such as “the development and wider use of earth observation 
technologies, including satellite remote sensing, global mapping and geographic 
information systems, to collect quality data on environmental impacts, land use and 
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land-use changes.”46 The concept of ‘ecological foot-printing’, which involves 
calculating the environmental impact of particular societies, nations or events, was 
discussed but due to US opposition did not make it into the final text.47 
As well as ‘more science’ the Global Deal proposals also called for new and 
additional financial resources for development.48 The Plan of Implementation 
reflected this, stressing that sustainable development would “require significant 
increases in the flow of financial resources as elaborated in the Monterrey Consensus, 
including through new and additional financial resources, in particular to developing 
countries.”49 Yet these calls for ‘more science and more resources’ were balanced by 
the acknowledgement that they were not the primary obstacles to achieving 
sustainable development. For advocates of a Global Deal the main challenge was 
political. As such greater public access to information and policy-making was urged, 
and the Danish non-paper emphasised the importance of previous agreements such as 
Rio’s Principle 10 (on public access to information and participation in decision-
making) and the 2001 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.50 
Public participation, lay knowledge and the need for science to be informed by civic 
values were stressed in The Jo’burg Memo.51 The most sophisticated articulation of 
these concerns was by Professor Steve Rayner of the UK Economic and Social 
Research Council’s ‘Science in Society Programme’, who suggested that 
 
scientists could administer some much needed shock therapy to the sustainable 
development debate by declaring unequivocally that further research is not a 
prerequisite for sound policy action, that science has already established a solid 
justification for society to act, and that politicians can no longer shelter behind the 
myth of the perfectibility of scientific knowledge. At this point in history the role of 
scientists as citizens may be more important than their role as technical experts.52  
 
In calling for scientists to focus on their role as citizens rather than technical experts, 
Rayner drew attention to the political and ethical dimensions of sustainable 
development, rather than viewing it as a primarily scientific or technical challenge. 
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This was an important feature of the Global Deal approach and reflects a more subtle 
and nuanced understanding of the relationship between power and knowledge than 
many other articulations of sustainable development.53 Accordingly the Plan of 
Implementation acknowledged, if only in passing, “the importance of ethics for 
sustainable development.”54 
Greater scientific and economic knowledge, measurement, assessment and 
modelling, mobilised in the pursuit of the political goal of equitable sustainable 
development, were accordingly crucial elements of the Global Deal approach. The 
tendency of the Global Deal proposals to invoke scientific and technical knowledge 
has much in common with the techniques of disciplinary government familiar from 
Brundtland and Agenda 21, however they also explicitly drew attention to the 
importance of balancing scientific knowledge with public participation, and hence to 
the inherently contextual and political nature of sustainable development. 
 
Techniques and technologies 
The principal mechanisms demanded by the Global Deal proposals were the 
creation of binding multilateral regimes and regulations, and negotiated targets and 
timeframes. There were calls for new legal conventions, such as on corporate 
accountability; targets on renewable energy, sanitation and biodiversity; and 
regulations, such as on health care, chemicals and the relationship between trade and 
environmental agreements.  
The South African non-paper argued that implementing sustainable 
development would require “concrete plans of action, delivery mechanisms, resource 
plans, targets and timeframes within an overarching and time bound ‘Johannesburg 
Programme of Action’.”55 The Danish non-paper suggested that the Global Deal 
should be based around the Millennium Development Goal targets, “international 
standards for environment and labour”, increased development assistance (aiming for 
the 0.7 per cent of GDP target), and the “ratification and implementation of existing 
multilateral environmental agreements within set time limits as well as strengthening 
and activating the financial mechanisms of these agreements.”56 Chasek and Sherman 
reported that “the Group of 77 and China was active in seeking clear targets and time 
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frames for implementation on most issues.”57 The EU sought targets on sanitation, 
renewable energy, biodiversity and sustainable consumption and production.58 Most 
large environmental NGOs at the WSSD also pressed for stronger texts and 
timeframes, for example Claude Martin of the WWF argued that “it is essential that 
the WSSD does not simply end up with declarations and voluntary pledges, but 
instead concrete commitments with targets and time-frames.”59  
The biggest victory for the Global Deal approach was the agreement of a new 
binding multilateral target on sanitation. Whilst there was a Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) on halving the number of people without access to safe water by 2015, 
there was no equivalent target on sanitation. Thanks to a concerted campaign by 
NGOs and water caucuses, as well as EU and G77 delegations, the Plan of 
Implementation set the target of halving the number of people without access to clean 
sanitation by 2015, despite considerable American opposition.60 However, there were 
rumours that the US and Japan had only agreed to the target on sanitation in exchange 
for other targets being dropped, such as on renewable energy.61 
Indeed, there were few other new and binding international targets in the final 
text. Whilst paragraphs on the safe management of chemicals by 2020 and achieving 
sustainable fisheries by 2015 were welcomed, many other targets were regarded as 
vague, non-binding, or as repetitions of previous agreements.62 Reviewing the 
contribution of the WSSD to international law, Marc Pallemaerts concluded that it 
contained few concrete legal additions or clarifications to existing laws, and moreover 
“even references to law in general as an instrument of social governance are rather 
scarce throughout the text.”63 Targets on renewable energy proposed by the EU and 
Brazil were opposed not only by the Americans, but also by the G77 and China, and 
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the final text stressed increasing access to energy for the poor rather than renewable 
energy or greater efficiency.64 
In terms of implementing these agreements, the Political Declaration 
somewhat plaintively urged “developed countries that have not done so to make 
concrete efforts [to] reach the internationally agreed levels of official development 
assistance.”65 However it was broadly recognised that levels of development aid had 
failed dismally to reach the target of 0.7 per cent of GDP, and several states made it 
clear “it was unrealistic to expect any rapid or dramatic increases.”66 New sources of 
finance, such as the Type II partnerships with the private sector, were therefore 
desperately needed. Yet advocates of a Global Deal were concerned about the 
possible “privatisation of development”, and smaller states were worried they could 
be marginalised in a competitive market for corporate investment.67 NGOs were 
concerned that partnerships would “offer governments an ‘escape hatch’ – a way of 
evading meaningful inter-governmentally agreed commitments.”68 Thus the Global 
Deal perspective on partnerships emphasised the need for fixed structures, 
coordination and oversight. The South African non-paper, for example, recognised the 
role partnerships must play in implementation, but clarified that “within each priority 
area, stakeholder groups will be called on to make concrete commitments to their role 
and responsibility in meeting the targets agreed.”69 This desire to regulate and govern 
corporate participation more closely was articulated most forcefully through 
campaigns for a convention on corporate accountability.  
A coalition of NGOs, supported by many developing states, called for a 
legally binding UN convention regulating the participation of the private sector in 
sustainable development.70 Opposition emerged during PrepCom II when the US, 
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South Korea, Turkey and Canada, among others, sought to remove even minimal 
references to voluntary corporate responsibility from the Chairperson’s text. This was 
blocked by the G77 and China, who proposed new text on the responsibilities of 
trans-national corporations.71 The issue arose again in Bali where a UN framework on 
corporate accountability was discussed, but remained in brackets after the EU and the 
US argued that this was a matter for national governments, or at least should be 
downgraded to a framework on corporate responsibility.72 Thus the debate became 
framed in terms of those favouring voluntary corporate responsibility and those who 
demanded stricter corporate accountability. 
 
‘Corporate responsibility’ was claimed by the sizeable business lobby at the Summit 
as being the main pathway by which business would voluntarily, and by means of 
partnerships, contribute to implementing sustainable development. … ‘Corporate 
accountability’, in contrast, was the rallying cry of most non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and community groups assembled in Johannesburg, who saw 
(big) business as the main constraint to sustainable development and who demanded 
strict regulation of corporate behaviour by national governments as well as an 
international corporate accountability convention.73 
 
 The official Summit outcomes included the language of both corporate 
responsibility and accountability, yet the balance was unambiguously tilted towards 
the former. The Political Declaration stated that “there is a need for private sector 
corporations to enforce corporate accountability, which should take place within a 
transparent and stable regulatory environment”, a formulation which relied on 
corporations exercising responsible self-government.74 The Plan of Implementation 
compromised by asserting the need to “enhance corporate environmental and social 
responsibility and accountability.”75 This was to be achieved through encouraging 
“industry to improve social and environmental performance through voluntary 
initiatives, including environmental management systems, codes of conduct, 
certification and public reporting on environmental and social issues.”76 The most 
contentious debates were over whether paragraph 49 laid the basis for a future inter-
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governmental regime on corporate accountability, and dramatic exchanges continued 
until the very close of the Summit.77 The final position was ambiguous, and optimistic 
commentators concluded that an opening had been created which might “actually 
result in future intergovernmental processes that would enable civil society to push for 
the creation of an international regulatory framework for corporations.”78 The texts 
themselves however were firmly behind a conception of corporate responsibility as 
voluntary and self-governing, rather than a more structured regulatory relationship. 
This was a reflection of the broader failure of the Global Deal vision to achieve many 
of the new binding regimes, conventions, targets or timeframes desired in 
Johannesburg. 
  
Production of subjectivities 
The Global Deal proposals tended to envision the relationship between 
governed and governors in relatively state-centric, hierarchical terms. The deal they 
hoped to strike was one within the international community of states, between the 
countries of the North and South. States were assumed to be “at the coalface” of 
delivering the Summit’s outcomes.79 Different articulations of the Global Deal 
stressed different ways in which the community of states could be coordinated ‘from 
above’, or pressurised ‘from below’, but all conceived the principal actors in 
sustainable development as sovereign states. Even civil society groups, so enthusiastic 
in their assertion of their own right to participate in Rio in 1992, were very clear in 
Johannesburg that states could not use partnerships to evade their primary 
responsibilities. The Eco-Equity NGO network issued a statement urging that, 
fundamentally, “the responsibility for agreeing on world-wide social and 
environmental rules must remain with governments”, and that “the primary Summit 
mandate is for governments to agree to action-oriented, time-bound measures.”80 
However, many of the Global Deal proposals recognised that the existing state 
system was relatively uncoordinated. As one pre-Summit discussion paper put it, “the 
international environmental regime appears weak and fragmented and lacks adequate 
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expertise, resources, authority, and legitimacy.”81 The South Africans suggested “a 
single centralised political council” within the UN system which would “co-ordinate 
monitoring of progress” on sustainable development.82 Accordingly the Political 
Declaration asserted that “we need more effective, democratic and accountable 
international and multilateral institutions”, and supported “the leadership role of the 
United Nations as the most universal and representative organisation in the world, 
which is best placed to promote sustainable development.”83 Other Global Deal 
proposals echoed pre-existing campaigns for the creation of a new international 
organisation which could coordinate sustainable development and counter the 
influence of the World Trade Organisation.84 The Jo’burg Memo, for example, 
supported “upgrading UNEP into a World Environment Organisation”, as well as 
proposing the creation of an International Renewable Energy Agency, along the lines 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency.85  
The Global Deal approach therefore represented an interventionist, structured 
rationality of government which sought to discipline and police global politics in the 
interests of sustainable development. It aimed to re-invigorate the eco-governmental 
projects of Brundtland and Rio, relying on a community of states governing through 
multilateral conventions, regulations and scientific expertise. Just as Foucault 
identified the emergence of bio-politics in the nineteenth century, when “methods of 
power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to 
control and modify them”, so the Global Deal proposals sought to manage and 
regulate the safety and security of the global population for sustainable 
development.86 As such it embodied a rationality of government that was 
fundamentally more global, more holistic, more interventionist and more state-centric 
than that of the partnerships approach. It was also more explicitly political. 
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 B. Gemmill, M. Ivanova, and C. Y. Ling, Designing a New Architecture for Global Environmental 
Governance, WSSD Issue Paper, (London; IIED, 2001-2), p. 1. 
82
 DEAT, People, Planet, Prosperity, p. 12; South Africa, From Rio to Johannesburg, p. 4. 
83
 UN, The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, #31 and 32. 
84
 Haas, ‘UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment’, p. 88; P. M. Haas, 
‘Addressing the Global Governance Deficit’, Global Environmental Politics, 4, 4, (2004), p. 7. 
85
 Sachs, The Jo’burg Memo, p. 66. 
86
 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, p. 142. 
 112 
The ‘jazzier dance’ of voluntary partnerships 
 
 It was the similarity of the Global Deal approach to the eco-governmentality 
of Brundtland and Rio that led many to view it with jaded scepticism in 
Johannesburg. After all, progress on sustainable development since 1992 had hardly 
been inspiring. Johannesburg’s Political Declaration noted that  
 
The global environment continues to suffer. Loss of biodiversity continues, fish 
stocks continue to be depleted, desertification claims more and more fertile land, the 
adverse effects of climate change are already evident, natural disasters are more 
frequent and more devastating, and developing countries more vulnerable, and air, 
water and marine pollution continue to rob millions of a decent life.87 
 
“It is by now evident”, one commentator proclaimed, “that the traditional structures of 
international relations involving sovereign states will not suffice to attain sustainable 
development.”88 For many delegates in Johannesburg new ways of thinking about and 
implementing development, new partners, and new flexible modes of governing were 
needed. The interventionist model of regulations, targets and timeframes was thus 
placed to one side, and new flexible and voluntary partnerships which could harness 
the vitality and creativity of private actors and civil society came to the fore.89  
The UN initially proposed including Type II agreements in the WSSD 
outcomes. They represented a new source of funds, offered a way to rescue a 
floundering Summit, and potentially opened up a new role for the UN as a 
coordinating agency of partnerships for development.90 Leading UN figures saw the 
partnerships as a way to tap the financial, technological, scientific and managerial 
resources of the private sector, for example through sending corporate technicians to 
developing countries: “we were thinking of a corporation deploying their scientists to 
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go and work in one of these countries.”91 The Type II proposals reflected broader 
trends towards greater co-operation between the UN and the private sector which had 
been developing throughout the 1990s and culminated in the launch of the Global 
Compact in July 2000.92 In line with these trends, Kofi Annan declared prior to the 
WSSD that whilst “governments will agree on a common plan of action … the most 
creative agents of change may well be partnerships – among governments, private 
businesses, non-profit organisations, scholars and concerned citizens.”93  
The UN’s view was that Type II outcomes were a complement to, rather than 
a replacement of, the Type I multilaterally negotiated texts. The brief UN guidelines 
on the partnerships stated that they “should have a multi-stakeholder approach” and 
include “governments, regional groups, local authorities, non-governmental actors, 
international institutions and private sector partners.”94 They should be “specific 
commitments” to reinforce the implementation of the WSSD outcomes, Millennium 
Development Goals and Agenda 21; they were to be “voluntary” and “self-
organising”; they were not to substitute for government agreements or 
implementation; their activities should be transparent and accountable (although how 
such accountability would be ensured was not mentioned); they must “have clear 
objectives and set specific measurable targets and timeframes for their achievement”; 
they must be “new” and demonstrate “added value”; have an international impact; and 
report to the CSD which would act as a “focal point”.95 
However, as negotiations progressed, it became clear that some of the 
strongest supporters of partnerships saw them as alternatives rather than complements 
to multilateral targets and timeframes.96 Jonathan Margolis, the head of the US 
delegation to PrepCom II, clarified the American position by stating that “there isn’t 
going to be a single Global Deal” at the WSSD, and rather than looking for “grand 
solutions” he declared that they were more interested in “solutions that actually lead 
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to concrete developments on the ground.”97 References to ‘concrete developments’ 
and ‘on-the-ground’ outcomes were euphemisms for the voluntary Type II 
partnerships.  
Critical commentators interpreted the US enthusiasm for partnerships as a way 
of blocking more binding agreements, and the absence of President Bush only seemed 
to confirm the impression that the Americans were not taking sustainable 
development seriously.98 Whilst anti-environmentalist strains within certain American 
administrations are undeniable, writing-off US participation in the WSSD as cynical 
and disruptive risks underestimating their commitment and enthusiasm to a particular 
form of development. This is a form of development increasingly conducted through 
new actors and mechanisms, and according to USAID in 2006 85 per cent of resource 
flows from the US to the developing world came from the private sector.99 Rather 
than dismiss these trends as anti-environmental, greenwash or corporate colonialism, 
such techniques are consistent with the increasing dominance of modes of advanced 
liberal government. 
 
Fields of Visibility 
Rather than the planetary vision of the Global Deal, the partnership approach 
focussed on showcasing exemplary projects that contributed to specific aspects of the 
sustainable development agenda. Thus attention was directed towards successful and 
encouraging partnerships, including the provision of solar water heaters to a 
university in Northern Gauteng, the generation of thermal energy from biogas in a 
rural community in Maphephetheni, and the installation of energy saving technologies 
at Baragwanath Hospital.100 These projects – and many others outside South Africa – 
“were marketed at the WSSD as projects demonstrating environmental best 
practice.”101 
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As individual and bilaterally-agreed initiatives, the scope of the Type II 
partnerships accredited in Johannesburg did not cover the entire spectrum of 
sustainable development issues but rather clusters in certain areas. UN figures show 
that the most populated individual issue-areas include water, education and energy.102 
Consistently under-represented thematic areas have included biotechnology, 
chemicals, drought, industrial development, mining, and mountains.103 The relative 
scarcity of UN-accredited partnerships in these areas seems to reflect certain 
industries’ reluctance to participate in sustainable development initiatives. More 
broadly, Andonova and Levy drew attention to the fact that less than half of the CSD-
accredited partnerships in 2003 were  
 
designed to address a substantive environmental management problem such as food 
security, biodiversity, climate change, desertification, disaster preparedness, energy, 
forests, fresh water, minerals and mining, coastal management, and mountain 
development.104 
 
In contrast, a large proportion of partnerships were focussed on ‘means of 
implementation’, defined as “capacity building, education, science, and information 
for decision making, as well as the development of financial and trade mechanisms 
for sustainable development.”105 This suggests that partnerships occur where 
resources are more readily available, and address issues where success is more easily 
measurable (such as provision of information technology) rather than complex socio-
environmental issues (such as desertification or land degradation). As such Andonova 
and Levy conclude that partnerships “are supply driven rather than demand driven”, 
and that “the process is heading for a future that will replicate as opposed to changing 
the world order.”106  
As well as approaching sustainable development on a project-by-project basis 
with no overall coordination or management, the partnership approach also fenced off 
certain issues as being outside the scope of the WSSD. For example, trade was 
regarded as a parallel issue that was being negotiated through the Doha process; 
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climate change was in the hands of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
and the Kyoto Protocol; terrorism and ‘rogue states’ such as Iraq were matters for the 
UN Security Council (or, for the Americans, the White House); the world economy 
was a matter for central banks and the World Economic Forum; and healthcare rights 
were to be decided by individual states according to their private religious and social 
traditions.107 Despite the convening of a UN ‘Financing for Development’ conference 
in Monterrey in March 2002, commentators noticed with surprise that there was “only 
half-hearted interaction” between it and the WSSD.108 Whereas all of these fields 
were central to the Global Deal vision of sustainable development, they were largely 
removed from view in the partnership approach. 
As such, by focussing on specific and measurable projects the partnership 
approach compartmentalised the broader sustainable development agenda. One 
member of the US delegation suggested that sustainable development “might be a 
great vision but an untenable policy orientation”, and that paring back its scope to 
focus on purely ‘environmental’ issues might be worthwhile.109 This 
compartmentalisation was demonstrated during the debates on the Rio principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ in Johannesburg. Principle seven of the 
Rio Declaration stated that  
 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore 
the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in 
view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.110 
 
In Johannesburg, attempts by G77 delegates to include specific references to this 
principle in the text, particularly sections on financing, trade and technology transfers 
to developing countries, provoked huge resistance from many delegations including 
from the EU as well as JUSCANZ. These objections centred on the argument that the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities “applied only to environmental 
concerns and should not be extrapolated to cover wider issues of sustainable 
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development.”111 This seemed in line with the specific wording of the principle 
(especially the first two sentences which only mention environmental degradation), 
but from the perspective of the more holistic Global Deal vision such an emasculation 
of the principle seemed to go against the whole spirit of sustainable development as 
integrating environmental, social and economic issues.112 The final text in 
Johannesburg was pared of references to the principle in the sections on finance, and 
the final statement by the US reiterated their opposition to extending it to non-
environmental issues.113 This was consistent with a broader rationality of government 
that refused to see sustainable development as an overarching policy prescription for 
global governance, and preferred to isolate and compartmentalise issues of pollution, 
economic development, free trade, good governance and so on, dealing with each 
through specific instruments and partnerships. 
 
Regimes of knowledge 
The partnership approach also tended to produce narrower, technical, 
instrumental conceptions of science, technology, economic development and poverty. 
Whilst similar regimes of knowledge were deployed as in the Global Deal approach, 
the partnership approach demonstrated little recognition of the social, political and 
ethical context in which these forms of knowledge were grounded. This can be seen in 
the attitudes to poverty which prevailed during negotiations. Rather than the structural 
and relational view of poverty envisioned in the Global Deal, poverty was instead 
increasingly framed in terms of a lack of resources. During Prepcom III it was 
observed that the text was “leaning toward a framework for sustainable development 
in developing countries, rather than a global programme of action. As one delegate 
pointed out, all the developed countries are being asked to do is ‘pull out their 
checkbooks’ [sic].”114 As Blowfield and Frynas explain, within the partnership 
approach  
 
poverty is presented as a regrettable fact rather than a consequence of any causal 
conditions and events. The advantage of this is that it allows poverty to be presented 
to business as something undesirable and soluble on a par with, for instance, a 
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malfunctioning valve or a quality control problem. However, it does nothing to 
encourage examination of the complexity of multilayered, structurally rooted 
problems or of the role of business within them.115 
 
This narrow and de-contextualised construction was especially prominent in 
the sections of the text on Africa, which portrayed an economical and depoliticised 
conception of sustainable development in which there was little recognition of the 
historical and structural causes of poverty or underdevelopment. The Plan of 
Implementation stated that  
 
Africa’s efforts to achieve sustainable development have been hindered by conflicts, 
insufficient investment, limited market access opportunities and supply side 
constraints, unsustainable debt burdens, historically declining levels of official 
development assistance and the impact of HIV/AIDS.116 
 
This is a rather one-sided picture of African underdevelopment, one in which ‘lack of 
investment’ is more significant than colonial and neo-imperial exploitation, and 
‘limited market access’ is highlighted without recognising the vulnerability of African 
markets to predatory transnational finance. The text admitted with staggering 
understatement that “most countries on the continent have not benefited fully from the 
opportunities of globalisation.”117 On the contrary, countless studies have shown how 
the enforced global spread of trade liberalisation, structural adjustment and reduced 
state capacity has contributed to African impoverishment.118 A recent survey of 
bilateral agreements between the North and the South by Oxfam International argues 
that they threaten “to strip developing countries of the capacity to effectively govern 
their economies and protect their poorest people”, and could “systematically 
dismantle national policies designed to promote development.”119 In West Africa, for 
example, the imposition of tariff liberalisation on agricultural crops could produce 
import surges in key crops such as potatoes, poultry, beef and onions, threatening 
vulnerable domestic producers with collapse.120 Through such measures, which are 
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encouraged in the Johannesburg outcomes, poverty is conceptualised as stemming 
from a lack of competition and free access to global markets, rather than a historical 
product of international economic and political power relations. 
The narrow and instrumental outlook of the partnership approach was also 
reflected in a view of science and technology that rested on a belief in neutral, 
objective, universal knowledge. This was most clearly seen in the WSSD debates over 
the 1992 Rio Declaration’s precautionary principle. Principle 15 stated that “where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”121 Since Rio the concept of precaution has been codified 
in a number of international and national environmental legal regimes, and the WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, agreed in Marrakesh in 1994, 
explicitly refers to the precautionary principle in regard to human health.122 
The negotiations at the WSSD therefore centred on whether or not to 
recognise the evolution of the concept since Rio, and specifically its extension beyond 
strictly ‘environmental’ issues. Supporters of the principle argued that health was an 
important sustainable development issue, and that precaution should thus be cited in 
these parts of the text. In response, a number of countries led by the US sought to 
restrict the scope and applicability of the principle specifically to environmental 
questions, arguing that this was the intention of the Rio text. Just as with regard to the 
negotiations on ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, the stance of the US was 
underpinned by a desire to compartmentalise and divide environmental issues from 
socio-economic issues. Eventually references to precaution in the section on health 
were removed, as well from sections on trade where delegates feared it might be used 
to establish trade barriers on certain products in the absence of scientific certainty.123  
As well as limiting references to precaution to paragraphs on chemicals and 
scientific means of implementation, delegates from the US and their allies managed to 
ensure references were to the “precautionary approach”, rather than the 
“precautionary principle.”124 This was part of a broader strategy to downplay the legal 
implications of precaution on behalf of a position which “consistently argued for 
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scientific certainty as one of the principal goals of sustainable development policy.”125 
Therefore, whilst Principle 15 implicitly recognises that scientific knowledge will 
never be complete and that political and ethical judgements must determine scientific 
contributions, within the partnership approach the prevailing attitude was that more 
complete scientific knowledge was a prerequisite for political action.126  
Such a perspective relied upon scientific data being translated into forms 
directly amenable to political and economic decision-making. From the perspective of 
policymakers, one of the most useful ways in which scientific knowledge can be 
communicated is through the language of quantifiable risk. Thus the partnership 
approach relied upon the calculation of probabilities – species extinction projections, 
human infection likelihoods, the chance of natural disasters, crime statistics, resource 
use estimates and so on – and cost-benefit analysis to determine where partnerships 
could be most effective and efficient. The Plan of Implementation called for 
“transparent science-based risk assessment procedures and science-based risk 
management procedures” for the sound management of chemicals and hazardous 
waste.127 A later section asserted that “an integrated, multi-hazard, inclusive approach 
to address vulnerability, risk assessment and disaster management, including 
prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, is an essential element of 
a safer world in the twenty-first century.”128 This rationality makes use of tools to 
stimulate responsible corporate and governmental action including life cycle 
assessment, environmental risk assessment, environmental input-output analysis, life 
cycle costing, cost-benefit analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis.129 
Through the calculation of risks and the cost-effectiveness of solutions, 
sustainable development was orientated toward specific, measurable and efficient 
partnerships, in particular those which offered technological solutions. The Political 
Declaration resolved that states should  
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help one another gain access to financial resources, benefit from the opening of 
markets, ensure capacity-building, use modern technology to bring about 
development and make sure that there is technology transfer, human resource 
development, education and training to banish underdevelopment forever.130 
 
This positive view of science and technology was echoed in the Plan of 
Implementation, which called for the development and commercialisation of cleaner 
and more efficient fuels, including biomass, liquid gas, renewables and “new or 
improved products or technologies”, and the development of technologies for “water 
harvesting from coastal fogs.”131 In response to climate change states were urged to 
“develop and transfer technological solutions.”132 One UN bureaucrat noted the heavy 
emphasis at Johannesburg on technical forms of knowledge, stemming at least in part 
from “certain governments who do believe that technology holds many of the 
solutions to many of the problems.”133 A lead South African negotiator suggested that 
with regard to climate change, the US solution is a “technological fix.”134 Technology 
and “knowledge transfers” to developing countries were urged, which were to be 
aided “in accessing the know-how and expertise required in order for them to make 
independent use of this knowledge in pursuing their development goals.”135  
This faith in objective science, risk assessment and ‘green’ technology was 
underpinned by a neo-liberal confidence in the ability of free market mechanisms to 
achieve sustainable development. The dominant discourse in Johannesburg was that 
“environmental problems are solvable through developing and implementing better 
technology, voluntary action and greater use of market mechanisms, such as trading 
permits.”136 Sustainable development would be achieved, it was argued, by releasing 
the natural energy of the marketplace and by providing an enabling economic and 
political framework. As such the Plan of Implementation repeatedly stressed the need 
to create “an enabling environment for investment” as the basis for sustainable 
development.137 It called for the continued promotion of “open, equitable, rules-based, 
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predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial systems”, and 
asserted that “a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable 
multilateral trading system, as well as meaningful trade liberalisation, can 
substantially stimulate development worldwide, benefiting countries at all stages of 
development.”138 Economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development 
were presented as mutually reinforcing, all flowing naturally from the creation of an 
enabling domestic environment.139 
Through these regimes of neutral and objective science, risk assessment, 
technological solutions and market rationality the partnership approach presented a 
thoroughly de-politicised and expert-dominated articulation of sustainable 
development. Within such a framework participants were required to “supplement 
their delegations with scientists, technical experts, industry representatives”, often to 
the exclusion of political lobbyists.140 One UN staff member conceded that in terms of 
major group participation in the CSD, “since the WSSD there has been more of a 
focus on technicians, expert practitioners that work in the field, and less of an 
emphasis on advocates.”141 The Global Deal’s recognition of the fundamentally 
political and ethical nature of sustainable development was largely missing from the 
partnerships approach. 
 
Techniques and technologies 
Instead of multilateral regulations and targets the partnership approach to 
sustainable development regarded the deployment of specific, focussed, multi-
stakeholder partnerships as the most efficient form of implementation. According to 
their supporters, “progress toward sustainable development requires many more – and 
more complex – partnerships. … We can manage cooperatively what we cannot 
manage individually.”142 The Plan of Implementation proclaimed the need to 
“enhance partnerships between governmental and non-governmental actors, including 
all major groups, as well as volunteer groups, on programmes and activities for the 
achievement of sustainable development at all levels.”143 
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Several strategies were used by advocates of the partnership approach to 
minimise and restrict the scope and number of binding commitments in the text. The 
proliferation of phrases such as ‘as appropriate’; ‘significant improvement’; ‘where 
applicable’; ‘enhance and accelerate’; and ‘the development of measures’ in the final 
text of the Plan of Implementation had the effect of watering-down specific targets 
and timeframes, as well as introducing a more flexible approach. Even where precise 
targets were established or re-stated, advocates of the partnership approach inserted 
their own caveats. In one revealing example, whilst the Plan of Implementation 
retained the overseas development aid target of 0.7 per cent of GNP, the final US 
statement noted that 
 
the United States reaffirms that it does not accept international aid targets based on 
percentages of donor gross national product. The United States does believe that aid 
should be increased to those developing countries making a demonstrated 
commitment to governing justly, investing in their own people, and promoting 
enterprise and entrepreneurship.144 
 
A similar clarification was made by the US with respect to paragraph 44(o) on the 
development of a regime for sharing and safeguarding the benefits of genetic 
resources. During the negotiation of this paragraph the words “legally binding” had 
been deleted from in front of the word “regime.”145 Accordingly the final statement of 
the US clarified that “in the light of this negotiating history, the United States 
understands that the undertaking envisaged in this paragraph would not entail the 
development of a legally binding instrument.”146 
Whilst many critics viewed these attempts to dilute agreements, targets and 
timeframes as simple obstructionism, and partnerships as merely a device to evade 
stronger commitments to sustainable development, it is undeniable that across the 
JUSCANZ delegations there were many enthusiastic supporters of partnerships and 
substantial amounts of money were pledged through these instruments. The WSSD 
resulted in the announcement of 251 partnerships, with an overall financial value of 
US$235 million.147 As of June 2004 the financial contributions of the partnerships had 
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increased to US$1.02 billion.148 Designated as the focal point for the partnerships, the 
CSD established and updates a searchable internet database, on which details of the 
now 344 partnerships (as of September 2008) can be accessed.149 During the Summit 
the US announced projects and partnerships in the areas of water and sanitation 
(US$970 million), energy (US$43 million), health (US$2.3 billion, some of which 
had already been promised prior to the WSSD), agriculture (US$90 million), and 
forestry (US$53 million), most of which were arranged outside of the CSD process.150 
Even those negotiators who were fiercely critical of American blocking tactics on 
binding targets conceded that when it came to partnerships, “the US fielded some 
good people who really put a lot of effort into making these real, credible things.”151  
During the WSSD, countless debates were held on how, or whether, the Type 
II partnerships were to be regulated and monitored, to whom they would be 
accountable, and what relationship they would have to the multilateral texts.152 Many 
wanted the UN to have a strong role in coordinating and monitoring partnerships, and 
some wanted to link specific partnerships with specific sections of text in the Plan of 
Implementation.153 The strongest advocates of partnerships stressed however that too 
strict monitoring and accountability would stifle the creativity and flexibility of this 
approach. Hale and Mauzerall argued that  
 
top-down accountability is neither workable nor desirable for the WSSD 
partnerships. A centralised agency charged with monitoring and sanctioning deviant 
partnerships would drain resources from development efforts while undermining the 
decentralised, flexible spirit that gives partnerships their strength and deterring 
potential partners from participating.154 
 
Advocates claimed “the value of voluntary initiatives is precisely in bringing together 
actors who believe they can achieve results by themselves and do not need an external 
body to monitor their actions.”155  
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 The Type II partnerships encouraged actors to monitor and assess their own 
performance. Hale and Mauzerall stressed the importance of “horizontal 
accountability” within partnerships, where standards and performance are self-
assessed by participants.156 The UN’s guidance notes on partnerships stressed that 
partners “should specify arrangements to monitor and review their performance 
against the objectives and targets they set and report in regular intervals (‘self-
reporting’).”157 The CSD has sought to encourage regular self-auditing of 
partnerships by sending out questionnaires and requests for updates on progress for 
its online database. The UN reported in 2006 that “the information contained in the 
partnerships database is provided to the secretariat by lead partners of registered 
partnerships. Requests for updates are sent out annually.”158 Such expectations, 
together with the requests for industry sector reports prior to the WSSD, have 
encouraged greater reflexivity within many businesses and increased the profile of 
sustainability within the private sphere.159 These techniques of voluntary self-
auditing and introspection are characteristic of advanced liberal government, 
whereby standards of responsibility and ‘proper conduct’ are encouraged and 
internalised, at a distance from regulatory or legal centres of authority.160 
Opinions are divided on the long-term significance of the CSD-accredited 
partnerships and the online database. Sceptics have pointed out that businesses have 
been slow to join these partnerships, and the most numerous partners are international 
organisations, states, and NGOs.161 One enthusiastic advocate of the Type II 
partnerships at the WSSD described their current situation as “moribund.”162 In a 
study of CSD-accredited partnerships in 2003, Hale and Mauzerall noted that only 2 
per cent of projects had corporations as leading partners; 78.8 per cent of partnerships 
contained no partners at all from the private sector, and “in monetary terms, 
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corporations account for less than 1 per cent of the partnerships’ funding.”163 This 
would appear disappointing, given the explicit rationale of the partnerships was to 
harness the energy, resources and flexibility of the private sector. In most cases the 
CSD partnerships have states or international organisations as the lead partners and 
chief financiers, and they often appear to simply be the re-packaging of existing 
projects.164 Andonova and Levy have argued that the “participation in the WSSD 
partnerships is uneven and mirrors rather than challenges prevailing patterns.”165 They 
also point out that “some high-profile initiatives that seemed to reflect the spirit of the 
partnership idea bypassed the process in Johannesburg out of a sense that it was 
irrelevant”, including the Mega-Diversity Initiative, a partnership between the 15 
most ‘bio-diverse’ countries.166 One industry consultant noted that he didn’t “think 
industry had really understood how the partnerships would work” at the WSSD, and 
did not have the interest or capacity to get deeply involved in projects that might 
diverge from their core business.167 It was significant that many sought to pursue 
partnerships elsewhere; “under the auspices of the Business Action for Sustainable 
Development, 95 partnership initiatives were announced in the lead up to the WSSD. 
But almost none of these partnerships chose to register with the WSSD partnership 
process.”168 
There are thus significant questions over the impact and future of the CSD 
partnership process. Viewed in isolation, it certainly is not a viable alternative 
approach to multilaterally-negotiated, state-led sustainable development, nor was it 
intended to be so. The Type II partnerships are therefore often dismissed as 
unimportant, a forgettable initiative designed to rescue a failing Summit.169 Yet, as 
Andonova and Levy argue, the Type II outcomes “grew out of a deeper strategic 
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understanding” and they “exemplify a broader phenomenon of transnational 
governance networks.”170 As Martens points out,  
 
there is hardly any multinational corporation on the Fortune 500 list which does not 
run a partnership project with a UN organisation. Some of the most active companies 
include BP, Coca Cola, Daimler Chrysler, Microsoft, McDonald’s, Nike, Novartis, 
Shell and Starbucks.171 
 
Figures compiled by the UN in 2008 show a dramatic transformation in the source of 
financial flows to the developing world over the previous decade. Whilst official 
development assistance (ODA) “doubled from $50 billion in 1998 to $104 billion in 
2006” it fell as a proportion of total financial flows, whilst private flows (excluding 
remittances) soared “from $193 billion in 1998 to $647 billion in 2006.”172 These 
figures suggest that private investment and voluntary partnerships are increasingly 
dominating global development, further blurring lines between development and 
investment, public and private. 
As such the limited success of the CSD process should not obscure the broader 
and increasing strength of neo-liberal rationalities of government. Whilst many 
private sector partners see no need to conduct their partnerships through the CSD and 
are wary of UN bureaucracy, the scale of corporate involvement in the 
implementation and governance of sustainable development is on the increase.173 The 
UN Secretary-General’s report to the CSD in 2006 concluded that “partnerships have 
been recognised as one of the most innovative outcomes of the World Summit and as 
having an important role to play in delivering World Summit commitments.”174 As a 
rationality of government partnerships are fast becoming the dominant approach 
within mainstream sustainable development discourse. 
 
Production of subjectivities 
The discourse of partnerships posed a challenge to the state-centrism of the 
Global Deal approach, and constructed a much broader range of self-governing actors 
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as necessary and important for the implementation of sustainable development. As 
Zehra Aydin from the CSD explained,  
 
the minute you become partners you have to be considered differently, you are no 
longer just an NGO, a private sector actor, you are also not just a member state, you 
are a partner with a specific commitment. And that puts you in a completely different 
light.175 
 
The partnership rationality of government relied not merely on states creating and 
enforcing binding regulations, but rather on states facilitating the creation of 
partnerships between business, international institutions, civil society and other actors, 
all of whom were expected to exercise responsible self-government. As the Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin concluded,  
 
the upsurge of social and business support for sustainable development, the 
widespread nature and acceptance of Type II partnerships and increasing recognition 
that multilateral environmental agreements, not to mention programmes for poverty 
eradication and improved sanitation, require efforts and actors beyond the State. Such 
efforts push the concept of multilateralism beyond a purely State-centric 
perspective.176 
 
This argument is easily misinterpreted as the claim that states are losing power and 
sovereignty to non-state actors in a zero-sum competition within global 
governance.177 In contrast, seeing partnerships as a rationality of advanced liberal 
government draws attention to the ways in which states and a whole range of other 
actors are recast, expanded, transnationalised and implicated in network forms of 
governance in flexible and multi-centric ways. 
State institutions and actors continued to play important roles as leading 
partners for sustainable development, and it was those with the greatest capacity that 
predominated: the five most active countries in the WSSD partnerships were France, 
South Africa, the USA, Japan and Indonesia.178 Andonova and Levy noted that the 
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most active countries were those who tended “to give or receive large amounts of 
foreign aid”, and to “have large numbers of NGOs, have large populations, and have 
more extensive national environmental planning infrastructures.”179 Yet, rather than 
states being automatically the prime actors for sustainable development, their role 
depended on their capacity to form partnerships. Different states and state institutions 
became involved with partnerships in different ways: some state departments co-
operated with businesses in developing new forms of technology; others contracted 
out community healthcare or biodiversity protection to civil society organisations.180 
The participation of many developing countries in the WSSD was facilitated by the 
GEF, which financed a partnership “to increase opportunities for legislators from 
developing countries to actively participate in the WSSD and its preparatory 
process.”181 Similarly, many large international NGOs such as the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, as well as private funders, have sponsored and facilitated the capacity of 
developing states to participate in global governance.182  
The Type II partnerships therefore recognised and legitimised many of the 
ways in which non-state actors already participated in the implementation and 
governance of sustainable development. Yet they also provided new opportunities to 
some of the largest international NGOs, whose scientific expertise, networks of 
contacts and experience of project management made them valued partners. 
Andonova and Levy noted that  
 
large transnational NGOs have not in any way boycotted or even shied away from 
participation and leadership in Type II outcomes, because on balance taking a 
proactive position gives them a clear comparative advantage in the transnational 
governance process, enhances their resources, and provides a greater ability to 
influence the agenda and structure of partnership institutions.183 
 
Such partnerships do not depend directly on state involvement, and one WSSD 
participant noted that “the various governments’ sidelining of the NGOs resulted in a 
number of NGOs making direct contact with the industry sector and exploring the 
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area of partnerships of mutual benefit.”184 Andonova and Levy’s study recorded that 
“most of the leading NGOs are large transnational organisations such as the IUCN 
and the Nature Conservancy, and considerably fewer are led by national and local 
groups.”185 Similarly, large international institutions such as UNEP, UNDP and the 
World Bank have been enthusiastic advocates of partnerships.186 Andonova and Levy 
showed that 29 per cent of CSD partnerships in 2003 had international organisations 
as the leading partner, which was “consistent with the hypothesis that secretariats of 
international institutions will be among the most eager suppliers of partnership in an 
effort to reinvent their mission and legitimacy.”187 Ivanova suggests that partnerships 
“offer a particularly propitious opportunity for international organisations to regain a 
leading role in global governance.”188 
The most dramatic re-casting achieved by the partnership discourse has 
involved the private sector however. By recognising corporations as essential 
partners, the energy, innovation, technical skill and financial muscle of the private 
sector was mobilised behind sustainable development. For the first time in a major 
environmental conference, business lobbyists like the International Chamber of 
Commerce, WBCSD and BASD, as well as individual firms, participated in the 
official summit process. This explicitly built on the assumption behind the Global 
Compact: “that the UN and the private sector have a common interest in the 
promotion of sustainable development on a global scale.”189 
For many critical commentators this new prominence was interpreted as the 
“corporate takeover” of the sustainable development agenda by business interests.190 
Paul Rutherford’s analysis of business discourses at the WSSD draws attention to how 
corporate participants sought to “position largely voluntary initiatives as concrete 
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empirical indicators of progressive and substantial forms of environmental change”, 
and used these examples to avoid “specific commitments to stricter forms of external 
environmental accountability.”191 Yet, rather than seeing business enthusiasm for 
discourses of corporate social responsibility as solely a means to evade regulation, he 
draws attention to the ways in which, through participation in the WSSD, “business 
seems to have gained an unprecedented level of ‘public’ legitimacy as a pivotal 
environmental actor.”192 Whilst some corporate actors will no doubt continue to use 
the language of sustainable development to mask unsustainable or ecologically 
damaging practices, the partnership discourse at the WSSD established that the 
business sector “has a duty to contribute to the evolution of equitable and sustainable 
communities and societies.”193  
This shift in the perceived role and status of business as a political and ethical 
actor can have far-reaching consequences. As Andrew Barry argues, “the ethical 
conduct of global business has become an object of both government and political 
action” and in so doing the ways in which companies conduct themselves, and the 
ways in which they are perceived by others, can shift.194 He notes that “global 
corporations are now expected to be ethical and expect themselves to be ethical. 
Moreover, many go to great lengths to make their ethical concerns public and open to 
a limited degree of scrutiny.”195 According to one industry consultant, the WSSD 
“was the first time I’d seen business taking environmental issues and sustainability 
issues seriously as a part of the business perspective.”196 The UN has continued to 
promote corporate social responsibility through initiatives such as the Global 
Compact, and in 2008 the Secretary-General reported to the 16th session of the CSD 
that “corporate social responsibility has become a central element of corporate image 
in the global economy”, and that “a growing number of companies are adopting 
voluntary initiatives to ensure good working conditions and environmental 
performance throughout their supply chains.”197 
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Once seen as the historical enemy of environmentalists, the business sector 
was thus re-framed in Johannesburg as a convert to the cause of sustainable 
development and as a capable and willing partner in its formulation and 
implementation. Björn Stigson, President of the WBCSD, argued that 
 
in Johannesburg, I believe business demonstrated a strong commitment to action that 
overcame the initial surprise of those who like to depict business as the absent villain 
or backroom schemer. Accused of ‘hijacking’ the Summit in its opening days, the 
large number of corporate delegates finally impressed most by exhibiting a genuine 
readiness for dialogue and initiative.198 
 
Key players within the business sector were eager to play their role as cooperative and 
enthusiastic partners, and their representatives, BASD, were one of the most upbeat 
voices in the final multi-stakeholder session of the WSSD. According to the UN 
report they  
 
expressed appreciation to Governments in voicing confidence in the ability of 
business to play a role in sustainable development through market mechanisms, and 
noted the need for cooperation in technology transfer and the role of consumers, 
especially youth. They noted awareness of the high standards by which business 
would be judged in undertaking partnership initiatives and grass-roots projects, and 
supported systems for business input into international institutions to create an 
environment of cooperation. Recognising the need for accountability and open 
reporting initiatives to build support and trust, they reiterated their willingness to 
work together with other major groups and governments in that regard.199 
 
The prominence of the partnership approach at the WSSD had the effect of 
producing a whole new range of political actors implicated in sustainable 
development. Rather than sidelining states, the most powerful states were joined on 
the stage by international organisations and NGOs, as well as corporate actors. Claude 
Martin of the WWF summed this up at the end of the WSSD when he reflected that 
the future of multilateralism lay with “new constellations of enlightened governments, 
intergovernmental institutions, environmental and development NGOs, forward-
looking companies, and creative thinkers.”200 
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Sustainable development as advanced liberal governmentality 
 
 The final outcomes of the Johannesburg negotiations therefore comprised 
official Type I texts which balanced the interventionist and disciplinary rationality of 
government of the Global Deal approach with the free-market voluntary 
governmentality of the partnership approach. Yet, by also including Type II 
partnerships as recognised outcomes, the WSSD outcomes overall worked to re-
orientate sustainable development towards modes of advanced liberal government. 
Even the uneasy balance in the Plan of Implementation revealed the predominance of 
the flexible approach desired by the US and their allies. There were no new legal 
conventions agreed, few substantial promises of new official development assistance, 
and a general unwillingness to discuss trade or financial rules for fear of prejudicing 
negotiations elsewhere. Some new targets were agreed, most notably on sanitation, 
fishing and chemicals, but the hopes for an array of binding multilateral targets on 
issues like renewable energy and biodiversity were dashed. A World Solidarity Fund 
was agreed in principle, but contributions were to be voluntary and virtually nothing 
has been heard of it since.201 Concrete progress on sustainable development was 
primarily envisaged as coming from voluntary, ad hoc partnerships, widely regarded 
as “precedent setting” and “the most novel outcomes” of the Summit.202 “Let me 
repeat,” Kofi Annan made clear in the final press conference of the WSSD, “this is an 
era of partnerships.”203 As such, commentators concluded that the “WSSD may 
increasingly be seen as the coming of age of new ways of addressing sustainable 
development at the global level.”204  
Indeed in the post-Johannesburg era sustainable development has been 
increasingly discussed and implemented in these terms. Mukul Sanwal makes this 
clear when he notes that “entirely new policy instruments oriented towards 
partnerships between public and private sectors are increasingly important” in the 
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global governance of sustainable development.205 Consistent with a neo-liberal 
reliance on the extension of market principles he argues that “market creation is 
considered the most direct approach to solving the problem of biodiversity decline”, 
and “the recognition of the key role of capital markets in economic growth shifts the 
focus from government or multilateral aid to private investment as the driver of 
international cooperation and the spread of new technologies.”206 Therefore, 
according to Sanwal, the task of “implementation requires going beyond traditional 
forms of cooperation between nation-states to global networks of state and nonstate 
actors, particularly the private sector”, in which the UN will function within part of a 
broader network of global environmental governance, the defining feature of which 
“will be interactive clusters of institutions and processes galvanising capital markets 
and supporting societal action.”207 From a very different perspective Newell concurs, 
noting that “our understanding of governance has to decentre the idea that states are 
the exclusive providers of effective environmental governance.”208 These changes are, 
for Sanwal, evidence of an “emerging global consensus around a new paradigm.”209  
 This new paradigm is characterised by techniques of advanced liberal 
governmentality. This rationality of government may well have many advantages over 
alternatives such as the Global Deal approach, including avoiding some of the pitfalls 
of attempts to construct a one-size-fits-all global development blueprint. As Foucault 
reminds us, new relationships of power and forms of government are never purely 
good or evil.210 However, unlike Sanwal’s analysis, a governmentality perspective 
adopts a stance of criticism and politicisation and seeks to highlight the dangers of 
new forms of rule. 
First, by compartmentalising sustainable development and rooting action in 
specific projects rather than more holistic visions at the WSSD, sustainable 
development’s uneasy reconciliation of environmental and development issues was 
threatened. The environmental dimension of sustainable development was frequently 
separated and dealt with through separate partnerships and instruments from 
economic and social issues. The political effects of this include a possible reviving of 
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historic tensions between ‘greens’ and ‘reds’, unravelling the ways in which Our 
Common Future and the ‘brown’ environmental justice discourse highlighted the 
necessity of addressing the environmental, social and economic causes of deprivation 
and degradation in an integrated way. By prioritising ad hoc, individual, supply-
driven partnerships, issues where success is easily measurable are favoured ahead of 
more deeply-rooted, complex and structural issues which resist easy auditing, 
categorisation and benchmarking. Vulnerable issues and communities risk 
marginalisation, and a ‘tinkering’ mindset is adopted “which implies that the 
fundamentals are sound and only relatively minor adjustments are necessary.”211 
Not only were the environmental, economic and social aspects of sustainable 
development frequently compartmentalised, but a specific and narrow construction of 
poverty as the dominant focus of the Summit meant that the language, values and 
forms of knowledge associated with the economic sphere were prioritised over others. 
The partnership approach to sustainable development deployed instrumentalist and 
economically-driven techniques of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis as the 
dominant standard of truth and efficiency. Yet these rationalities not only result in the 
marginalisation of other actors and forms of knowledge, but are capable of doing 
great harm to complex and organic social and ecological relationships.212 There are 
aspects of human experience which resist reduction to the calculation of risks, costs 
and benefits, whether it is the loss of a species like the polar bear, or a loved one from 
HIV/Aids or unclean water.213 For Dryzek,  
 
no matter how attractive economic prescriptions may be in instrumental terms, even 
to committed environmentalists, they help constitute a discourse, and a world, which 
those according higher priority to citizenship, democratic and ecological values find 
unattractive.214 
 
As The Jo’burg Memo argued, “markets were never meant to achieve community or 
integrity, beauty or justice, sustainability or sacredness – and by themselves, they 
don’t.”215  
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Finally, the political effects of the partnership approach included the 
concretisation of certain characteristics and forms of legitimate political participation. 
In order to be empowered, partners must be willing and able to participate. They must 
conduct themselves responsibly as well as possess useful knowledge, expertise and 
capacities. According to the logic of partnerships, a powerful mining corporation 
might be a more attractive partner than a community social movement or a 
democratically elected government; and an international development bank might be 
prioritised over a UN agency or an advocacy NGO. As such, partnerships are not 
neutral, value-free tools, but rather they prioritise certain types of actor, specifically 
those with technical expertise or project management skills. Given the prioritisation of 
scientific and technological forms of knowledge, and a mentality that stresses ‘getting 
the job done’ rather than more lengthy deliberative or democratic processes, private 
actors have tended to become more valued and important development partners than 
many small states, NGOs or social movements. 
 In such ways an advanced liberal rationality of government threatens to de-
politicise sustainable development by framing it in terms of the most efficient and 
cost-effective management of partnerships for implementation. As critical 
commentators noted, the “concept of ‘partnership and stakeholders’ perpetuates the 
myth that there is a collective endeavour, and that all players are equal and conflicts 
of interest can be resolved by roundtables seeking consensus.”216 The shift from more 
centralised and hierarchical forms of governance to voluntary, flexible partnerships 
does not mean that power relationships are bypassed or government is replaced with 
freedom, rather it represents a new form of rule at a distance according to a rationality 
based on the operation of the market. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the debates at the WSSD can be understood in 
terms of competing rationalities of government. The clashes between visions of a new 
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Global Deal and the advocates of Type II partnerships were not merely differences 
over whether to use multilateral targets or voluntary partnerships to implement 
sustainable development, but rather they were clashes between competing conceptions 
of how government should be exercised: over what, according to which standards of 
truth, and by whom. In 2008 the UN Secretary-General reported that  
 
five years after the World Summit on Sustainable Development, there appears to be a 
growing acceptance that partnerships are now embedded in the international 
sustainable development dialogue and have become an integral part of the work of 
the United Nations system.217 
 
This chapter is not claiming that partnerships have replaced multilateral agreements as 
the predominant form of environmental governance, or that states have been displaced 
as political actors. Rather it has argued that the WSSD represented a shift towards a 
new rationality of government, from a more disciplinary mode of government in 
which the population was a passive body to be regulated, to an advanced liberal mode 
of government in which the global population is both the means and the ends of 
government. This new rationality is one in which both multilateral regulations and 
individual partnerships could be deployed as a means of mobilising and channelling 
the energies of the worldwide population. 
Re-orientating sustainable development towards voluntary partnerships and 
market-based rationalities has a number of political implications. Rather than a 
holistic and global vision, sustainable development government is instead conceived 
in more specific and compartmentalised ways. Poverty eradication was established as 
the primary focus for sustainable development, but it was a narrow, de-contextualised 
and de-politicised representation of poverty that dominated the partnership approach, 
to which technical and instrumental conceptions of science, risk assessment, 
technology and economics were deployed as the necessary solutions. The most 
important actors for sustainable development were increasingly judged in terms of 
their willingness and ability to participate in partnerships, rather than more 
democratic, ethical or political criteria. Perhaps most importantly, conceiving of 
sustainable development in terms of advanced liberal government threatens to de-
politicise the politics of environment and development, relying on notionally free and 
equal partnerships, neutral science and the impartiality of the free market. There is 
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little space here for dissent or revolt, and relationships of power and conflict are 
marginalised through a focus on consensus and partnership. As a result 
 
the market and its mechanisms are so dominant, and appear to offer such an efficient 
(and naturalised) means of muting conflict and struggle, that politics comes to be 
viewed as something odious and subversive rather than necessary to the life of 
human societies.218 
 
Partnerships were thus presented as forms of governance which could “manage 
relationships that otherwise degenerate into counterproductive confrontation.”219 
This “fetishisation of partnership” and norms of cooperation and consensus at 
the WSSD has thrown the role of democratic debate and dissent, and hence summits 
themselves, into question.220 If bilaterally agreed partnerships are the way forward, 
are gatherings of international leaders and civil society in one place for a few days to 
negotiate political agreements still important as tools of global governance?221 As 
Friends of the Earth pointed out, “partnerships happen anyway and do not need a 
major multilateral political Summit to deliver them.”222 This was acknowledged in the 
Plan of Implementation which agreed to  
  
streamline the international sustainable development meeting calendar and, as 
appropriate, reduce the number of meetings, the length of meetings and the amount 
of time spent on negotiated outcomes in favour of more time spent on practical 
matters related to implementation.223 
 
Participants in Johannesburg questioned whether “one of the lessons to be learned 
from the WSSD 2002 could be not to put so much emphasis on this kind of inter-
governmental meeting.”224 The WSSD had the effect of re-orientating sustainable 
development towards practical and technical questions of implementation and 
bilateral voluntary partnerships, apparently eroding the necessity of summits 
themselves. Yet the assumption that such moments have a limited or declining role 
within advanced liberal rule is one that is questioned in the following chapter. 
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Chapter four 
 
Performing Sustainable Development: 
Governing by example at the WSSD 
 
 
 
 
As Africans, we were proud and privileged to host the 
leaders and representatives of the peoples of the world 
as they met to consider their response to the urgent 
challenge of sustainable development. At the same time, 
we were convinced that the ordinary people of our 
country understood that for a new and brighter world of 
hope to be born required that these leaders and 
representatives should convene in conference, freely to 
agree among themselves about what they needed to do 
together. 
Thabo Mbeki, February 2004 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In re-orientating sustainable development towards voluntary bilateral 
partnerships, it appeared that the WSSD marked the beginning of the end for 
multilateral summits convened to negotiate a consensus text. Yet to suggest that 
global summits have no role in the new formations of advanced liberal government is 
to underestimate their theatrical, performative and exemplary importance. The WSSD 
was far more than simply an institutional mechanism for the production of a set of 
outcomes. Following in the footsteps of the conferences in Stockholm and Rio, 
Johannesburg was a global festival, a summit of summits, which sought to 
encapsulate the state of global sustainable development and perform it to the world. 
This chapter demonstrates how the theatrical spectacle of the WSSD functioned as a 
technique of advanced liberal government, and as such constitutes a form of 
‘exemplary government’ which established a stage and audience, assembled a 
particular cast of actors to perform their roles, and stage-managed and communicated 
their performances in particular ways.  
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It is therefore misleading to regard the Summit as merely a ‘talkshop’ or a 
round of photo opportunities, hand shakes and signatures, and thus ephemeral to the 
main business of global politics.2 Such are the impressions often given in discussions 
of the ‘theatre’ of summitry. Middleton and O’Keefe, for example, argue that “in the 
WSSD, as in all other summits, there is a degree of theatricality since much of the 
bargaining takes place before the event.”3 They do not discuss this theatricality in any 
depth, nor do they appear to regard it as particularly interesting. They imply that the 
real politics of summitry is to be found in the negotiations and the outcomes. These 
dimensions are important of course, as the previous chapter showed. Yet the 
theatricality of the Summit is in itself interesting and important: the politics of 
spectacle, representation and symbolism are all ways in which the character and 
nature of global politics are constituted. Maurice Strong, UN Secretary-General at 
UNCED famously remarked that “the process is the policy.”4 This chapter argues that 
‘the process is the politics’. Thabo Mbeki’s conviction that ‘the ordinary people’ 
understood the need for such a conference of leaders indicates his grasp of the 
symbolic importance of the Summit. By meeting in Johannesburg and freely agreeing 
on the future course of global politics, he argued, the legitimacy of the international 
system was confirmed, even as new forms of governance were emerging.  
This chapter shows how the Summit as an ensemble of processes and events 
worked to govern global politics. Adopting a Foucauldian approach to government as 
“the conduct of conduct” it analyses how the theatre of the WSSD was a specific 
practice of government which itself established certain fields of visibility, particular 
regimes of knowledge, specific techniques and technologies, and produced an 
identifiable cast.5 Inspired by Geertz’ work on the theatre state in Bali it argues that 
the WSSD functioned as an “exemplary centre” which governed primarily through 
example rather than by decree.6 Participants were repeatedly warned that “the eyes of 
the world will be fixed on Johannesburg during the WSSD”, and the rituals of 
summitry – the photo opportunities, the speeches, the multi-stakeholder dialogues, the 
press statements, even the disputes and the protests – were all part of the Summit 
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theatre for this global audience.7 This chapter therefore develops an understanding of 
how summits are a technique of government at a distance, and function as “translation 
mechanisms”, or “loose and flexible linkages … made between those who are 
separated spatially and temporally.”8 Such a perspective suggests that, despite the 
growing importance of bilateral partnerships, multilateral summits continue to play an 
important role within forms of advanced liberal government. 
 
 
 
The Theatre of the Summit  
 
 The WSSD was a “summit of many summits”, with multiple venues, 
programmes and participants.9 The wealthy northern suburb of Sandton housed the 
heart of the Summit at the luxurious Convention Centre, but the broader WSSD 
consisted of a diverse ensemble of parallel events which ranged further afield. The 
Global People’s Forum, the official civil society event, was held in a huge exhibition 
hall known as Nasrec in the south of the city about 30 minutes’ drive from Sandton 
(or up to two hours in Johannesburg traffic). Closer to Sandton, the Ubuntu Village 
was a cultural centre and exhibition tent where governments and civil society could 
interact and access hands-on technologies for sustainable development. The 
WaterDome housed water-themed events and sessions some twenty-five minutes from 
Sandton. The IUCN hosted an Environment Centre at Nedcor Bank, next to the 
official conference venue. Critical gatherings of civil society assembled at St 
Stithian’s College for the People’s Earth Summit and the South-South Biopiracy 
Summit, and there was a well-attended landless people’s camp near Nasrec at 
Shareworld, a dilapidated old amusement park. Environmental justice and farming 
activists congregated at Shaft 17, an old mine-turned conference centre.10 Related 
events took place in other locations around South Africa, such as the International 
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Youth Summit and the African Youth Summit at Mogwase in North West Province, 
and the Indigenous People’s International Summit in Kimberley. There was much 
more to the WSSD, therefore, than just the official negotiations. 
These events give some sense of the grand theatre of the occasion. In 1992 
Strong’s vision was for the Rio Summit to be “the greatest show on earth”, and this 
ambition was replayed in the chaotic, daunting, historic and inspiring carnival 
atmosphere in Johannesburg.11 One UN bureaucrat reflected this sentiment, recalling 
that whilst review sessions in New York have their value, “there will never be 
anything like the Summit. It was really a crucible moment for the world, and for the 
sustainable development community.”12 This sense of historical occasion was an 
integral part of the Summit’s drama, as one sceptical activist conceded: “the only way 
to get anybody to do anything is through a high-level meeting like that, that’s what 
they’re motivated by.”13 Indeed, central to the Summit rationality was the aim to 
inspire and motivate as many as possible of those who participated in it, watched or 
read about it. The WSSD was a calculated attempt to influence the conduct of a whole 
range of diverse political actors through the theatre of the event itself.  
 
 
 
Fields of Visibility 
 
 The theatricality of the WSSD depended upon its construction as a ‘raised 
stage’ in world politics, somehow ‘above’ the normal run of politics. Discourses of 
summitry invoke hierarchical and vertical metaphors in order to claim a superior 
breadth of vision from the rarefied atmosphere of the summit, asserting the political 
importance of the event through the number and prestige of its participants, and the 
importance of the issues under discussion.  
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The summit vision reinforced the global scope of sustainable development 
discourse. Klaus Topfer, the Executive Director of UNEP, observed in his opening 
speech that “we suffer from problems of planetary dimensions. They require global 
responses.”14 The first PrepCom opened with the Chair, Emil Salim, calling for the 
need to chart a collaborative course for sustainable development to avoid “crashing 
Spaceship Earth into an environmental disaster”, recalling the same metaphor used in 
the Brundtland Report.15 The UN logo for the WSSD pictured a globe held in a hand 
or on the back of a dove.16 The South African logo for the WSSD, entitled People, 
Planet, Prosperity, depicted a red African sun setting over a green Earth, creating a 
similarly wide vision for sustainable development.17 For many commentators, the 
value of such “mega-conferences” was that they  
 
make it possible to hold a global dialogue about global issues … They force 
politicians to raise their horizons and consider strategic, longer-term questions that 
might otherwise be sidelined by day-to-day economic and political exigencies.18  
 
By framing the Summit as ‘above’ normal politics, it claimed a perspective both 
detached and superior to ‘grassroots’ concerns, and more far-seeing than merely 
national or local-level politics.19 The Political Declaration noted that UN conferences 
since Rio had “defined for the world a comprehensive vision for the future of 
humanity”, and proclaimed grandly that “we commit ourselves to act together, united 
by a common determination to save our planet, promote human development and 
achieve universal prosperity and peace.”20  
Yet despite this assertion of global scope there were gaps and lacunae in the 
view from the Summit, and issues that were not up for discussion. Jens Martens has 
persuasively shown how “some of the central obstacles and blockades faced by 
multilateral cooperation have remained taboo” at summits like the WSSD.21 For 
example, there is a “UN taboo against overt criticisms of member governments at 
UN-sponsored events”, preventing some policies and regimes from being openly or 
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critically discussed.22 At the WSSD this meant no protests against American 
preparations to invade Iraq, or criticisms of their broader unilateral foreign policy. 
The problems this caused were vividly conveyed during one incident in Bali.  
 
In the first week of PrepCom 4, the slogan ‘what are we going to do about the United 
States?’ appeared on stickers within minutes of the remark slipping out over the 
unguarded microphone of an exasperated Emil Salim, Indonesian chairperson of 
PrepCom 4. Overnight it appeared on t-shirts around the Convention Centre. Because 
of UN regulations that no protests are allowed inside the convention centre, the t-
shirts were ‘improved’ by security guards who put masking tape on the country 
name, leading NGO people to talk about ‘what are we going to do about you know 
who?’23  
 
Representatives of major groups confirmed that “there are some things you can’t do at 
the UN. You can’t point to certain governments.”24 
Other issues that could not be officially discussed or negotiated at the WSSD 
included the structure of the global economy and world trade.25 Despite states’ refusal 
to discuss issues which might compromise the parallel WTO negotiations, many 
activists and lobbyists sought to highlight the importance of trade rules for sustainable 
development. Whilst the provisional text urged states to “enhance the mutual 
supportiveness of trade, environment and development, while ensuring WTO 
consistency”, an increasingly vociferous campaign emerged aimed at removing the 
text on ‘ensuring WTO consistency’.26 The eventual removal of this text was received 
with delight by those who had feared it would establish WTO trade rules as superior 
to multilateral environmental agreements, but this defensive victory left the 
relationship between trade and the environment no clearer.  
Whilst the WSSD claimed a global view therefore, certain issues were 
removed from view and there were limits to what could be discussed even in 
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“diplomacy at the highest possible level.”27 Yet the effects of such assertions of 
hierarchy and globality were significant. The performance of the Type II partnerships 
on the ‘world stage’ of the Summit, for example, made them central to the discourse 
of sustainable development. Those who participated on the Summit stage were 
constructed as important, necessary and legitimate political actors, able to rise above 
their day-to-day concerns to address issues of genuine global importance. The ‘raised 
stage’ of the Summit and its global field of vision was thus at the heart of re-affirming 
sustainable development as a planetary discourse and its participants as somehow 
‘supra-political’. 
 
  
 
Regimes of knowledge 
 
 Traditionally the forms of knowledge underpinning summitry have been those 
of diplomacy and realist political science. The authoritative experts empowered at 
summits are experienced diplomats, foreign office ministers, international lawyers 
and heads-of-state, competing in terms of realpolitik, alliance-building, negotiating 
strategies, bargaining and legal phraseology.28 These forms of knowledge continue to 
inform the negotiations at summits, yet increasingly moments like the WSSD rely at 
least as much on communicative forms of knowledge such as brand management, 
public relations and the choreography of public diplomacy. As such the new 
authoritative experts in summit politics include press officers, ‘nation branders’, 
celebrity politicians and communications strategists. These forms of public diplomacy 
are part of a broader trend towards the emergence of “brand states”, a trend in which 
communications gurus seek to repackage national identities in order to create 
“emotional resonance” among an increasingly global audience of consumers.29 
In this respect the role of the media in Johannesburg was crucial. They were 
present in unprecedented numbers, and approximately 4,000 accredited journalists 
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attended the Summit.30 As a pre-Summit panel on ‘The Media and Sustainable 
Development’ made clear, “news executives had enormous impact on what and how 
the media covered world events such as the Summit”, which in turn “moulded the 
impressions and understanding of audiences.”31 Both state and non-state actors spent a 
great deal of time and effort on their media strategies, and venues like the Ubuntu 
exhibition tent were prime advertising spaces, attracting visitors at a rate of 30,000 
per day and “featuring dozens of displays by organisations ranging from 
ChevronTexaco to the European Space Agency to numerous governments’ Agenda 21 
national committees.”32 In order to make the most of these opportunities, countless 
advertising agencies, brand managers and public relations experts were employed by 
Summit participants.33 The World Health Organisation, for example, employed the 
Meropa Communications consultancy to  
 
assist with communications strategy, manage local media relations, deploy 
photographers, see to media conference arrangements, organise [the Health 
Environments for Children Initiative] Reception event, street theatre and procure  
public relations items (posters, T-shirts, banners).34 
 
The WWF launched a “global multi-media campaign” in preparation for the WSSD, 
including “a website that allows visitors to send their personal SOS message to world 
leaders, [and] television and print advertising, alerting global audiences to the urgent 
need for action.”35 One early South African NGO briefing paper advised civil society 
to “Kick some butt! Use the media. Embarrass the politicians.”36 The South African 
NGO GroundWork helped organise a ‘Greenwash Academy Awards Programme’ in 
the style of the Oscars on 23 August 2002 as part of their campaign on corporate 
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social accountability, which was widely and favourably covered by the media.37 They 
presented first prize to BP for their ‘Beyond Petroleum’ advertising campaign, and 
drew attention to the actions of corporations which revealed the hypocrisy of their 
marketing.38 As a result, “many of the potentially controversial partnerships, 
particularly those involving corporations, held their meetings on the outskirts of the 
Summit, fearing bad publicity.”39 Another prominent media campaign organised by 
local NGOs was the “toxic tour” for Summit delegates to the heavily polluted Steel 
Valley community in Vanderbiljpark, where community groups were trying to get 
compensation and clean-ups from government and local industries.40  
The British WSSD delegation, like many others, had prepared an explicit 
communication strategy for the WSSD based around raising awareness of sustainable 
development issues in the UK media and highlighting the importance of the WSSD 
for the WEHAB agenda.41 A post-Summit review by the Parliamentary 
Environmental Audit Committee concluded that “it is widely agreed that UK 
Government communications with the media at the Summit were very effective” and 
recorded that the delegation held daily press briefings and Margaret Beckett alone 
conducted 35 interviews.42 Despite this, the report also noted that it “was 
disappointing the pre-summit media coverage in the UK persistently concentrated on 
the size and content of the proposed delegation and the level of luxury of their travel 
and accommodation”, and furthermore that they “saw no evidence that such comment 
had been anticipated or that the Communications Strategy could counter it.”43 The 
report also criticised the government for “ineffective pre-planning” regarding media 
reactions to the composition of the delegation, and in particular the initial decision not 
to send then Environment and Agriculture Minister Michael Meacher MP to 
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Johannesburg.44 This apparent conflict within the government led to a media outcry, 
which was 
 
led by environmental NGOs concerned that it appeared that the Government was 
prepared to leave behind one of its most experienced Ministers in terms of the 
Summit’s agenda issues. Friends of the Earth went as far as to offer to pay Mr 
Meacher’s air fare. Within 48 hours of this offer Mr Meacher was confirmed as part 
of the official delegation.45 
 
The Parliamentary committee concluded that this indicated indecision and an 
“inadequate pre-Summit communications strategy”, and that “it is essential that the 
Government’s sustainable development communications review evaluates [the] 
Summit experience to inform future sustainable development communication 
strategies.”46  
The relative success and/or failure of Summit participants was therefore often 
assessed in terms of their communications strategies, the performance of a particular 
identity, and their ability to grab the media headlines. Theatrical speeches during the 
WSSD by Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe and Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez received widespread attention, with the latter displaying characteristic flair for 
the media sound-bite with the assertion that “heads-of-state go from summit to 
summit, whilst the majority of their people go from abyss to abyss.”47 Many state 
delegations took the opportunity of the Summit stage to announce initiatives and 
partnerships and ratify treaties. China, South Africa and Poland ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol just weeks before the WSSD, and Russia and Canada used the WSSD to 
announce their impending ratification of the Protocol. During the WSSD 48 countries 
and one international organisation signed, ratified or acceded to over 39 UN 
conventions.48 The choice to announce these initiatives and commitments at the 
Summit was clearly calculated to maximise the political dividends and dramatic 
potential of the media circus in Johannesburg, and it is likely their timing owes more 
to the dictates of communicative rather than realpolitik forms of knowledge.  
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In contrast the US suffered from negative press coverage at the WSSD, 
centring on their perceived obstruction of international agreements and the furious 
reaction to Secretary-of-State Colin Powell’s speech in the final plenary session. 
During Powell’s address “delegates jeered, booed, slow-clapped and shouted down 
the retired general, forcing him to stop speaking and causing conference president 
Nkosasana Dlamini-Zuma to repeatedly bang her gavel and call for order.”49 One 
journalist reported that “it was not easy to watch U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell 
being booed, some delegates walking out as he spoke. The poignant U.S. shame 
became page one news worldwide.”50 
The Summit organisers and hosts also mobilised media, branding and 
communicative forms of knowledge in order to ‘sell’ the Summit as a success and a 
triumph of international diplomacy. When negotiations did stall they were presented 
as simply diplomatic tactics rather than fundamental differences. According to one 
press report, “officials were confident that an apparent deadlock on some central 
issues could merely be attributed to negotiation tactics and should not necessarily be 
seen as insurmountable obstacles to the summit reaching consensus.”51 Another report 
revealed that 
 
the current standoff between rich and poorer countries on issues of good governance 
and access to world markets is likely to continue until the ‘last minute’ of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), officials said on Sunday. They said 
holding back on commitments to good governance was the only real bargaining chip 
developing countries had to win concessions on equitable access to the markets of the 
developed world. ‘It is quite normal in negotiations like these for people to want to 
hang on to the last minute.’52 
 
Important political differences were thus represented as simple negotiating ploys in 
order to stress the official line that the Summit, as the Political Declaration phrased it, 
“confirmed that significant progress has been made towards achieving a global 
consensus and partnership among all the people of our planet.”53 According to the UN 
Secretary-General in the post-Summit press conference, “this Summit will put us on a 
path that reduces poverty while protecting the environment, a path that works for all 
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peoples, rich and poor, today and tomorrow.”54 The South African newspaper, The 
Star, effusively praised the WSSD as “one of the greatest international conferences 
ever” and “an inspiration for our children.”55 More circumspectly, one of the South 
African organisers concluded in hindsight that “ideally what you wanted was to have 
a carefully crafted public communications exercise that took real issues and debates 
out to a public audience. It happened to a certain degree. … But we could have done 
more.”56  
The Type II partnerships proved a media-friendly storyline for the news 
coverage of the WSSD, enabling reporters to focus on specific issues, regions and 
projects, rather than attempting to cover the slow and often torturous process of 
international negotiations. One media briefing suggested that  
 
media people whom might find covering yet another world summit boring, could 
consider sending news crews to locations around the world where projects were 
going on that are related to the Summit. Heads of state shaking hands at the Summit 
will not be good international story material, neither good sound bite material.57 
 
Images such as British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, planting a tree in Johannesburg’s 
Alexandra Township were therefore popular with both reporters and politicians.58 The 
value of the WSSD as an advertising space and as a means of communicating and 
promoting the Type II partnerships goes some way to demonstrating the continued 
importance of summitry in an era of advanced liberal government. 
One prime example of the importance of media relations, communicative 
strategies and public relations branding to the Summit was the joint media conference 
held by Greenpeace and the business lobbies WBCSD and BASD on 28 August. 
Despite their historical antipathy, they used a joint public meeting in order to make 
clear the urgent need to reduce carbon emissions, and “to urge governments to act 
more forcefully to provide an international political framework that enables, 
stimulates and rewards innovation and implementation.”59 Billed as “an 
unprecedented event”, it was noted that “Greenpeace is well known for its 
disagreements with, and campaigns against, the activities of some of the companies 
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who are members of the WBCSD” and “the WBCSD is well known for advocating a 
market-based and free trade approach to solving environmental problems, including 
voluntary measures that often differ radically from Greenpeace approaches.”60 Yet, 
according to Björn Stigson, President of the WBCSD, “this is a good example of 
where the need to save the planet is so important it transcends any other differences 
we may have.”61 That this meeting did not signal sudden consensus on policies was 
demonstrated when BASD later clarified that “the initiative in no way should be seen 
as business endorsing the Kyoto principles.”62 In contrast to regimes of knowledge 
based around bargaining and realpolitik which posit relative gains as a fundamental 
measure of success at the summit, the communicative forms of knowledge which 
underpinned the WSSD promoted consensus and partnership as at the heart of ‘true’ 
success in Johannesburg. Thus both Greenpeace and WBCSD/BASD concluded that 
in this venue they had more to gain by emphasising their agreement than their 
differences. 
It is only too easy to regard such press conferences as hypocritical ‘spin’ and 
meaningless rhetoric. Many regarded these theatrics as a deviation from the real 
business of politics, and wrote-off the WSSD as “the world’s biggest photo-
opportunity.”63 Similarly, Chasek has argued that in international conferences an 
impediment to the negotiation of agreements  
 
is the tendency of participants to engage in oratory and grandstanding. Even when the 
public and the press are excluded from the meeting, the presence of a sizeable 
number of delegates – along with their attendant staff – often tempts participants into 
posturing.64 
 
However, it is a mistake to regard the concern with communication and media 
relations as entirely ephemeral or misleading. As Geertz showed in his account of the 
theatre state in Bali, the spectacle and ceremony of the court “were not means to 
political ends: they were the ends themselves, they were what the state was for.”65 
Geertz’s work therefore “restores our sense of the ordering force of display, regard 
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and drama.”66 In a similar way, the communication of the theatre of the WSSD 
displayed a certain ‘ordering force’. Media stories about the Summit created the 
reality of the event. Lars Petersen’s study of Danish television coverage of the WSSD 
shows how “the media are not simply involved in reporting on a social world … 
Rather, the media are actively involved in constituting the social world.”67  
Simon Dalby’s analysis of media coverage of the 1992 Rio Summit has shown 
how stories in authoritative sources such as the New York Times in many ways create 
the reality of the event.68 He showed how coverage focussed primarily on “diplomatic 
matters, the Bush administration’s positions and the isolation of the US delegation at 
the summit”, rather than the debates per se, with the result that “clearly what mattered 
here was who were the winners and losers in the great contests of geopolitical 
rivalry.”69 This is a familiar media discourse for representing international politics in 
which it is framed in terms of conflict, competing interests and zero-sum power 
struggles between state actors. Many media stories on the WSSD reproduced this 
discourse, with the ‘failure’ of the Bali PrepCom particularly prominent.70  
Yet an alternative media discourse of partnership, optimism and consensus 
was strongly promoted at the WSSD. Such a discourse was central to the way the 
Summit attempted to govern sustainable development at a distance through the 
conduct of conduct. In the run-up to Johannesburg, Seyfang and Jordan argued that  
 
there is no doubt that mega-conferences are immensely successful at raising public 
attention on issues of global concern. There are very few other occasions when 
environmental issues have received such intense media attention as they did in the 
run up to the 1992 Earth Summit.71 
 
Thus, “by commanding the front pages of national newspapers, the mega-conferences 
introduce debates about the environment and development to homes and businesses 
all over the world.”72 As such “it is hard to overstate the role of the media in 
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promoting sustainable development”, particularly in transferring information and 
ensuring transparency but also, as Petersen points out, in “the formation of public 
spheres and collective identities.”73 From a governmentality perspective it is 
significant to note that, rather than primarily relying on diplomatic and realist forms 
of knowledge, events such as the WSSD increasingly are underpinned and informed 
by communicative regimes of knowledge.  
 
 
 
Techniques and Technologies 
 
 These communicative regimes of knowledge in the theatre of summitry were 
closely fused with the multiple techniques and technologies of staging at the WSSD. 
The similarity between the “contrived character” of modern politics and the explicit 
choreography of the theatre has been highlighted by Edelman, who noted that “in the 
drama, the opera, the ballet, in the display of paintings and in the performance of 
music setting is plotted and manipulated, just as it often is in the staging of 
governmental acts.”74 More recently Constantinou has drawn attention to the ways in 
which the discourse of diplomacy imbues objects such as the foreign embassy and the 
conference table, floor and hall with instrumental significance.75 The stage-managing 
of the WSSD was directed toward projecting a smooth and successful performance, 
yet these techniques also had particular effects for the participation of the various 
actors involved in the Summit.  
Summits such as the WSSD are primarily constituted through the specific 
routines of UN diplomacy, what one South African negotiator referred to as “these 
arcane mechanisms of diplomacy and set formulas.”76 The need to produce a 
consensus text required a raft of skilled interventions and techniques to manage the 
negotiations. Discussions proceeded section by section and once agreed they were 
only reluctantly re-opened for discussion.77 When negotiations stumbled such as at 
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PrepCom IV, closed ‘informal-informals’ (informal meetings with limited access 
aimed at brokering deals) and ‘Friends of the Chair’ meetings were employed to 
identify the main antagonists and try to break the deadlock.78 Despite through-the-
night negotiations and emotional appeals from the Chair, the Bali PrepCom ended 
with a quarter of the text still in brackets and Emil Salim told media that “the meeting 
has failed to reach a consensus due to a lack of good faith and spirit of constructive 
dialogue.”79  
Delegates therefore arrived in Johannesburg with much work to do. The 
WSSD began by negotiating in ‘the committee of the whole’, which was comprised of 
all the delegations. Multi-stakeholder sessions involving the major groups were held 
on various sustainable development topics, and the conference report noted that “the 
innovative nature of these discussions should be encouraged as a model for enhanced 
multi-stakeholder participation and engagement within the United Nations system.”80 
The negotiations in Johannesburg were always more than simply means to an end: 
they were regarded as an example to the rest of the world of how conferences should 
be conducted and disputes resolved. 
Yet the plenary and multi-stakeholder sessions proved incapable of reaching 
consensus. Many of the outstanding sections were therefore forwarded to what was 
known as the ‘Vienna Setting’ which involved smaller groups of delegates negotiating 
on behalf of broader coalitions.81 During this stage of the process informal networking 
and closed-door negotiations proliferated, as “small caucuses of delegates in darkened 
corners yielded agreed language and movement towards compromise formulae.”82 
Even here however it became clear that delegations were unable to reach agreement 
on many outstanding sections and several parts of the texts had to be forwarded for 
direct negotiations between ministers in what was termed the ‘Johannesburg Setting’. 
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Here negotiators “could take high level political decisions on issues where the 
diplomats remained deadlocked”, although the danger of upsetting the delicate 
balance of the negotiations was greater.83 
At the same time that negotiations were taken to the ministerial level, 
increased pressure was applied to delegates. “We held their feet in the fire”, Olver 
recollected, “Valli [Moosa, South African Minister for Environment and Tourism] 
worked them night and day.”84 Techniques to facilitate consensus became even more 
pronounced. 
 
Sunday’s relocation to smaller negotiating quarters combined physical restraints on 
the number of delegates with increased political pressure from the Chair to drive the 
process to its conclusion. With entrance to the meeting room and the adjoining 
corridor tightly controlled, delegates and observers were pushed to their limits as 
leaving the ‘zone’ to access food or proper sanitary facilities jeopardised re-entry. 
Seasoned veterans highlighted this as the typical ‘back room drama’ characteristic of 
negotiations, while others could only hope that the outcome would be worth the 
wait.85 
 
Partly as a result, when the South African-authored Political Declaration emerged, it 
was adopted with limited discussion and few amendments. Observers commented 
that, “whether as an expression of faith in the hosts or through sheer exhaustion, 
delegates are clearly reluctant, at this late point, to negotiate another Johannesburg 
outcome.”86 
Through these tried and tested techniques of diplomacy and negotiation, the 
Summit eventually produced negotiated outcomes, with the final version of the Plan 
of Implementation being agreed at 1:15 am on the last day.87 These consensual 
outcomes were the primary indicators of a successfully choreographed performance. 
Yet the WSSD was about far more than just the production of a text and the Summit 
theatre required detailed staging, translation, programming, transportation, media 
provision, security, advertising and marketing, catering, logistics, accommodation and 
much more.88 JOWSCO, the South African company set up to organise the Summit, 
“was faced with a major logistical challenge within the limited time available”, and 
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transportation, budgeting, attendance and arranging venues proved particularly 
troublesome.89 Despite these many logistical difficulties the Summit proceeded 
smoothly overall, and Thabo Mbeki proudly reported that Nitin Desai, the WSSD 
Secretary-General, had declared it to be “the best organised” UN conference he had 
participated in.90 
 The presence of thousands of NGOs, corporate representatives, major groups 
and media at the Summit also required a whole assemblage of techniques and 
technologies for managing and facilitating their participation.91 First, those who 
wished to formally participate in the Summit had to be accredited by the Summit 
Secretariat which took a great deal of time and energy.  
 
The enthusiasm for participating in the World Summit was so strong … there was a 
flood of accreditation requests … we viewed more than a thousand new applications 
… over the year up to the summit we accredited exactly 737 organisations. This was 
a big part of the preparatory process – reviewing applications, deciding if the 
organisation met the criteria for accreditation, and then giving them a special status 
so they could come to Johannesburg.92 
 
The accreditation process could be challenged by states, and three Tibetan NGOs 
were denied accreditation after China complained.93 Despite the increased access and 
involvement of non-state actors, just as Raustiala observed in the 1990s, “NGO 
participation remains a privilege granted and mediated by states.”94  
Once accredited, groups had access to the main conference venue and all its 
events. This gave them “much closer access to the governments, because they were in 
the same building, and they were having coffee and lunch and dinner in the same 
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place, and they were running into each other.”95 The major groups were also given 
seats for the plenary sessions of the Summit. According to Zeyra Aydin, the UN 
official managing the major groups’ programme, 90 seats were put aside, ten for each 
major group, something that had “never happened before in any UN meeting.”96 This 
allowed their representatives to speak in debates, and participate in the multi-
stakeholder sessions and round-tables.97 Slots were provided for the major groups to 
speak to the whole conference at the start and end of the Summit. The order of the 
speakers was carefully calculated and hierarchical, and it was agreed that  
 
the speakers’ list will be established by drawing lots, in accordance with customary 
UN protocol, whereby Heads of State and Government will speak first, followed by 
ministers, and then heads of delegations, and that lower-level delegations and 
observers may speak in Plenary from Thursday–Friday, 29–30 August.98 
 
Together with techniques such as the multi-stakeholder dialogues and round-table 
sessions, these mechanisms sought to govern participation in the interests of “a 
serious dialogue between governments and other stakeholders.”99  
However, even UN facilitators conceded that this dialogue enjoyed “varying 
levels of success”, with the major groups often having to rely upon the chair to ensure 
that states actually listened to what they had to say.100 Access to particular areas and 
facilities was tightly controlled and security was a paramount concern, as one 
journalist reported. 
 
Media entry to three of the four major sites had journalists trekking to back alleyways 
and using service entrances guarded by armed police and looking like post–9/11 
airport security with X-ray machinery, dogs, and all. There were more than 150 
computer stations and another 200 hook-ups available for media at Sandton, but only 
200 seats reserved for print media in the main plenary gallery, some seven floors up 
from media central, and the elevators were ‘down’ for security reasons. Media pool 
passes, generally available to those who arrived at 6:30 am, were limited. 
Photographers and television crews were escorted inside by police officers.101 
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The participation of non-state actors at the WSSD was therefore channelled and 
governed in certain ways. Major groups’ interaction with the negotiators was 
conducted by specified representatives and on an issue-by-issue basis. Particular 
spokespeople were nominated so they could “funnel their ideas through that 
person.”102 When the CSD NGO steering committee collapsed during the PrepCom 
phase, the WSSD secretariat appointed three NGOs – the Third World Network, the 
Danish-92 Group (whose role was later taken over by ANPED, the Northern Alliance 
for Sustainability) and the Environment Liaison Centre International – to represent 
NGOs.103 This prompted protests from some NGOs concerned by the unilateral nature 
of the decision.104 Such techniques of management were clearly necessary in light of 
the WSSD priority on cooperation and consensus; however they work to qualify the 
official claim that the Johannesburg Summit was a space of free interaction and equal 
partnership. 
The degree of participation granted to accredited groups in Johannesburg, 
though multi-stakeholder dialogues, speeches in plenary sessions, and the Type II 
partnerships went further than in most previous conferences.105 In his pre-Summit 
briefing, Nitin Desai argued that Johannesburg would be different from Rio because it 
would recognise civil society organisations “as more than just advocacy groups trying 
to influence governments but as genuine partners in implementation.”106 Yet 
frustrations still emerged over the limits to participation at the WSSD.107 A coalition 
of Southern social movements claimed that the multi-stakeholder dialogue format 
 
did not seem to have any influence on the outcome of the Summit. It turned out to be 
an effective way of curbing voices that oppose the current neo-liberal policies, 
forcing the input of social movements through a consensus mechanism that excludes 
any expression of our analysis and proposals. Genuine effective input from civil 
society groups that do not share the neo-liberal positions remain unheard.108 
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Concerns about the distance of the civil society forum from Sandton, the degree of 
access that the major groups would have to the intergovernmental process and the 
amount of time that would be assigned for their statements were raised early in the 
PrepCom process.109 One activist pointed out that whilst access was unprecedented, 
“during the PrepComs there were practically no governments in the room when we 
gave those interventions”, and therefore there was no way of making sure “there’s an 
actual impact between what civil society is saying and what the governments are 
agreeing on.”110 A coalition of South African NGOs complained that 
 
limited access can only be understood as a deliberate attempt to create competition, 
conflict and division between civil society actors. It undermines the productive and 
creative role that civil society played in the 1992 Rio Summit and subsequent 
conventions. A dangerous precedent has been set.111 
 
UN organisers conceded that “after the summit there was frustration, with many 
major groups feeling that whatever they do their voices will never be heard by 
governments.”112 
Security and the capacity of the venues meant that even many accredited 
participants had to be turned away from some events. “We had a big problem with 
restricting the flow of the major group representatives who couldn’t even get into the 
building”, reflected one of the organisers, “we didn’t anticipate so many people 
turning up and there not being enough space for them. We were giving out raffle 
tickets, and people could hand them on, and take turns going in and out of the 
building.”113 This put the organisers in a difficult position, and it was conceded that  
 
it really created a problem when there were speakers coming in, or important people, 
we had to try to keep track of who needed to be in the room … I guess there is 
certainly a hierarchy, but as the Secretariat we had to be careful, and we always are, 
not to pick and choose. It’s a self-organising process.114 
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These formal and informal hierarchies constituted important techniques for the 
regulation and management of the Summit, and highlight the degree to which power 
relationships permeate UN negotiations. Even within and between state delegations 
power relationships were conditioned by these techniques of government, since the 
smallest and poorest states found their ability to participate restricted by their “small 
delegations, limited staff and limited capacity.”115 The complexity of the process 
meant that larger, wealthier and more experienced delegations were placed at an 
advantage. Despite the talk of openness, consultation and participation, negotiations 
on the texts was conducted, in the last instance, by the representatives of the most 
powerful states meeting behind closed doors.  
 For some this demonstrated the sham of the WSSD, and the continued 
operation of age-old realpolitik and back-room diplomacy.116 However, such 
techniques of exclusion, marginalisation and facilitation can also be seen as elements 
of the broader Summit theatre, in which a smooth performance and production of an 
agreed text was an essential part of legitimating the political status quo. Through such 
techniques, which included sovereign and disciplinary strategies of power, the 
Summit itself was constituted as a technique of exemplary government, which 
established certain procedures and standards for the conduct of global sustainable 
development.  
 
 
 
Production of subjectivities 
 
 By providing a stage on which sustainable development was performed, the 
WSSD also governed global politics by producing a particular cast of actors and a 
global audience. This section shows how the Summit can be seen as a technique of 
facilitating rule at a distance through the way it established inspirational leaders and 
cooperative partners, and promoted certain standards of conduct for legitimate 
political actors. 
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Through the establishment of the Summit as a raised stage with a global field 
of visibility, the population of the entire world became the potential audience. 
Delegates were reminded that “the eyes of the world are upon us here, waiting for 
signs that we are able to bridge our differences.”117 Mbeki warned that “the peoples of 
the world expect that this World Summit will live up to its promise.”118 This global 
audience was extended to future generations, and the Political Declaration recorded 
that “at the beginning of this Summit, the children of the world spoke to us in a simple 
yet clear voice that the future belongs to them”, children who “represent our collective 
future.”119 When speaking to the 11th session of the CSD in 2003, Moosa reminded 
them that at the WSSD “we entered into a solemn pact with future unborn generations 
not to destroy beloved planet Earth.”120 Through these discursive framings an 
audience for the WSSD was constructed that included all the peoples of the world, 
now and into the future. 
Viewing the performance of the WSSD from a governmentality perspective, 
this audience was constructed as both the ultimate end of government and its most 
important means.121 They were not merely a passive audience, receiving the 
instructions and dictates of the Summit delegates, but were urged to respond to the 
example set in Johannesburg, to participate directly in the WSSD itself if they could, 
and to implement sustainable development according to the model advocated at the 
Summit. As such the exemplary government of the WSSD constructed each and every 
member of the global population as responsible for their own self-government for 
sustainable development. 
The cast which participated in the Summit itself were thus placed into a 
special relationship with this broader audience. Not only were they constructed as 
essential actors for sustainable development, but they were also expected to be leaders 
that would inspire the broader audience to participate in sustainable development. 
Participation itself was increasingly framed as a task for cooperative partners rather 
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than sovereign independent actors. Those who were able to play this dual role of 
inspirational leader and cooperative partner most convincingly were accordingly 
recognised as the most legitimate and important political actors. 
The leading roles in international politics have conventionally been assumed 
to be played by states and their representatives. Both media and academic discourses 
of summitry have tended to look automatically to states as the source of political 
willpower and leadership for sustainable development.122 State actors were 
themselves keen to stress their centrality at the Summit, as Zehra Aydin observed. 
 
In the UN it is important for governments always to make sure that you understand 
that this is an organisation of member states, it doesn’t belong to anybody else. 
NGOs come here because the member states allow it, the Secretariat is paid because 
the member states pay them. It’s all about the membership. And the minute you talk 
too much about the participation of non-state actors, the governments feel they have 
to make sure you understand that this is their house, and the rest are guests, allowed 
in for whatever purpose. And usually the non-state actors are allowed in to contribute 
to the discussion and help the governments to make informed decisions.123 
 
Reflecting this state-centrism, the Political Declaration began by declaring: “We, the 
representatives of the people of the world…”, a telling variation on the UN Charter’s 
familiar ‘We, the peoples…’.124 It was a clear assertion that the democratic 
representatives of sovereign states were the primary actors in Johannesburg. The 
Political Declaration went on to claim that the legitimacy of representative 
democracy and the international community of states rested on their ability to provide 
leadership at moments like the WSSD, poetically invoking Biblical verse to argue that  
 
unless we act in a manner that fundamentally changes their lives the poor of the 
world may lose confidence in their representatives and the democratic systems to 
which we remain committed, seeing their representatives as nothing more than 
sounding brass or tinkling cymbals.125 
 
In this oft-quoted passage the delegates were positioned as defenders of democracy 
and their success at the Summit, it was insinuated, was all that stood between 
democracy and the potentially anti-democratic poor. In this light there are few 
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political moments as powerfully symbolic as the successful resolution of a protracted 
diplomatic deadlock by a newly arrived head-of-state after just hours of face-to-face 
negotiations. In one sense, particularly for participating states, the entire system of 
democratic political representation was secured through such interventions. 
This symbolic emphasis upon the primacy of states and their highest 
representatives was furthered by the ‘Johannesburg Setting’, which involved a group 
of ministers and other senior government representatives who could take high-level 
political decisions on issues where the diplomats remained deadlocked.126 The WSSD 
allowed heads-of-state to play the glamorous and dramatic role of international 
statesmen, acting out their sovereignty as the last hope for agreement on sustainable 
development. Typically, EU President Hans Christian Schmidt claimed that “if the 
problems cannot be solved at a technical level, we are prepared to solve them at a 
political level.”127 It is in this sense that David Reynolds argues that “personalised 
power is at the heart of summitry”, since summits draw attention to the make-or-break 
roles of the ‘great men’ of inter-state politics.128 
 In many ways, therefore, the WSSD was an opportunity for states to perform 
and assert their centrality in global politics. However, as the re-orientation of 
sustainable development towards multi-stakeholder partnerships has shown, the 
automatic primacy of state actors in sustainable development was no longer 
guaranteed. States were expected to be leaders in international politics not just 
through the negotiation of texts but through the announcement of new initiatives and 
programmes, perhaps in partnership with diverse other actors. Examples of exemplary 
leadership demonstrated by states at the WSSD included the announcement by an 
alliance of like-minded delegations that they were forming a Renewable Energy 
coalition in order to express their “strong commitment to the promotion of renewable 
energy.”129 Expressing their disappointment of the failure of the Plan of 
Implementation to include a binding target for renewable energy, they stated that “we 
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commit ourselves to cooperate in the further development and promotion of 
renewable energy technologies”, and that “we have adopted, or will adopt, such 
targets for the increase of renewable energy and we encourage others to do 
likewise.”130 Such initiatives reveal the emergence of new rationalities of government 
at the WSSD. Rather than relying on multilateral agreements and regulations, new 
constellations of state and non-state actors used the Summit stage to promote an 
explicitly exemplary rationality of government, encouraging others to voluntarily 
follow their example. 
The WSSD also broadened the ways in which non-state actors could 
participate in global governance. Thus for some, the lesson of Johannesburg was that 
“the failure of national governments to act coherently and assertively” implied that 
“leadership for sustainability will come from civil society.”131 The participation of 
NGOs and other major groups in the WSSD – through multi-stakeholder meetings, 
informal interactions with delegates, plenary speeches as well as the parallel Global 
People’s Forum – recognised and built on their role during the 1992 Rio Conference 
and during the 1990s with the CSD. Peter Willetts has described how “NGOs have 
changed from being peripheral advisors of secondary status in the diplomatic system 
to being high status participants at the centre of policymaking.”132 As Gemmill and 
Bamidele-Izu have pointed out, their “creativity, flexibility, entrepreneurial nature, 
and capacity for vision and long-term thinking often set NGOs apart from 
governmental bodies”, particularly when it came to forming flexible and bilateral 
partnerships.133  
Business actors were also well-positioned to play leading roles at the WSSD 
through partnerships and exemplary initiatives. The UN record of the WSSD noted 
that “a notable difference between Rio and Johannesburg is the more conspicuous 
presence of business at the latter.”134 The 700 business delegates at the WSSD were a 
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well-organised and highly visible group.135 Advertisements for corporations stressing 
their social and environmental contributions were prominent, whether it was de Beers 
billboards announcing “Water is Forever” or the BMW exhibition in Sandton 
Square.136 Other high profile commercial sponsors of the Summit included Hewlett-
Packard, DaimlerChrysler, Standard Bank, Anglo American, Eskom, Coca-Cola and 
South African Airways.137 One industry analyst concluded that “business had a strong 
and visible focus at the summit which was backed by extensive and expensive 
preparation and organisation.”138 One of the most prestigious events of the entire 
Summit was the Lekgotla Business Day organised by BASD on 1 September.139 It 
was US$100 per head to enter, and Kofi Annan delivered the keynote speech, adding 
to the “public legitimacy” of business as an important sustainable development actor 
at the Summit.140 
The Summit stage was therefore shared in Johannesburg by a multiplicity of 
actors, including states, major groups and international institutions. Rather than their 
political legitimacy being judged primarily in terms of democratic representation or 
accountability, the status of WSSD participants was increasingly also judged in terms 
of their ability and willingness to provide exemplary leadership and pursue 
cooperative partnerships for sustainable development. Legitimate political actors were 
expected to contribute concrete resources, energy and expertise to partnerships for 
sustainable development, as well as to conduct themselves appropriately, 
cooperatively and consensually. This stress upon cooperation as the hallmark of 
responsible conduct was a defining feature of how the WSSD constructed legitimate 
political actors. At the close of PrepCom I, Emil Salim praised “the smiles and good 
spirit” which had led to a “constructive and positive atmosphere”, and hoped that a 
similarly cooperative spirit would continue throughout the negotiations.141 The 
eventual agreement in Johannesburg was interpreted as a sign that “significant 
progress has been made towards achieving a global consensus and partnership among 
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all the people of our planet.”142 Through the Type II outcomes previously oppositional 
identities – such as Greenpeace and the WBCSD, for example – were reframed as 
equal partners with a shared interest in sustainable development. As one UN official 
reflected, this demonstrated a “newfound camaraderie”, such that 
 
the focus now is on really working together, and that was something everyone agreed 
upon at the summit, that partnerships are important, that, in order to fulfil these goals 
and commitments, the entire international community, whoever is the appropriate 
actor in the situation, they must work together. … That’s why you don’t see 
organisations simply coming to rail at the government[s]. It’s not productive any 
more.143 
 
In such ways the WSSD can be regarded as a technique of power which attempted to 
govern the conduct of international politics by establishing standards of proper 
behaviour in terms of inspirational leadership and cooperative partnership, and 
through which the entire global population would ultimately be enrolled in 
responsible self-conduct and partnership for sustainable development. 
 
 
 
Two cases of exemplary government at the WSSD 
 
Two examples of how this exemplary government worked at the Summit are 
useful to illustrate the evolving role of summits, and the political effects produced. 
These are the Johannesburg Climate Legacy initiative, and the re-branding of South 
African national identity as both the ‘negotiating capital of the world’ and as the 
‘custodian of sustainable development’. Both these cases show how the WSSD was 
predicated on governing the conduct of conduct by example. 
The Johannesburg Climate Legacy (JCL) initiative demonstrates how the 
private sector was brought into sustainable development governance during the 
WSSD. JCL was a Type II partnership between the South African Government, 
UNDP, IUCN, BASD, WBCSD, the Development Bank of South Africa, a UK 
company called Future Forests, the US Climate Neutral Network, the International 
Institute for Energy Conservation and the GEF. It aimed to measure the carbon 
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footprint of the Summit and then off-set it through green projects in South Africa 
funded by private donations.144 Aiming to raise US$5 million in total, during the 
Summit itself they only raised US$330,000.145 More important than the actual sums 
raised, however, was the way the initiative explicitly invoked an exemplary rationality 
of government, evidenced in claims that the project “will provide forever a blueprint 
for the mitigation of the environmental impacts of hosting large international 
conferences.”146 
The project deliberately sought to utilise the prominence and visibility of the 
WSSD in urging business actors to act responsibly by offsetting their carbon footprint 
for travel to the Summit, and accordingly act as an inspiration to others. Companies 
were advised that, by doing this on “the world stage”, they could “make one of the 
most important commitments in modern history to a sustainable future.”147 The 
company running the JCL public relations strategy were Future Forests, who describe 
themselves as “a world leader in turning carbon liability into a brand asset for 
companies.”148 They claimed that 
 
JCL is the opportunity to demonstrate in a direct, practical and visible way that 
specific businesses support carbon responsibility. By delivering a voluntary 
programme aimed at individuals, JCL has also the potential to pick up the climate 
change agenda with a mass market and bring about shift change in behaviours and 
attitudes of peoples around the world. … [Companies] will benefit from prominent 
exposure on an international stage in a flagship project of the WSSD, with UN and 
international government endorsement. … All corporate sponsors will benefit from 
the high level of media interest in the WSSD in general and the Johannesburg 
Climate Legacy (JCL) project specifically, generated by a dedicated media and 
marketing team at Future Forests, supported by local teams and infrastructure … 
Access to a central ‘press office’ for the JCL project, managed by Future Forests … 
will provide a central point of contact for international and local media and provide 
marketing materials, to corporate sponsors as well as media, to ensure maximum 
return on investment.149 
 
Several key aspects of the ways in which the conduct of conduct through 
example was attempted are evident here. First, the initiative stressed the way in which 
‘prominent exposure on an international stage’ was central to the communication of 
sustainable development. From this perspective the Summit was more important as an 
advertising opportunity for promoting exemplary projects than it was as a venue for 
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multilateral negotiations. Since the WSSD the CSD has hosted a number of 
“partnership fairs”, which rest on a similar exemplary rationality of government, 
being designed to enable “partnerships for sustainable development to network, 
identify partners, create synergies between partnerships and learn from each other’s 
experiences.”150 
Secondly, the initiative made it clear that part of the attraction of the project 
was the way it included the skills and knowledge of public relations and marketing 
experts, who could turn ‘carbon liability into a brand asset’. The production of 
knowledge and value out of what was once merely pollution or waste signifies an 
important political effect of the new regimes of power/knowledge enacted at the 
WSSD.151 Moreover, the reliance on branding and advertising strategies demonstrates 
the centrality of communicative forms of knowledge to exemplary rationalities 
government. 
Thirdly, the initiative firmly positioned responsible businesses as leading 
actors for sustainable development, indeed businesses were informed that they could 
‘make one of the most important commitments in modern history to a sustainable 
future’. Companies were able to invest in this product without any action to reduce 
the carbon emissions of their core business. A mining corporation, for example, could 
purchase credits to reduce its carbon footprint, without changing any aspect of its 
actual operations. Moreover, beyond merely reducing their own carbon footprint, part 
of the explicit rationale of the scheme was that by doing so they could bring about 
‘change in behaviours and attitudes of peoples around the world’. This was to be 
achieved not only through a vague hope that the project would promote and 
encourage the idea of carbon off-setting, but also by developing “three models for 
extending the Climate Legacy idea worldwide” to future events, entire cities, and 
forms of transport.152 IUCN have also applied the Johannesburg model to the 
‘greening’ of subsequent events such as the World Conservation Congress in 
Bangkok in 2004.153 This encapsulates the rationality of exemplary government, in 
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which the conduct of conduct is achieved through the communication of certain 
examples, rather than the promulgation of regulations, laws, targets or restrictions. 
The Johannesburg Climate Legacy was therefore a Type II partnership which 
shows how sustainable development discourse and the WSSD functioned in practice 
within formations of advanced liberal government. Premised upon voluntary 
participation and market approaches to climate change it exemplifies the ways in 
which sustainable development was re-framed at the WSSD.154 It also highlights the 
importance of summits in terms of providing a highly visible marketing and branding 
opportunity, through which private sector actors could reposition themselves as at the 
heart of global governance for sustainable development. 
 
 Whilst the Johannesburg Climate Legacy is an excellent example of a specific 
partnership that worked to govern sustainable development through advanced liberal 
exemplary government, the re-branding of the South African national image at the 
WSSD shows more broadly how the theatre of the Summit ordered and governed 
global politics. Through their performance at the WSSD a South African brand was 
constructed and reinforced as an inspirational leader in both international negotiations 
and at the forefront of sustainable development. It also shows how the traditional 
political roles of states have been expanded, transnationalised and modified through 
their insertion into regimes of exemplary government. 
The theatre of the WSSD offered inspirational leaders an opportunity to 
communicate a message of optimism and reconciliation to the watching audience. No 
one individual seemed to represent these qualities more than Nelson Mandela, and 
through his presence the image of South Africa as a ‘Rainbow Nation’ which had 
overcome the injustices and divisions of the past was repeatedly invoked. Despite 
Mandela not being officially involved in the WSSD there was a predictably excitable 
reaction to his presence, with numerous heads-of-state queuing up for photo 
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opportunities and a dose of “Madiba magic.”155 His presence helped the South 
African government develop a ‘nation brand’ as an ideal host for international 
conferences.156  
Since the mid-1990s South Africa has actively sought a leading and hosting 
role in international negotiations, seeking to mediate between the North and South 
and promoting its own version of reconciliation. Major international conferences 
hosted in the post-Apartheid era include the ninth UN Conference on Trade and 
Development in 1996, the twelfth Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Durban in 
1999, the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerances (WCAR) in Durban in 2001, and the World Parks Congress in 
Durban in 2003. South Africa also chaired the Commonwealth from 2000 – 2001, and 
the newly established African Union in 2002. Given that South Africa’s absence from 
such events was a major feature of their pre-1990 international isolation, it was noted 
as early as 1999 that hosting summits was becoming “a very visible feature of South 
African diplomacy.”157 Summit organisers confirmed that South Africa was actively 
“trying to build ourselves as a conference destination.”158 In light of this the smooth 
hosting of the WSSD was a source of great pride to many South Africans, with one 
commentator declaring that “South Africa has become a major destination for 
international dialogue. It has simply become the ‘Negotiating capital of the 
world’.”159  
Chasek and Sherman interpreted the decision to hold the WSSD in South 
Africa as a reflection of “the important contribution the South African government 
had made in advancing the cause of multilateralism and in contributing to North-
South dialogue since its readmission to the UN”, as well as in recognition of South 
Africa’s domestic achievements since 1994.160 Instrumental in its formation but 
absent during most of the Apartheid years, South Africa was the UN’s “prodigal 
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child” and the WSSD was a key moment in a process of re-integration into the UN 
that culminated in 2007 with their election to a temporary seat on the Security 
Council.161 South Africa’s renunciation of nuclear weapons and their leadership 
during the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension negotiations 
further contributed to their high moral standing in international society.162 In this 
sense Chasek described the WSSD as South Africa’s “coming of age ceremony”, and 
for Mbeki “the success of the WSSD “showed the peoples of the world what we were 
doing with our freedom, for which they too had struggled and sacrificed.”163 In his 
State of the Nation address in 2000, Mbeki declared that, “having ended our dark days 
as a pariah country, we can rightly say that, today, the nations of our common 
universe are confident that out of South Africa will emerge a thing of value that will 
contribute to the building of a more humane world.”164 As such the WSSD was an 
important element of Mbeki’s vision of South Africa at the forefront of an ‘African 
Renaissance’ in global politics.165 
South African politicians played an active role before, during and after the 
WSSD to ensure its diplomatic success. In particular, pressure was applied after the 
Bali PrepCom in support of the draft Plan of Implementation, and to try to persuade 
heads-of-state to attend the Summit.166 At a handover meeting held in Rio in June 
2002 Mbeki ended his speech with a public promise that “failure in Johannesburg was 
not an option.”167 During the Summit negotiations themselves there was substantial 
pressure applied and many hours of facilitation by leading government figures 
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including Moosa, Olver and Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma.168 On one occasion, 
right at the end of the WSSD when the paragraph on energy was one of the few 
sections still outstanding, Moosa apparently “pleaded with delegations to accept the 
revised text intact.”169 Such personal efforts demonstrate the degree to which many 
South Africans believed that “the onus of ensuring the successful outcome of the 
WSSD rests largely on the shoulders of the South African government”, who 
accordingly felt a keen sense of responsibility as “brokers.”170 
The smooth running of the WSSD was crucial to the re-branding of South 
African identity, and they sought “to demonstrate unequivocally that Johannesburg 
has the ability to host major international gatherings, and to create positive 
impressions of the city, the province, the country and continent.”171 The welcoming 
ceremony was a theatrical spectacular, involving a “one-and-a-half hour show 
depicting the birth of the planet and set on a multi-tiered stage in the shape of the 
continent.”172 Gauteng police commissioner Perumal Naidoo confirmed that “we aim 
to change misperceptions about safety and security in South Africa in general and in 
Gauteng in particular and hope that our efforts will help to attract the attention of 
foreign tourists and investors.”173 Despite the Summit’s budget overspend Olver 
reported in the aftermath that “the benefits of the WSSD to the country’s image were 
much better than could have been achieved by spending the same money on 
marketing.”174  
The conclusion of the Summit with agreement on the texts therefore 
confirmed the growing South African brand as successful international negotiators.175 
This drew upon the belief that South Africans have unique and valuable lessons to 
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teach the international community about peaceful negotiations and reconciliation. The 
motif of the South African transition pervaded statements on the WSSD. Speeches by 
Nitin Desai and Klaus Topfer during the opening session both closely linked the task 
before them with the memory of the South African struggle. According to Topfer, 
 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in the city of Johannesburg 
represents a defining moment in the efforts of the international community to put our 
planet on a sustainable path for the future. It is a defining moment for many reasons, 
but above all, as we were earlier reminded, 10 years ago, when we met in Rio to 
embark on our journey as an international community on the path of sustainable 
development, South Africa was not among us. At that time the vision of a free South 
Africa was still a dream. Ten years later, we are meeting to chart a new course under 
the leadership of a freely elected South African President, in this great country that 
has emerged as a strong and vibrant member of the international community. Mr. 
President, you have called the victory over apartheid and the emergence of a free, 
democratic and inclusive South Africa a ‘triumph of the human spirit’, and indeed it 
is. … South Africa realised its dream of freedom. We must realise the dream of 
environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable development, of responsible 
prosperity for all.176 
 
This framing of the South African experience and their particular national character 
was widely evident. A collective statement by South African NGOs during the 
Summit noted their country’s “unique experience and skill in managing our complex 
and continuous political transformation”, and asserted that “South Africa is chairing 
the WSSD because, as people, we defeated apartheid.”177 One NGO director observed 
that “the recent South African experience is rich with innovative and creative 
facilitation techniques for solving conflict.”178 Another commentator noted that 
“South Africa has indeed exported negotiation to the world and sold it as a viable 
means of addressing human concerns and challenges. It is therefore not surprising that 
global conferences of such magnitude are often held in South Africa.”179 By 
performing this history of reconciliation on the stage of the WSSD, the South African 
national brand acted as an example to the rest of the world of how peaceful 
multilateral negotiations could be conducted. Yet, such a construction of South 
African history ignores much of the pain and violence of the transition, as well as 
over-stating the degree to which South Africa is now peaceful and reconciled. Within 
this rose-tinted vision of South African history, Summit organisers could make claims 
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such as that “South Africa has had a history of quite constructively managing mass 
protest”, an assertion which ignores a parallel and much longer history of violent 
clashes and police brutality.180  
The second aspect of the South African re-branding at the WSSD was as 
inspirational leaders at the forefront of implementing sustainable development. In 
June 2002 a ceremony was held in Brazil in which the torch of the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit was passed to the South African Government.181 This was associated with the 
symbolic transfer of the Rio legacy on environment and development. As Mbeki 
explained to the South African Parliament in the Summit aftermath,  
 
as a host country the successful outcome of the Johannesburg World Summit places a 
special responsibility on us to be – in our own habits and practices – among the 
global leaders in sustainable development. Just as South Africa provided the 
leadership required of it at the Summit and … hosted with widely acclaimed success 
the biggest-ever multilateral event, so too must South Africa serve as a shining 
example in putting into action the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.182 
 
For some observers, the Summit raised the profile of sustainable development in 
South Africa to the degree that “it changed the way government worked.”183 An inter-
ministerial cabinet committee on sustainable development was set-up, and South 
African leadership within the CSD has been prominent since the Summit.184 In the 
words of a prominent South African businessman the WSSD “was very powerful … it 
put us on the global map. I think it made us the custodian of sustainable development 
in some way, for the next five or ten years.”185 
As ‘custodians of sustainable development’ the South Africans used the 
WSSD to showcase a range of sustainability initiatives and projects in the country, 
including the ‘Greening the Summit’ initiative which aimed to reduce the ecological 
footprint of the event and was “pioneering the way international events will be 
organised.”186 The Johannesburg Climate Legacy partnership was a flagship project in 
this initiative, but there were also social regeneration projects, inner-city clean-ups 
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and injections of money into the transport and infrastructure of the northern 
suburbs.187 A “Zero Waste” programme sought to reduce the waste produced by the 
event and recycle as much as possible.188 
The impact of such schemes on the broader ecological footprint of the WSSD 
was relatively slight, especially since, as one post-WSSD study pointed out, “the bulk 
of the impact stems from international air travel” and “in the bigger global and 
metropolitan picture of resource consumption and waste generation, the impact of the 
WSSD was minimal.”189 However, such initiatives are another indication of the 
rationality of exemplary government since, as well as their immediate and direct 
impact, they were intended to be copied and imitated far beyond Johannesburg. As 
one review of the ‘Greening the Summit’ initiatives pointed out, these programmes 
“were marketed at the WSSD … to the world as examples of environmental best 
practice projects.”190 The UNDP’s promotional booklet noted that participants at the 
Summit would “be inspired by the number of ordinary South Africans who are 
striving towards sustainable development.”191 Such an outlook confirms the prevailing 
wisdom of national brand managers, who stress that “primary responsibility for the 
success of the nation brand lies with individuals”, whose “key function is to ‘live the 
brand’ – that is, to perform attitudes and behaviours that are compatible with the 
brand strategy.”192 
South Africa’s role as an inspirational leader for sustainable development was 
not therefore based on their ability to enforce stricter environmental and social 
regulations, or drive international negotiations towards stronger and more binding 
conventions. Rather South Africa was an ‘exemplary centre’ whose conduct would 
serve as a shining example to others. Both the ways in which South Africa advertised 
its brand as ‘negotiating capital of the world’ and as ‘custodians of sustainable 
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development’ rested upon the power of leadership by example, rather than the power 
of enforcing and obeying. Their re-branded dual role as an inspirational power was 
succinctly articulated by one of the South African organisers who reflected that 
“South Africa is the one place there is hope that sustainable development is possible. 
… maybe Mandela walks into the room and everything changes.”193 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how the WSSD can be regarded as a piece of grand 
political theatre which acted as an “exemplary centre” in governing broader global 
politics.194 It acted as a model for international negotiations, demonstrating that states, 
international institutions and major groups could come together and to agree on the 
future implementation of sustainable development. As such, it established a certain 
way of doing international politics and instead of eroding the importance of 
international summits it demonstrated the importance of exemplary and inspirational 
stages on which to communicate and govern sustainable development at a distance.  
This rationality of exemplary government depended on the establishment of 
certain fields of visibility, regimes of knowledge, assemblages of techniques and 
particular identities and subjectivities. By establishing the Summit as somehow 
‘above’ the normal run of politics not only was the entire global community made 
visible, but so was the WSSD itself constructed as a visible stage, towards which the 
eyes of the world were directed. The communication of the Summit events and the 
actions of its participants was enabled through forms of knowledge such as public 
relations, media strategies and branding. Advertising was important at the WSSD to a 
degree unprecedented at a UN conference. Participation in the Summit itself was, 
whilst more open than ever, both governed and managed by particular techniques, 
technologies and routines. Hierarchies between participants were established and 
policed, and certain qualities were required for accreditation to the conference centre. 
Access was granted and restricted to negotiating rooms in accordance with the need to 
produce a consensus on the text. Yet the particular roles on which the exemplary 
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government of the Summit depended – those of the inspirational leader and 
cooperative partner – enabled non-state actors to share the Summit stage with states to 
an unprecedented degree.  
The exemplary government of the Summit can be seen in detail through 
specific initiatives such as the Johannesburg Climate Legacy, which enabled the 
private sector to play a central role in sustainable development governance. The South 
African government also took advantage of the Summit stage to perform their ‘brand’ 
as the negotiating capital of the world and as custodians of sustainable development. 
These roles were predicated not upon their power or authority to dictate or coerce 
other political actors, but rather upon the example they set and the responsible 
conduct they demonstrated. The empowerment of new actors and coalitions and the 
valorisation of new forms of knowledge in the implementation of sustainable 
development constitute the primary political effects of the WSSD theatre. 
The exemplary government of the Johannesburg Summit was an integral part 
of the broader construction of sustainable development as a form of advanced liberal 
governmentality, relying upon the responsible self-government of voluntary partners. 
Both presupposed the freedom and voluntarism of their objects of government, and 
both were predicated on a conception of the broader population as both the object and 
subject of government. In fact, the partnership model of sustainable development 
depends upon high profile moments like the WSSD where specific partnerships could 
be communicated and advertised as examples to follow. This suggests an evolving 
role for UN summits. Rather than acting primarily as institutional mechanisms for 
reconciling state interests and agreeing on new instruments of global governance, 
increasingly they function as advertising and branding sites through which the 
conduct of conduct is conveyed. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Resisting Sustainable Development: 
The Politics of Protest at the WSSD 
 
 
 
 
There is nothing as vulnerable as a mass of 
people on the street, staring down the risk that 
state power may be unleashed against them … 
and nothing as powerful.  
Munnik and Wilson, 2003 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Saturday 31 August 2002 was hot, sunny and tense in Johannesburg. On this 
day, midway through the WSSD, protestors marched from Alexandra Township to the 
Sandton Convention Centre to bring their grievances to the Summit.2 Rather than one 
march, however, there were two, and both claimed to represent ‘civil society’. Amid 
threats of police action and allegations of state brutality, the theatre of the Summit 
was temporarily preoccupied with confrontation rather than consensus. The protests 
against ‘the W$$D’ are often ignored and yet they offer important insights into the 
ways in which dominant forms of government are resisted, disrupted and 
paradoxically sometimes reinforced. They also revealed the tensions within 
sustainable development which the Summit discourses of consensus and partnership 
had partially obscured.  
The protests were significant not least because of their size and the degree to 
which they unsettled the South African political landscape. The official civil society 
march led by the African National Congress (ANC) and their Alliance partners, the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), numbered less than 5,000, 
whilst the more confrontational social movements mobilised almost 25,000.3 They 
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formed the largest and “most militantly anti-government march since 1994”, and 
enthusiastic commentators proclaimed that on that day “the map of the South African 
political landscape was fundamentally transformed.”4 Others have interpreted the 
marches as “a battle for control of South Africa’s revolutionary tradition”, the 
outcome of which suggested a “new era” in South African politics.5 
For many of those involved, the marches were a defiant statement of 
resistance against the South African state, the UN and the WSSD. However, by 
adopting a Foucauldian governmentality perspective, these straightforward alignments 
of power and resistance are destabilised. By considering them as “counter-conducts” – 
assertions of “the will not to be governed thusly” – rather than pure forms of 
revolutionary resistance it is possible to see how they both subverted and reinforced 
dominant forms of government.6 The forms of resistance and representation adopted 
by the protestors often explicitly contested the means, scope and ends of the advanced 
liberal rationality of government of the WSSD, yet they also relied upon the theatrical 
stage of the Summit. By using the WSSD as a platform to contest official discourses 
of consensus and partnership the protestors provoked marginalisation, condemnation, 
vilification and even repression, with the result that often their very status as 
legitimate political actors was cast into doubt. 
 
 
 
Contesting consensus at the WSSD 
 
 The marches on 31 August were the most visible and high-profile protests 
amidst a number of other flashpoints during the WSSD, in a period of such broader 
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tension that commentators proclaimed “an undeclared state of emergency.”7 The 
clashes at the WSSD intersected with tensions over the economic policies of the ANC 
government, in particular the shift from the ‘Reconstruction and Development Plan’ 
(RDP) to the more overtly neo-liberal ‘Growth, Employment and Re-distribution’ 
(GEAR) programme in 1996.8 Coinciding with the transition in the Presidency from 
Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki and the end of the ANC’s “political honeymoon”, 
GEAR’s policies of cost-recovery and the privatisation of basic services have caused 
tension within the ruling Alliance as well as among local communities and social 
movements.9 
 The WSSD took place after a turbulent and fractious preparatory process in 
which a number of groups had clashed over the form of civil society representation.10 
Meetings of the Civil Society Secretariat were dominated by disagreements over 
structure, financial irregularities and clashing personalities.11 Tensions between 
radical social movements, NGOs, and more established organisations such as 
COSATU resulted in a number of social movements leaving the formal preparatory 
process and forming the Social Movements Indaba (SMI), declaring itself “opposed to 
the hoax of the W$$D.”12 The official Civil Society Secretariat, chaired by 
COSATU’s Bheki Ntshalintshali, proceeded to organise the Global People’s Forum 
and eventually marched with the ANC on 31 August, whilst the SMI concentrated 
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instead on a series of events on the fringes of Nasrec, the landless people’s camp at 
Shareworld, and the environmental justice summit at Shaft 17.13 
 Tensions between these groups erupted at the WSSD, and media discourses of 
conflict fuelled the confrontational atmosphere. Headlines were militaristic and 
violent: “Battle Lines Drawn at Jo’burg Summit”; “A new war for the allegiance of 
the poor”; “Summit marchers attack government”; “Invasion of the would-be wealth-
snatchers”;  and “Militant siege of summit feared.”14 The SMI was reported as firing 
“the first public salvo in its war on the World Summit on Sustainable Development … 
and warned it was mobilising for a frontal assault.”15 In this atmosphere security 
concerns were heightened, and the Johannesburg authorities adopted a  “zero 
tolerance” policing strategy, meaning that street vendors, hawkers and the homeless 
were swept out of the city.16 Social movement activists alleged that squatters were 
being dumped “miles from Johannesburg to hide poverty from summit delegates.”17 
According to Naomi Klein, “vendors and beggars have been swept from the streets, 
residents of squatter camps have been evicted”, and the Sandton precinct was 
transformed into a “military complex” with remote spy planes and a 1.8 kilometre 
“struggle pen” for authorised protests.18 
Protesting at the WSSD was therefore fraught and dangerous. When activists 
and academics from the International Forum on Globalisation organised a candlelit 
march from the University of the Witwatersrand on 24 August in support of freedom 
of expression, they were blocked by riot police who fired stun grenades into the march, 
injuring several protestors.19 Whilst the mass marches on 31 August passed peacefully, 
activists recounted how they “were surrounded by police vans, cars, armoured 
vehicles. Helicopters circled overhead, reminding many of us of the days of anti-
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apartheid struggle.”20 On 2 September police and security guards clashed with pro-
Palestinian demonstrators outside the Wits Education Campus over a scheduled 
speech by Shimon Peres, resulting in rubber bullets being fired by police injuring a 
number of activists.21 During the WSSD there were also protests in Sandton against 
pollution from steel refineries in the Vaal Triangle, and in Durban against pollution 
from oil refineries.22 Greenpeace International followed up a confrontation with 
Indonesian police during PrepCom IV in Bali by hanging a banner from one of the 
cooling towers at the Koeburg power station near Cape Town to protest against the 
only nuclear power plant in Africa.23 Countless other smaller protests occurred during 
the WSSD, including walk-outs from the Sandton Conference Centre, angry speeches 
in the Global People’s Forum, and innumerable placards and banners. 
These various incidents could be interpreted within a framework which sees 
civil society as the source of resistance against the state. The SMI, for example, 
asserted that “on the 31 August 2002 the map of the South African political landscape 
was fundamentally transformed. A new mass movement came into existence.”24 Yet 
this Manichaean view of politics does not capture many of the nuances and 
inconsistencies the protests threw-up, or how they intersected with forms of advanced 
liberal government. The following sections show how the rationalities of resistance 
adopted by protestors both subverted and reinforced dominant forms of government. 
 
 
 
Fields of visibility 
 
 Mainstream discourses established the WSSD as a superior stage from which 
the entire globe was visible, and on which the representatives of the people of the 
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world could meet to agree on a new and better planetary future. This assertion of 
verticality and superiority implied that the Summit was above political divisions and 
conflicts. In contrast, protestors at the Summit sought to disrupt and question this 
construction by revealing how dominant forms of sustainable development actually 
represented partial and inherently political interests. Whereas the partnership 
approach was predicated upon highlighting the best examples of cooperative 
initiatives and sustainable practices, the protestors sought to make visible the 
unsustainable consequences of development-as-usual. For Naomi Klein this 
represented “the iconic act of resistance in an unsustainable world: refusing to 
disappear.”25 
 This rationale of making visible the consequences of unsustainable 
development was behind the idea of marching from Alexandra Township on 31 
August. The route was chosen to highlight the appalling conditions in which many 
South Africans still live, and to emphasise the difference between these conditions 
and the wealthy environs of Sandton where Summit delegates spent most of their time 
during the WSSD.26 This was explicitly communicated in an SMI press release. 
 
Alexandra represents a microcosm of everything that is wrong with the W$$D. The 
massive unemployment, lack of essential services, housing evictions, water and 
electricity cut-offs, environmental degradation, and generalised poverty that is 
present-day Alexandra sits cheek-by-jowl with the hideous wealth and extravagance 
of Sandton where the W$$D is taking place. While the fat cat bureaucrats and 
politicians will be hiding themselves away in luxurious Sandton and spewing out 
meaningless rhetoric and resolutions about the poor and sustainable development, the 
people of nearby Alexandra continue to live in dire poverty and to wage a daily 
struggle for survival. The tragic irony could not be more apparent. Here is an 
opportunity for local and international press to break out of the hypocritical shell that 
is the W$$D and to see, hear and report on the realities, not the myths, of 
‘development’ in South Africa.27 
 
For Trevor Ngwane, a leading social movement activist, “Sandton is a heaven on 
earth, and Alexandra is something very close to hell.”28 One marcher told an 
international journalist that “if the international community wants to understand why 
we will be marching, they are welcome to come and see us. We will show them how 
we live and perhaps they will understand.”29 
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In contrast to the poverty of Alexandra, the protestors drew attention to the 
fact that most of the economic benefits of the WSSD went to the hotels, restaurants 
and infrastructure of the well-off northern suburbs close to the official conference.30 
As the official Summit history reported, “in the biggest-ever one-off capital injection 
in the host city’s northern suburbs, the City of Johannesburg spent tens of millions of 
rand on road upgrades, road resurfacing, traffic signal upgrades and better signage 
prior to the Summit.”31 Very little of the wealth and investment generated by the 
Summit was felt in Johannesburg’s poorest districts. When attention was paid to the 
inner city, it was to clear hawkers and taxi drivers from the streets, “so no-one can see 
them.”32  
Protest at the WSSD thus sought to make visible the effects of unsustainable 
development, through publications such as Global Fire and W$$D Resistance as well 
as the protests against pollution in the Vaal Triangle and Durban and the Greenpeace 
action against nuclear power.33 This was a rationality of resistance based on 
highlighting environmental and development disasters and using the media to force 
government or corporations to act, described by Clive Barnett as “the politics of 
shame.”34 It was a direct inversion of the exemplary rationality of partnerships, which 
focussed on positive and successful projects. As such the Youth Declaration at the 
Global People’s Forum stated “our opposition to the new reliance on the so-called 
‘Type II’ partnerships, which we see as a cover-up for the failure of the multilateral 
process.”35 Other speakers argued that “partnerships come in the guise of helping poor 
people. The reality is the contrary.”36  
By highlighting the unsustainable effects of business as usual, the Summit 
protestors drew attention to the need to address the structural causes of poverty and 
environmental degradation, rather than simply promoting ad hoc specific 
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partnerships. This entailed re-asserting global visibility, “in the sure knowledge that 
social movements from all over the world share our belief that the present social and 
economic order is not sustainable.”37 The SMI concluded that “only a global and 
united social movement can reverse and defeat the present policies that are 
impoverishing and destroying the planet and its people.”38 The Global People’s 
Forum’s Programme of Action urged that “we have to build a strong resistance 
network that is interconnected and shows solidarity between all countries of the North 
and South, and East and West, to expose and unmask unsustainable corporate 
practices.”39   
 In this way the WSSD protests are an example of the constant re-negotiation 
between the local and the global in the politics of sustainable development. They 
represent what Ferguson and Gupta refer to as “a transnational ‘local’ that fuses the 
grassroots and the global” in creative and flexible new ways.40 Claims by Summit 
delegates to represent the global interest were trumped by protestors who argued that 
the “fat cat bureaucrats and politicians” in Sandton did not represent them, asserting 
their own more global perspective.41 In response to attempts to construct a space 
above politics where the global future could be reconciled, the protestors showed how 
the policies agreed at such summits produce chronically unsustainable conditions such 
as those in Alexandra.42 Whilst the advanced liberal exemplary governmentality of the 
WSSD was predicated on the illumination of the most encouraging and optimistic 
examples of sustainable development, the protestors sought, through an inverse form 
of exemplary politics, to highlight some of the most troubling examples of 
unsustainable development. In their own way, therefore, the protestors also used the 
Summit stage to assert their global perspective on behalf of the world’s poor. This 
apparent paradox was identified at Rio in 1992 by Chatterjee and Finger. They argued 
that such protests fell into the “UNCED visibility trap”, in that no matter “whether 
they sought to promote or protest against the idea of sustainable development, 
whether they sought to feed into Rio or organise alternative meetings”, they all 
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worked to “increase the visibility of the UNCED process.”43 In the same way the 
protests at the WSSD both contested and reinforced the summit rationality. The logic 
of attempting to hold a global summit was not contested by protestors; rather it was 
the specific interests promoted at the Summit which were resisted.  
 
 
 
Regimes of knowledge 
 
The regimes of knowledge invoked by the protestors in Johannesburg had an 
ambiguous and often contradictory relationship to those inside the official Summit. 
Whilst many environmentalist protestors asserted the scientific case for issues like 
climate change in order to press for more urgent governmental action, others drew 
attention to the ways in which local, democratic and indigenous forms of knowledge 
were preferable to the hegemony of scientific, technological and economic forms of 
knowledge.44 Ironically, however, in order to draw attention to their struggles the 
most successful protestors were those who adeptly utilised similar forms of media and 
communication strategies to the ones prevalent within the mainstream WSSD.  
Many of the protests at the WSSD demanded more action on social and 
environmental issues, and they frequently used scientific forms of knowledge to 
support their case. The perceived lack of international action on climate change was a 
major focus for many protestors in Johannesburg, in particular international NGOs 
such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and WWF.45 These groups urged that action 
was necessary on the basis of the overwhelming scientific evidence. Even the SMI 
campaigned on a platform that included ending “the destructively wasteful use of 
fuels” and on behalf of “a clean environment, safe energy and sufficient water for 
all.”46 
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However, many protestors also sought to resist the discursive framing of 
sustainable development in terms of risk assessment, technological solutions and 
market-based forms of knowledge. Stephen Law, Director of the Environmental 
Monitoring Group, criticised the manner in which sustainable development has 
become “simply a matter of finding and applying the right corrective technology – be 
it GM crops to feed the world, cheaper drugs to cure disease, cleaner energy to keep 
industry going, better satellite imagery to view the destruction of the rainforests” and 
so on.47 The logic of combating climate change through carbon trading – on which 
initiatives such as the Johannesburg Climate Legacy rested – was also explicitly 
contested, with critiques of the Kyoto Protocol for having “become so much of a 
mechanism for managing global carbon trade that the issue of real emission cuts has 
been marginalised.”48 The Summit of Indigenous People’s registered their opposition 
to “the implementation of carbon sinks and carbon-trading mechanisms in the Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.”49 
These protests therefore negotiated a delicate balance between challenging the 
basis of scientific knowledge, and using that knowledge tactically in order to force 
action on certain issues. This has been a long-running challenge for environmental 
movements.50 Groups such as GroundWork and the South Durban Community 
Environmental Alliance (SDCEA) have pursued dual strategies of both contesting the 
dominant scientific and technical knowledge advanced by industry, as well as 
responding to industry with their own scientific data on health impacts and pollution 
levels, for example using ‘bucket brigades’ to measure water and air pollution 
levels.51 Such strategic negotiations of the politics of truth reflect Foucault’s insight 
that ecological movements have often been opposed 
 
to a science or, at least, to a technology underwritten by claims to truth. But this same 
ecology articulated its own discourse of truth: criticism was authorised in the name of 
a knowledge of nature, the balance of life processes, and so on. Thus, one escaped 
from a domination of truth not by playing a game that was totally different from the 
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game of truth but by playing the same game differently, or playing another game, 
another hand, with other trump cards.52 
 
These ‘other trump cards’ which the protestors in Johannesburg mobilised included 
ever-more creative, imaginative and communicative tactics, often intended to 
persuade through emotive, empathetic or aesthetic appeals rather than scientific or 
economic logic. Banners, effigies, street theatre, placards and satire were all deployed. 
In Bali, for example, Greenpeace sailed a giant effigy of a three-headed dragon 
representing George Bush up to the beach near to the conference venue.53 The 
Indonesian police refused to let the dragon land and, in a compromise, Greenpeace 
decided to burn the effigy at sea, further adding to media coverage. The peaceful 
candle-lit march in Johannesburg on 24 August and the unexpected brutality of the 
police response attracted instant international media coverage for the protestors, who 
included internationally prominent global justice activists and authors such as Vandana 
Shiva, Njoki Njehu, Maude Barlow, Tony Clarke, Naomi Klein, Anuradha Mittal and 
John Saul, all with access to international media and broadcasting.54 Activists filmed 
the confrontation, arguing that “our rights are being trampled upon … it is a disgrace 
that during the WSSD repression is going on like this.”55 The clash had an 
international media resonance “because it was at night, and they had candles, it was 
dramatic, it speaks to the mainstream audience, to CNN.”56 
Media strategies and skilful use of communicative forms of knowledge were 
therefore just as important for the protestors at the WSSD as they were for the 
participants and organisers. In South Africa, as Barnett has shown, these creative and 
dramaturgical forms of activist politics have been welcomed by a broader media eager 
for “a ‘people-centred’ journalism and ‘story-telling’ modes of address.”57 The 
protests at the WSSD were not therefore operating on a different plain of knowledge 
to those of the official delegates, but rather they sought to invert and twist official 
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mobilisations of science, advertising and branding on the Summit stage, contesting 
them, disrupting them and articulating competing alternatives.  
 
 
 
Techniques and technologies 
 
The techniques of protest adopted at the WSSD were varied and 
heterogeneous. Whilst many protestors demanded that governments fulfil their 
responsibilities and govern sustainable more intensely, others took to the streets 
rejecting conventional discourses of targets, timeframes and partnerships. The image 
of marchers on the streets singing, dancing and waving placards was one that 
dominated public perceptions of the protests, yet most protestors articulated a vision 
of sustainable development that echoed the Global Deal proposals being put forward 
by delegates within the WSSD. 
The march on 31 August and the clashes with police on 24 August and 2 
September were, for many, the archetypal manifestations of resistance, evoking 
familiar repertoires of protest.58 Rather than engage with the Summit debates over 
targets, timeframes and partnerships they resorted to the demonstrative and 
carnivalesque tactics associated with the anti-globalisation movement.59 The marches 
grabbed media attention, with South African newspaper the Sowetan reporting that 
“the SMI had received a high media profile during the marches that had taken place 
against the Summit. The movement had clashed with police on a number of 
occasions, each time getting widespread media coverage for their cause.”60 
Furthermore, as Clifford Bob notes, “apart from drawing attention, protest marches 
and demonstrations can prove to international actors that a movement has a vibrant 
local constituency and a pressing problem, thereby assuaging concerns about the 
movement’s legitimacy.”61 
  The protestors’ tactic of organising mass marches was significant in two main 
ways: in acting as a unifying and identity-forming experience, and in humiliating the 
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ANC on the Summit stage. First, participating in a mass march was an inspirational 
process for many people and the experience of 31 August has had a lasting legacy for 
many South African social movements. In 2006 the SMI proudly looked back at the 
march as “the landmark in the history of social movement cooperation.”62 For 
activists like Veriava the marches played a role in “forging an imagination of a 
commons, of some space that we exist in together.”63 As Elias Canetti famously 
explained,  
 
in that density, where there is scarcely any space between, and body presses against 
body, each man is as near the other as he is to himself; and an immense feeling of 
relief ensues. It is for the sake of this blessed moment, when no one is greater or 
better than another, that people become a crowd.64 
 
Through such marches the social movements acquired their identity, and as Desai 
proudly asserted, “this is a struggle that already has heroes, legends, and martyrs.”65  
Secondly, the choice of marching as a technique was significant in that it 
aimed to directly challenge the South African Government on its own ground, using 
its own tactics. ANC history is rooted in protest politics, and Alexandra has been one 
of their historic heartlands. Despite a decade and a half in government the ANC still 
“yearns to remain a grassroots, mass-mobilised party.”66 When permission was 
granted for the social movements to march on 31 August, the ANC simultaneously 
announced they would be leading the official civil society march which would also 
progress from Alex to Sandton. Supported by traditional mass organisations including 
the trade unions and the civics, they expected to easily outnumber the social 
movements and confidently predicted 20,000 people at their march.67 In this context, 
the numerical superiority of the social movements was a massive humiliation.68 A 
triumphant SMI press statement later crowed that “a new movement is being built that 
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for the first time since 1994, poses the potential of a serious challenge to the South 
African government amongst its historic core constituency – the broad working 
class.”69 SMI spokesman Dale McKinley was jubilant: “We embarrassed them in their 
own back yard,” he was quoted as saying, “their grassroots structures are 
decimated.”70  
That these marches took place at the WSSD on the Summit stage was 
especially significant. Choosing to march in the full view of the global community 
was predicated on humiliating the government, and post-Summit assessments of the 
march by participants claimed it “shattered Mbeki’s image – it was a PR disaster”, 
specifically because “the whole world saw us.”71 The global stage also conditioned 
the state’s response to the marches, and it was the international condemnation of the 
policing of the candle-lit march on 24 August that forced the authorities to grant 
permission for the march on 31 August.72 COSATU General Secretary Zwelinzima 
Vavi told the Mail & Guardian that “it would be quite a horrible statement if the 
world came for the first time into democratic South Africa and the people were not 
able to march … the last thing we want is a city with blood on the floor.”73 The South 
African Government was acutely aware of the international media gaze, and one 
Summit organiser recollected that “at one point I had to stop a meeting and run to 
Sandton. These American kids are demonstrating. They have no permit. The Jo’burg 
Metro [police] want to arrest them. Then you worry that the media are going to pitch 
up. It’ll be the headlines tomorrow.”74 Under pressure from the global media, and 
keen to perform its role as a responsible leader on the international stage, the ANC 
reaction to the protests was, somewhat reluctantly, “to call on the South African 
Police service to exercise restraint and tolerance, even in respect of those 
demonstrators who have themselves chosen the path of provocation and violence.”75 
The tactic of taking to the streets therefore had many advantages for the 
protestors, in terms of both solidifying their own collective identity and challenging 
established power relations. Yet such marches were not necessarily in complete 
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opposition to the WSSD enterprise. First, many Summit organisers saw the marches 
as a positive ‘alternative dimension’ to the official negotiations, and Olver remarked 
that “protest adds an extremely important and colourful element to the whole thing. 
So it needs to be constructively brought in. But at the same time we were not going to 
let anything get out of control.”76 The marches contributed to the high public profile 
of the WSSD and sustainable development. Secondly, large numbers of protestors 
used the marches to intervene in particular debates within the official negotiations. In 
particular, many supported the Global Deal proposals: stricter targets, firm 
timeframes, binding international conventions and regulations, and enforced corporate 
accountability. Thus a coalition of South African NGOs called “on South Africa to 
stand firm in its demand for a strong, Type 1 outcome.”77 Friends of the Earth 
declared that “robust legally binding measures are, in the end, essential if sustainable 
development issues are to be dealt with effectively.”78 Greenpeace International 
Director Remi Parmentier told media that “the failure to include concrete targets and 
timetables for action on sustainable development defeats the entire purpose of the 
Summit.”79 The Youth statement to the Global People’s Forum angrily noted that “we 
are outraged by one government in particular – the United States of America – and its 
attempts to undermine and sabotage agreements at this summit.”80 These articulations 
of resistance were therefore directed at the partnership rationality of government, and 
demanded instead a more interventionist, more disciplinary form of sustainable 
development governance. As such they were not a total rejection of summitry, 
multilateral UN politics, or the idea of global governance for sustainable 
development. Instead they were often an extension of the debates inside the 
convention centre; in the context of an emerging neo-liberal consensus on voluntary 
partnerships they were a strident demand “not to be governed like that.”81 
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Production of subjectivities 
 
 The forms of resistance adopted at the WSSD were varied and heterogeneous. 
However, what united them were their attempts to disrupt and contest the discourses 
of consensus, co-operation and partnership that dominated at the WSSD. For many of 
the protestors, their own identities and roles were predicated upon an oppositional 
stance, and as Seyfang and Jordan note, “environmental pressure groups usually 
criticise politicians for not doing enough when they arrive at mega-conferences, but 
they have their own reasons for attending and being seen to confront political leaders 
and industry representatives.”82 The fundamental objective of the marches was “to 
draw the political lines more clearly”, and for Dale McKinley, “what the WSSD did, 
not just internationally but also internally, is that it drew a line”, which “represents 
nothing less than a clear ideological and organisational divide amongst historically 
progressive forces in South Africa.”83 However, the success of the protestors in 
constructing this clear line between power and resistance at the WSSD was only ever 
partial and temporary. 
From the start of the preparatory process in South Africa differing conceptions 
of civil society had divided participants. COSATU’s involvement in the civil society 
process provoked tensions, and Ntshalintshali later conceded that  
 
our involvement was seen by others in civil society as like Big Brother trying to 
correct a number of issues … There were people that were unhappy, and I think the 
debate was mainly around whether the ANC, or the liberation organisation, or the 
political party, should be part of the civil society. I think there is still a debate about 
those things.84 
 
For the SMI, COSATU’s involvement was “part of a political strategy to control and 
silence civil society, and place the WSSD process under government control.”85 They 
left the official WSSD process because of state interference, stating they wanted “to 
carry on a civil society process that is independent from government and rooted 
                                                 
82
 Seyfang and Jordan, ‘The Johannesburg Summit and Sustainable Development’, p. 22. 
83
 APF, Assessment of WSSD Mobilisation and Activities; interview with Dale McKinley, SMI Press 
Secretary, (Johannesburg, 23/10/2006); D. McKinley, ‘Democracy and Social Movements in South 
Africa’, in Padayachee, The Development Decade, p. 418. 
84
 Interview with Bheki Ntshalintshali, Deputy General Secretary COSATU, (Johannesburg, 
04/10/2006). 
85
 Civil Society Indaba, CS Indaba walks out of WSSD NGO Forum. 
 194 
among the working people.”86 This was grounded in a classically liberal desire to 
establish ‘civil society’ as a sphere free from state intervention. One prominent 
activist explained that the WSSD conflicts were fundamentally about whether the 
ANC would tolerate an autonomous civil society, claiming that, “very simply put, it 
was a fight over whether the government operating in the person of the ANC and the 
person of the Alliance, whether they’d be able to dictate a civil society agenda.”87 
Authoritarian behaviour by the state seemed to threaten this space, and more than 
once comparisons were made between ANC policing and Apartheid-era repression.88 
An SMI statement in the aftermath of the violence against the candle-lit march on the 
24 August indicated this apprehension. 
 
The events of this evening are only further confirmation of the ever-narrowing space 
in the ‘new’ South Africa, for the exercise of the basic constitutional and human 
rights to freedom of expression and assembly. If it was not before, it should now be 
crystal clear that the South African government is hell-bent on smashing legitimate 
dissent by whatever means they deem appropriate, including attacking peaceful 
marchers and terrorising children. The ghosts of the South African past are returning 
with a vengeance.89 
 
This assertion of basic constitutional and human rights was a demand for the South 
African state to behave like a responsible liberal democracy, and for many of the 
protestors this was their main aim.90 
On the other hand, more radical protestors articulated a critique of the state 
based on a ‘class-war’ view of politics. For these intellectuals and activists the South 
African state was regarded as having become “the local and continental agent of 
imperialism.”91 Patrick Bond, for example, described Mbeki and his ministers as 
“‘compradors’ – i.e., agents of the global establishment.”92 For many of these protestors 
therefore the marches were more than a demand to be heard or for the state to implement 
its constitution, instead they were about building “the ‘base’ of a movement that could 
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in the long term challenge the ANC at the polls.”93 The Citizen reported that 
“marchers threatened the government that if it ‘does not address our issues and do 
what the people demand, we will do to them what we did to the apartheid 
government.’”94 In a much-quoted statement, Ngwane claimed that the marchers 
desired to shut down the Summit and “take Sandton.”95 This rationality of resistance 
as total struggle against a class enemy was set out in one SMI statement: 
 
As social movements active in the South African context we know that rulers 
committed to capitalism have never changed their environmentally destructive ways 
without mass struggles by those affected by these policies. Nor have they changed 
policies that deny democratic rights without struggle and sacrifice on the part of the 
oppressed. We also know that without struggle and organisations the policies of 
exploitation pursued by the multinational corporation cannot be changed. … Above 
all else, our resolve to struggle is strengthened by the many struggles currently taking 
place in South Africa against the effects of neoliberalism, and against new oppressors 
and exploiters.96 
 
Within this more radical rationality of resistance, the notion of co-operating or 
entering into partnership with the state, the UN system, or multinational corporations 
was anathema. Corporate involvement in environmental initiatives was dismissed as 
“greenwash” and UN initiatives like the Global Compact and Type II partnerships as 
“bluewash.”97  
Such rationalities of resistance adopted a starker view of politics as 
fundamentally bipolar. For Vula Mthimkhulu, writing in the civil society newspaper 
Global Fire, the Summit presented an opportunity to “popularise the struggle against 
forces of evil”, and “the genuine enemies masquerading as comrades during the 
Summit.”98 In this vein more violent visions of political action were articulated, 
including placards reading “Bomb Sandton”, and talk of occupying and blockading 
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the M1 motorway into Johannesburg.99 Other radical activists on the left decried the 
efforts of SMI marshals to ensure a peaceful march, lamenting that the end result was 
“domesticated.”100  
 Politics, for these protestors, was not a question of reconciliation, consensus or 
partnership. Yet the degree to which such starkly binary views represented the 
outlook of a majority of the protestors, or the degree to which they captured the 
complex polycentric ways in which rule is exercised in contemporary global politics, 
is doubtful. Most organisers insisted that violence had never been their aim. John 
Appolis stressed that it was “not intended to be an open confrontation with the police 
and the army, but was envisaged as a legal and peaceful one whose main task was to 
popularise our political and organisational objectives.”101 Moreover, most of the 
protestors at the WSSD had an ambiguous relationship to the ANC and the South 
African government. The social movements’ leaders and ideologues have, as one 
recent contribution suggests, risked “ignoring the large percentage of the members of 
their own organisations that continue to support the ANC.”102 Among many activists 
support for the ANC remains strong, and many of the new social movements have 
their roots in organisations linked or allied to the ANC.103 In an SMI meeting in 2003 
convened to review the WSSD, some delegates made the point that “the anti-ANC 
march was not entirely directed at the ANC but rather at the economic policies which 
it chooses to implement.”104 The EJNF expressed their concern after the WSSD that 
“the SMI was standing on platforms they perceived to be too ‘anti-government’, too 
antagonistic.”105 
Attempts by radical protestors to establish a binary between an authoritarian 
and capitalist ‘state’ and a realm of free and democratic social movements also fail to 
capture the diversity of institutions and modes through which rule is exercised. The 
apparently monolithic state is in fact composed of many different institutions and 
aspects, and the SMI conceded in an internal discussion in 2004 that on the subject of 
                                                 
99
 Hooper-Box et al, ‘Victory for peaceful protest as marches go smoothly’, The Sunday Independent 
(SA); interview with Ahmed Veriava, SMI and Freedom of Expression Institute, (Durban, 02/12/2006). 
100
 F. Barchiesi, ‘Marching on the Left: Before and After August 31’, Khanya Journal, 2, (2002), p. 15.  
101
 Appolis, ‘The Political Significance of August 31’, p. 8. 
102
 R. Ballard, A. Habib and I. Valodia, ‘Conclusion: Making Sense of post-Apartheid South Africa’s 
Voices of Protest’, in Ballard et al, Voices of Protest, p. 401. 
103
 Desai, We Are The Poors, p. 41; interview with Mashile Phalame, Earthlife Africa, (Johannesburg, 
18/09/2006). 
104
 SMI, WSSD Review Session, 13/02/2003, (unpublished). 
105
 APF, Social Movements Indaba Tracks Back, (April 2003). 
 197 
the Alliance’s National Democratic Revolution, the “moral authority of the project is 
still high.”106 Radical voices agreed that “the South African ruling class still enjoys 
political and constitutional legitimacy.”107 Many groups used the Summit as an 
opportunity to criticise specific environmental or economic policies, but afterwards 
returned to working with the ANC and the national, provincial and local state on a 
day-to-day basis.108 Others supported the work of DEAT in its attempts to regulate 
corporations.109 Anti-pollution community organisations such as the South Durban 
Community Environmental Alliance and the Steel Valley Crisis Committee were able 
to use the international spotlight of the WSSD to raise awareness about their 
campaigns, aiming to pressurise the South African Government into enforcing 
environmental regulations.110 Richard Worthington from Earthlife Africa explained 
that they tried to deal with the issues of nuclear power and renewable energy 
separately, since their attitude on the former is “government we think you’re really 
screwing up, while the other [it] is government you’re showing some promise now 
let’s get serious.”111 Often even the same individuals will, as Ashwin Desai admitted, 
praise the history of the ANC as anti-Apartheid liberators at the same time as the cost 
recovery policies of local government are condemned:  
 
If Thabo Mbeki comes around, or Mandela, to remember the 16 June Soweto 
Uprising, people still see the need to go to the meeting and chant the slogans of the 
party of liberation: the ANC, slayer of apartheid. But the next day they are fighting 
evictions, and denouncing the ANC as a party of neoliberalism.112 
 
These multiple aspects of ‘the South African state’ reveal the impossibility of 
reducing political landscapes to that of a homogenous state opposed by grassroots 
resistance.  
Attitudes towards the UN, international society and the WSSD were also 
mixed. Whilst decrying the “craven and flatulent” tone of the Summit, many critical 
voices continue to regard the UN as a potentially progressive sphere in which the 
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weakest developing nation has a vote equal to that of the most powerful.113 For these 
reasons Earthlife Africa chose to participate in the Global People’s Forum and lobbied 
at Sandton, whilst at the same time they had members marching with the SMI on 31 
August.114 Groundwork supported the SMI, but spent most of their time and energy 
on their own ‘Corporate Accountability Week’ which received high-profile attention 
from government, delegates, and international NGOs.115 Ceasefire, EMG and GEM 
all participated at Nasrec and lobbied in Sandton, but also marched with the SMI. The 
very existence and funding of many of these critical NGOs was also closely tied to, 
and facilitated by, Northern NGOs, foundations and governments.116 Rather than a 
binary conflict between North and South, or ‘the people’ against ‘the rulers’, many of 
those who participated in and protested against the WSSD were bound together in 
rhizome networks of global governmentality.  
 Overall, therefore, whilst the protestors attempted to use the marches to 
establish a clear line between governed and governing, and there were serious 
disruptions to the Summit discourses of partnership, consensus and compromise, 
ultimately this crude simplification of global politics as a binary struggle between 
progressives and reactionaries foundered on the variegated networks of global and 
local governance. The clear line of division the protestors sought to establish was 
continually blurred, transgressed and erased. As such, rather than viewing the WSSD 
protests as pure forms of resistance against a monolithic governing power, or trying to 
identify which were ‘true’ acts of resistance and which were reformist, we can rather 
interpret the WSSD protests as manifestations of Foucauldian “counter-conducts.”117 
 
 
 
Protest and the limits of advanced liberal government 
  
The protests at the WSSD both subverted and reinforced dominant modes of 
advanced liberal government. Yet to claim this is not to argue that ultimately such 
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counter-conducts are unimportant, or that they have no effect. Middleton and 
O’Keefe, for example, argue that by protesting at the Summit and “acting as if a 
major reversal of the outcomes of the [PrepCom] committees was possible at the 
Summit itself, the INGOs were simply adding their bit-parts to the performance.”118 
This dismissal of dissent as purely theatrical (and by implication unimportant) fails to 
appreciate how the different ways in which protestors negotiated their relationships 
with the WSSD, the UN and the South African government produced significant 
political effects.  
One of the effects of the forms of counter-conduct adopted at the Summit was, 
by challenging and disrupting the discourses of partnership and consensus, to 
establish the existence of limits to the politics of advanced liberal government. Those 
actors who were willing to dissent and critique, but ultimately signalled their 
willingness to behave responsibly and enter into partnerships and constructive 
dialogue were accepted as political actors, important players in the implementation of 
sustainable development. However, those who sought to draw the line more explicitly 
between power and resistance at the WSSD were marginalised, repressed and 
excluded from the politics of sustainable development. By explicitly contesting its 
performance of reconciliation, unity and consensus these protestors threatened to 
undermine the South African brand as successful negotiators, and the exemplary 
performance of sustainable development at the WSSD. The South African 
Government responded by marginalising, criticising, criminalising and/or repressing 
those who did so. The vilification and demonisation of protest at the Summit needs to 
be understood in the context of the hierarchical and authoritarian tendencies of the 
ANC as a party, its constructed role as leader of the ‘National Democratic 
Revolution’, and the challenge the protestors posed to the South African brand as a 
united and reconciled country, as well as within the discursive context of the 
Summit’s stress on consensus and cooperative partnerships. The political effects of 
these responses were serious for many individual organisations, as well as broader 
framings of state-civil society relationships in South Africa and beyond. 
 The history of the ANC and their role in the anti-Apartheid struggle has 
produced a party with centrist, hierarchical and often authoritarian attitudes to 
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government.119 These deep historical tendencies have been exacerbated by the 
generational shift from ‘the island generation’ (such as Mandela) to ‘the exiles’ (such 
as Mbeki), since the latter developed a highly secretive, military-style of politics 
which stressed loyalty and obedience.120 Pallo Jordan, an ANC MP and government 
minister, has admitted that “governing a country has reinforced the centripetal 
tendencies in the movement’s culture.”121 The ANC has massive electoral dominance, 
winning 63 per cent of the popular vote in 1994, 66.4 per cent in 1999, and 69.7 per 
cent in 2004, which has further strengthened their mandate for strong leadership.122 
This electoral endorsement has made it easy to write off parliamentary opposition as 
conservative or reactionary; however internal critique has been treated more harshly 
with critical voices being publicly disciplined or expelled.123 
The party emphasis on unity, loyalty and consensus stems partly from their 
struggle history, but also from the perception of the ongoing National Democratic 
Revolution as a continuation of the liberation battle. During the transition from 
Apartheid rule to democracy the major anti-Apartheid organisations, including the 
South African Communist Party, the trade unions, the United Democratic Front and 
the civics, all supported or formally allied themselves with the ANC. As a result the 
ANC have since tended to assume that “history has bequeathed on it the mission to 
lead South African society as a whole in the quest for a truly non-racial, non-sexist 
and democratic nation.”124 It is therefore orthodoxy within the ANC that “the 
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organisation is not merely a political party, but remains a liberation movement.”125 
The importance of progressive actors uniting behind the delivery of the National 
Democratic Revolution is a recurring theme in party and Government 
pronouncements.126 
In this context the events of the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) 
held in Durban in August 2001 were hugely disappointing and frustrating for the 
ANC. The WCAR was a fractious and ill-tempered meeting, with fierce disputes over 
the definition and legacy of racism, reparations for slavery, and whether Israel’s 
policies in the Middle East constituted racism.127 Civil society contributions to the 
conference were also divided, and in the aftermath the ANC conducted a review 
which heavily criticised the South African Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition 
(SANGOCO). The ANC concluded that “SANGOCO failed to mobilise South 
African civil society to play a constructive role in the forum”, instead allowing the 
agenda to be dominated by a narrow range of anti-ANC organisations which pursued 
a sectarian agenda.128 The acrimony of the WCAR would haunt preparations for the 
WSSD, with the ANC making it clear that “as we prepare for the WSSD it is essential 
that we build a proper, democratic, consultative civil society process … whoever 
claims to represent South African civil society has a very important responsibility.”129 
At the WSSD they urged “that progressives, both within government and in civil 
society, should act in solidarity to ensure that the WSSD does indeed address the 
important issues of poverty and underdevelopment.”130 
Experiences such as the WCAR have exacerbated the ANC tendency to 
distrust independent, critical civil society voices, which stems from their history of a 
protracted and continuous struggle for survival and the necessity of a siege mentality 
during the anti-Apartheid years.131 The ANC report on the WCAR, for example, noted 
that whilst NGOs  
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have an essential role to play in international processes, including the provision of 
technical advice, most have no independent social base and are tied to funding from 
interest groups, governments, corporations or foundations, often with self-interested 
agendas.132 
 
The relationship between the state and society is primarily conceived as one in which 
the ANC provides political leadership and other actors, where they can be trusted, are 
mobilised for the implementation and delivery of policies and services. Barnett and 
Scott have argued that post-Apartheid “South African politics has been shaped by a 
strong impulse towards the inclusion of potential antagonists within networks of state 
patronage and policymaking.”133 In an ANC discussion document in 1996, Mbeki set 
out his view of this relationship, which was that it 
 
turns on the combination of the expertise and professionalism concentrated in the 
democratic state and the capacity for popular mobilisation which resides within the 
trade unions and the genuinely representative non-governmental popular 
organisations. The democratic state therefore has a responsibility to ensure that this 
independent and representative non-governmental sector has the necessary strength 
to play its role in ensuring that the people themselves, and in their own interest, 
become conscious activists for development and social transformation.134 
 
Government, and indeed politics more generally, is therefore regarded as primarily 
about implementation, service delivery, efficiency and “getting things done” rather 
than the deepening of democracy in terms of debate, dissent and deliberation.135 
NGOs and civil society have been enlisted in this project, cast as “assistants to 
government in service delivery”, part of a “social partnership” together with 
government and business to further the “common national interest.”136 To do this, 
however, NGOs and social movements must be willing to engage in partnerships. At 
the WSSD the ANC cautioned the Global People’s Forum that 
 
as a progressive third world movement that has emerged from and inspired many 
‘social movements’ we are also concerned by the ‘rejectionist’ tendencies of some in 
the emerging global movement. Certainly, the need for a ‘countervailing force’ 
against the arrogance of combined private/business and state interests should not be 
dismissed, and all would agree that the independence of ‘civil society’ is fundamental 
to democratic governance. On the other hand, we believe that the progressive 
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transformation of global society requires alliances of progressives, both within and 
outside the state, especially where that state is popular.137 
 
This conception of partnership and alliance replacing ‘rejectionist’ and critical politics 
is crucial to the governmental rationality of the ANC. The ANC view of protest 
politics is that “the people waged a difficult, costly, protracted and successful struggle 
to end and negate their role as a protest movement and to transform themselves into a 
united reconstruction and development brigade.”138 
This view of the people as ‘a united reconstruction and development brigade’ 
is essential to understanding the ANC’s attitude to protests at the WSSD. The South 
African brand at the Summit was predicated on the portrayal of the country as a 
reconciled and peaceful society that had successful negotiated the transition from 
divisive Apartheid to united ‘Rainbow Nation’. Since Apartheid was premised on the 
notion of essential racial differences, “the leitmotif of resistance politics was thus an 
emphasis on sameness”, with the result that the ANC displays “an inability to talk 
about the truly fragmented nature of the South African society and state.”139 As 
Greenstein notes, “even today, that the people are composed of different groups, with 
sometimes overlapping and sometimes contradictory interests, which cannot be 
collapsed into a larger unity, is not a common notion in South African political 
discourse.”140 
 These conditions provide the context within which the ANC and the South 
African state responded to criticisms and protests during the Summit. The ANC, as 
Steffen Jensen has suggested, seems to have no language to deal with local political 
opponents and conflicts on a legitimate basis, and seeks to revert to the moral clarity 
of the anti-apartheid struggle in which “those who are with the ANC are, by 
definition, in favour of transformation, and those who are against the ANC are 
opposed.”141 In this context, the ANC response to protest followed a number of lines. 
First, they were ridiculed as naive, and economically and politically illiterate. 
Secondly, they were criminalised as inherently violent and destructive. Thirdly, 
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insinuations of foreign, counter-revolutionary influence were made. These reactions 
were not unique to the South African state, and indeed were common and recurring 
responses to protest by participants and organisers during the WSSD.  
Protestors at the WSSD were condemned by Mbeki as aiming for the “collapse 
of the Summit”, and for being people who “do not want any discussion and 
negotiations.”142 Critical voices were frequently dismissed as troublemakers, 
unhelpful elements and “just moaners.”143 Similar allegations were made by other 
participants in the Summit, with one commentator attacking the irresponsibility of the 
international media for the way they “jumped on the Johannesburg bandwagon at the 
final fence and proceeded to report on an exhausted party of travellers with little 
regard for the journey they had been on.”144 British Deputy Prime Minister John 
Prescott lashed out in the New Statesman at the “destructive criticism” of some press 
reports on the Summit, also arguing that whilst “some NGOs have done excellent 
work; others like to snipe from the sidelines” with the result that “criticism becomes 
corrosive rather than constructive.”145 “Sustainable development requires 
partnership,” he re-iterated, and if “governments have to fight every inch of the way 
against cynical opposition as well as vested interests, such changes simply won’t 
happen.”146 
Protestors at the WSSD were also often ridiculed for their naivety or 
irrelevance. In response to being asked about the importance of the social movements 
in 2002, one South African government advisor responded that “I don’t know the 
name of the director of the Landless People’s Movement. These social movements are 
not really taken seriously here, mainly because the issues they deal with don’t appear 
to be the key challenges confronting the country.”147 ANC spokesperson Smuts 
Ngonyama described social movement activist Dennis Brutus as “a person who flies 
in and flies over whenever he wants. At best he is a protest activist. In South Africa 
we are more serious than that.”148 The ANC was joined in its condemnation of the 
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protestors by the SACP, which branded them “infantile” and “irresponsible”.149 ANC 
Today in September 2002 argued that “government economic policies are essentially 
correct, whatever our critics say to advance their political and ideological agendas”, 
and criticism was dismissed as the ranting of the “ultra-left.”150 Environment Minister 
Valli Moosa later reflected that “to their discredit” the South African protestors “were 
completely incoherent”, and that the Greenpeace protest at Koeburg “was just frankly 
rich European kids behaviour.”151  
As well as being cast as naive and foolish, protestors at the WSSD were 
commonly portrayed as violent, irresponsible and destructive.152 The Star claimed that 
the aim of the social movements march on 31 August was “thuggery, disorder and 
damage to property.”153 One environmental consultant pronounced that the marches 
were merely “flavour of the month. You could see rent-a-crowd in there … There 
were people who were looking for causes, who were looking for excuses to go and 
smash up the street lamps.”154 Media reports warned that there was “increasing 
concern in intelligence circles that militant groups will stop at nothing to disrupt the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development.”155 Media and state discourses 
commonly credited the police with ensuring peace and order, in the face of the 
assumed inherent lawlessness of the protestors.156 As a lawyer for the South African 
Police Service warned, “a large congregation of people has inherent dangers, and this 
means that it needs to be controlled and regulated properly by persons with the 
necessary skills and training.”157 The assumptions underpinning these allegations are 
that ‘the people’ are inherently violent, whilst the state is inherently peaceful. This is a 
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frequent trope of the reporting of protests, with examples including the official 
Summit history Ten Days in Johannesburg recording that on 31 August “a big 
contingent of SA Police Services and Defence Force staff ensured a peaceful 
demonstration.”158 The possibility that the protestors might be committed to peaceful 
demonstration and that police action could incite violence is rarely considered.159  
This attitude to protest occurred within a broader context in which critical 
social movements have often been criminalised in South Africa.160 Activists claim 
that their marches are routinely denied permission, denying their constitutional right 
to freedom of expression through recourse to the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
(passed in 1993 during a period of intense civil unrest but never repealed or amended) 
and criminalising them for political reasons.161 Activists complained about 
“systematic harassment and intimidation” by the National Intelligence Agency in the 
run-up to the WSSD.162 On 17 August 2002 activists from the Soldiers’ Forum, an 
Anti-Privatisation Forum affiliate, were arrested for trying to travel to Cape Town to 
protest at Parliament against their unfair dismissal and failure of the state to pay their 
pensions. Whilst imprisoned they were allegedly threatened and subjected to tear 
gassings, assaults, and racial slurs. Seven had to be hospitalised. On 10 December 
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2002 Johannesburg Regional Magistrate’s court dropped charges against all 93 
soldiers.163 On 21 August 4,000 landless people and activists marched in downtown 
Johannesburg where they were heavily supervised by police who eventually arrested 
77, including National Land Committee co-ordinator Andile Mngxitama and 
SANGOCO President Zakes Hlatshwayo.164 The 77 were detained for two days, and 
when they finally appeared in court after the WSSD all charges were dropped.165 In 
the Summit aftermath, commentators questioned whether these incidents formed part 
of a deliberate strategy by South African authorities to minimise dissent. Jane 
Duncan, Director of the Freedom of Expression Institute, noted how  
 
gung-ho arrests, followed by the dropping of charges, was to become a familiar 
pattern over the WSSD period, leading to accusations that the state was using 
wrongful arrests to get key activists off the streets to prevent them from causing 
‘trouble’ over the WSSD period.166 
 
She points out that “of the one hundred and ninety six people who were arrested in the 
run up to, and during the WSSD, all of them have had charges dropped against 
them.”167 
Summit protestors were also linked to terrorists, counter-revolutionaries and 
enemies of the state.168 Mbeki alleged that the protestors “saw the WSSD as an 
opportunity for them to wage a struggle against our movement and government.”169 
Sean Tshabalala, director of VIP protection for the South African police, was quoted 
by the media as saying that  
 
we have learnt lessons from Seattle, Genoa and Davos. The same will not be allowed 
to happen. … We are prepared for everything – airborne, sniper or mortar attacks, 
violent illegal protests, kidnappings, lunatic attacks or biological attacks like with 
anthrax.170  
 
                                                 
163
 McKinley, ‘Trying to “Kill” the Messenger’, pp. 94 – 95. 
164
 ‘“Jail won’t stop the march”: Arrest of US woman and 77 landless hardens activists’ resolve’, The 
Citizen (SA), 23/08/2002; ‘Landless claim police brutality’, Mail & Guardian (SA), 24/08/2002. 
165
 Everleth, ‘Criminalising Dissent’, p. 89. 
166
 Duncan, Another Journalism is Possible. 
167
 Ibid. 
168
 J. Battersby, ‘Summit protestor crackdown: Fears agitators may infiltrate legal marches’, The 
Saturday Star (SA), 24/08/2002; ‘Boeremag planned WSSD attack’, Die Burger (SA), 14/11/2002; 
Bond, Talk Left, Walk Right, p. 158.  
169
 Mbeki, ‘South Africa Can Take Pride in World Summit’. 
170
 ‘Tough time for summit protesters’, News 24 (SA), 20/06/2002. 
 208 
This demonisation of protest through association with the anti-globalisation 
movement and the ‘Battle of Seattle’ was common.171 The Johannesburg Chief of 
Police noted in the aftermath of the WSSD that “one only needed to be reminded 
about the violent events that occurred in Seattle in 1999 and Genoa in 2001 to 
understand the sort of situation that confronted the country’s security organs.”172 State 
officials apparently told the media “they were aware that professional agitators behind 
Seattle and last year’s mayhem at the G8 summit in Genoa, Italy, were in the 
country.”173 This insinuation of foreign influence worked to de-legitimise and de-
politicise protest by associating it with imperialist and anti-South African agendas. 
The most detailed discussion of these alleged links was made in an article 
prior to the Summit by ANC advisor Michael Sachs. He alleged that “as we approach 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg later this 
year the Seattle movement will, in all likelihood, converge on our biggest city in a 
festival of dissent.”174 Among his concerns about the Seattle Movement was that it 
was manifested in a small “coterie” of activists located in Southern capitals, 
unconnected to popular and mass struggles, and funded by the North.175 He clarified 
that “I do not mean to argue that the Seattle movement is inherently reactionary … 
However, given its Northern origin, its diverse content and its amorphous form, 
Seattle’s progressive credentials should not be taken for granted.”176 This raises 
problematic questions for Sachs.  
 
Some have even argued that the rise of the NGO phenomena in the South, with its 
‘anti-statist’ overtones and dependence on foreign sources of funds, itself forms part 
of the project of imperialism and neo-liberalism. Even if we do not accept this ‘worst 
case scenario’, the concept [of] ‘civil society’ is not without ideological and political 
implications. Sometimes it is devoid of relation to the actual histories and 
institutional landscapes of the societies in which it is deployed.177 
 
Sachs also expressed concerns with the anti-statism and the anti-developmentalism of 
the Seattle movement and environmentalism more generally, and pointed out how 
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both directly contradict the National Democratic Revolution.178 Well-written and 
often nuanced, Sachs’ paper nevertheless both caricatures and homogenises the so-
called ‘Seattle Movement’. Yet it is the repeated insinuation that protests at the 
WSSD were stimulated by foreign agitation rather than ‘real South African 
grievances’ that provides the discursive context for the violence of the state response.  
The most revealing ANC response to the protestors was contained in their 
statement on the day following the clash between the candle-lit marchers and the 
police. 
 
[W]e wish to roundly condemn the actions of those factions (both local and 
international) for whom these democratic victories, so recently won after so much 
sacrifice, are mere fodder in the irresponsible pursuit of confrontation and anarchy. 
We know well from our own struggle that such mindless violence is the practice of at 
best the naive, and at worst the agent provocateur.179 
 
The claim that local protestors are being naively led astray by international agitators is 
insinuated here, and the protestors are uniformly labelled irresponsible and anti-
democratic. They are portrayed as troublemakers rather than having any serious 
grievances and it is explicitly argued that such protests are detrimental to the struggle 
of progressive forces in the new South Africa. The defining image of the marchers on 
31 August was that created by The Sunday Times. 
 
War veterans from Zimbabwe, ultra-leftists, disgruntled former soldiers, right-
wingers, international anarchists, Palestinian and Israeli campaigners and hackers are 
all coming to Johannesburg this week hoping to grab the spotlight during the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development. South African intelligence services have 
picked up plots to ‘shut down’ the summit. But government security services have 
thrown a ring of steel around Johannesburg to ensure that potentially violent 
disruption and sabotage is speedily diffused … Disgruntled former SA soldiers, who 
have been campaigning to get their jobs back, have also been identified as a potential 
danger since they have military training.180 
 
The responses to protests during the WSSD therefore combined a wide range of 
tactics to marginalise and discredit them, including presenting them as naive, 
criminal, and even traitorous. Such discursive framings stem from what Neocosmos 
describes as the “state-defined consensual discourse”, which means that   
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criticisms of the ANC/state can be labelled as beyond the national consensus, as 
either the utterances of racists or ex-racists if such criticisms are made by Whites, as 
disloyal or narrow egotistical remarks if made by Blacks, or simply as foreign-
inspired.181 
 
Those protestors at the WSSD who refused to accept dominant discourses of 
consensus, unity and partnership were accordingly placed outside the domain of 
legitimate politics. This positioning has had serious consequences for particular 
groups, and for broader power relationships within South Africa post-WSSD. 
 
 
 
The political effects of protest at the WSSD 
 
Determining the explicit effects of protests such as those in Johannesburg in 
terms of precise causal chains is full of methodological and empirical 
complications.182 Rather than attempt to attribute precise causal significance to 
particular actions, this chapter argues that the protests and clashes at the WSSD 
contributed to the pressure on Summit delegates to retain some commitment to 
multilateral (Type I) outcomes, and that without them it is more likely that the 
voluntary partnerships would have had an even higher profile. Proponents of 
partnerships within the UN expressed regret that negotiations were conducted in a 
climate of suspicion of the US and the neo-liberal agenda, with the result that the 
partnership approach was “re-shaped” into something “less dynamic and aggressive 
than had been envisaged when they started.”183 The protests contributed to this 
climate, and were an encouragement to negotiators who wanted to press for stronger 
targets and timeframes and worked to discourage businesses from trumpeting new 
partnerships too enthusiastically.184 Yet the effects of the protests were also 
significant in terms of their effects on the evolution of South African civil society and 
the attitude of state institutions toward particular groups.  
                                                 
181
 Neocosmos, ‘Rethinking Politics in Southern Africa Today’, p. 85. 
182
 Della Porta and Diana note difficulties including the attribution of fixed interests to particular 
movements and actors, the attribution of causal credit to particular actors, the complexity of modern 
political and sociological phenomena, and the question of timescale. Della Porta and Diana, Social 
Movements, chapter 9.  
183
 Interview with Diane Quarless, Vice Chair and Rapporteur on the Bureau of the Preparatory 
Committee for the WSSD, and co-Chair of Partnership Initiatives, (New York, 17/10/2007). 
184
 C. Norris, ‘Partnerships for Sustainable Development: The Role of Type II Agreements’, in 
Kalhauge et al, Global Challenges, p. 227. 
 211 
In the Summit aftermath, commentators asked whether the adversarial 
relationship between the governing party, police and protestors “was a taste of things 
to come.”185 In hindsight Michael Sachs conceded that “there were certainly serious 
problems and violations that took place from the side of the police” at the WSSD, but 
rejected suggestions that the ANC had become the “new oppressors” of social 
movements in South Africa.186 Yet the WSSD signified, and provided a context for, 
gradually increasing levels of violence, repression and intimidation of critical social 
movements aligned with the SMI, as well as striking workers and trade unionists.187 
In their discussion of one case among many, McKinley and Veriava record the death 
of 67 year-old Johannesburg water activist, Emily Lengola, who was shot in her shack 
in early 2003 by unknown gunmen. They go on to observe that whilst activists 
 
did not publicly claim that Emily’s murder was the work of the ANC and/or ANC-
aligned individuals within the community, they did point to the fact that the murder 
took place in an ANC-created ‘atmosphere in which APF activists are often viewed 
as “enemies of the state” and the governing party, the ANC’.188 
 
One activist described the situation as “a low intensity civil war.”189 Roger Southall 
agrees that the government’s response to protests since 2004 has been at times 
“heavy-handed”, justified by “dark hints that the violence was being orchestrated by 
sinister forces.”190  
This heightened atmosphere has contributed to “serious organisational 
changes” for many social movements in the aftermath of the WSSD, who have 
struggled to cope with the arrests of their leaders, fear and intimidation, lawsuits, and 
the nervousness of international donors and funders.191 Talk of “stasis” or “an 
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interregnum” in the social movements has become common.192 Organisations affected 
most seriously have included SANGOCO, the EJNF, the Rural Development Services 
Network, the National Land Committee and the Landless People’s Movement.193 The 
SMI has struggled to keep open the space it created in 2002, and as a network 
structure it has been affected by the problems faced by other movements.194 At a 
meeting in 2005 activists highlighted “the fact that some of the social movements that 
were part of the formation of the SMI in 2002 face serious political and organisational 
challenges. … Some are riddled with internal struggles around issues of resources and 
leadership.”195  
The Landless People’s Movement has been particularly hard-hit by their 
exclusion from legitimate politics since the WSSD. In 2002 it was one of the fastest 
growing and most influential movements, and it brought thousands of rural members 
and activists to Johannesburg to draw attention to the slow pace of land 
redistribution.196 Based in the Shareworld complex, they organised a ‘Week of the 
Landless’, and received a great deal of media attention as well as taking a prominent 
role in the march on 31 August.197 However, the strains of such a large event “brought 
to a head simmering tensions between different political trajectories”, and fears of 
National Intelligence Agency infiltration soured relationships within the movement.198 
According to a former organiser, “there was a deep conflict within the camp … there 
were accusations of people carrying guns, others were going to be assassinated … The 
future of the movement was at stake.”199 The divisions within the movement, 
exacerbated by the pressures of a major international Summit, combined with the 
impacts of the arrests of members and leadership and increased police harassment 
meant that “for the LPM [the WSSD] was a disastrous event, in terms of its future.”200 
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The decline of the EJNF post-2002 has also been a great disappointment for 
many environment and development activists in South Africa, since it demonstrated a 
remarkable ability to synthesise ‘red’ and ‘green’ agendas into a ‘brown’ form of 
environmental justice that resonated with historically disparate communities. 
Described by Cock as potentially the “organisational expression of a coherent, 
comprehensive environmental justice movement in South Africa”, she also noted how 
“participation in the WSSD was clearly a radicalising experience for EJNF”, and “as a 
key component of the Social Movements Indaba, relations with the ANC and the post-
apartheid state have become increasingly confrontational.”201 Whilst it played a 
leading role in the social movements in 2002, since then personnel problems, internal 
struggles and donor mistrust have meant it has virtually “imploded” and has “to all 
extents and purposes ceased to exist.”202 Whilst it is clear that the WSSD was by no 
means the primary causal factor in the decline of the EJNF, it was certainly 
contributory, and the tensions of 2002 threw a spotlight on broader conflicts within 
the South African polity.203 
In contrast to the problems experienced by many of these more radical social 
movements, many of the leading NGOs which protested at the WSSD have not faced 
the same degree of marginalisation, harassment and organisational decline.204 As well 
as very different organisational structures and institutional resources, this is linked to 
the fact that, as Barnett and Scott have shown,  
 
deliberative environmental governance in South Africa puts a premium on norms of 
participation, conciliation, and consensus. Any departure from these norms is looked 
on as obstructive, and even as an index of the lack of legitimacy of the [social 
movements] who adopt such adversarial activism.205 
 
Groups like WESSA, Earthlife Africa and GroundWork were better able to negotiate 
a balance between critique and engagement at the Summit. As such their conduct 
draws on the models provided by international advocacy and protest groups like 
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Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth.206 Greenpeace clashed with police in both Bali 
and Cape Town, and used the Summit as a stage for high profile condemnations and 
criticisms of the way in which sustainable development was being framed and the 
manner in which UN summits were conducted. They described the Plan of 
Implementation as “a sad reflection of the lowest common denominator as dictated by 
the US”, and supported the position of the SMI in “denouncing the outcome of the 
WSSD.”207 Yet at the same time they lobbied continually within the UN, advising and 
participating in debates and multi-stakeholder forums; they supported the EU 
declaration on renewable energy; and they held a joint meeting with business lobby 
groups to call for government action on climate change, “shelving our differences on 
other issues on this occasion.”208 The final statement by the Third World Network at 
the WSSD (with whom both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have many links) 
was that “the Summit had constituted a great experience for the cooperation of many 
like-minded NGOs and common citizenry coming together in the interests of 
sustainable development”, a clear affirmation of the discourse of partnership and 
consensus on which the Summit depended.209 Despite their criticisms and protests, 
these groups could not reject the Summit entirely since it was a forum in which they 
were deeply implicated, and on which their identity was predicated. As Munnik and 
Wilson observed, “for NGOs accredited to the UN the WSSD was part of their reason 
for being. They had the technical skill, experience, and knowledge of both issues and 
process to participate.”210 
Similarly, South African NGOs like WESSA managed to successfully 
negotiate a balance between creative protest and staying within the acceptable limits 
of dissent. They concluded post-Summit that, notwithstanding the disappointments of 
the official outcomes, “WESSA gained substantially from the Summit which was well 
worth the considerable effort that went into it.”211 WESSA have traditionally been 
regarded as a green organisation more interested in wildlife and landscapes than social 
justice, relying on their scientific expertise to create a largely technical and 
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conservationist niche. At the WSSD they engaged with the partnership and corporate 
social responsibility discourses, suggesting principles for sustainable partnerships and 
citing examples of their own successful projects.212 However, they also made an effort 
to engage with brown and red agendas, participating in the Biopiracy Summit and 
expressing their fears that partnerships might lead to the “corporatisation/privatisation 
of environmental and social resources.”213 Their attitudes on global trade, 
biodiversity, and the privatisation of basic resources were in line with many of the 
social movement protestors at the Summit, and they actively sought “to be more 
clearly seen in solidarity with those sectors which are anti-privatisation.”214  
Yet the prospects for closer green and brown linkages were damaged by 
tensions during the civil society process and the post-WSSD decline of the EJNF. 
During 2001 the Civil Society Secretariat published a T-shirt with a cartoon on it 
“showing the CEO driving a taxi to the Summit and leaving behind a butterfly-loving 
Green” which provoked anger at the “the crude representation and marginalisation of 
the greens.”215 There was also broader resentment at the prominence of some 
environmental groups at the IUCN centre next door to the main Summit venue. It was 
advertised as  
 
‘across the road from where business is meeting and five minutes walk from where 
government is meeting’, leading to the caustic comment that they were also a 45 
minutes ride from where the rest of the NGOs were and a world away from the issues 
of poverty and development that the summit was supposed to be about.216 
 
These tensions are familiar elements of environmental politics in South Africa, but 
they also echoed discursive tensions within the WSSD over issues like common but 
differentiated responsibilities and precaution where environmental concerns were 
increasingly separated from economic and social agendas. 
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The environmental justice vision of sustainable development in South Africa 
is primarily articulated by more critical NGOs and community movements such as 
Earthlife Africa, GroundWork and the SDCEA. These groups have been able to use 
moments like the WSSD fairly successfully in order to disrupt and contest dominant 
framings of sustainable development, as well engaging with more conventional 
deliberative structures.217 As Barnett and Scott have argued, such groups engage in 
protests and activism “to shift the parameters of inclusive forums and deliberative 
procedures”, as well as “to maintain their own coherence and perform their legitimacy 
to their constituent memberships and broader publics.”218 This entails a delicate 
balancing act between the development of greater scientific and technical expertise at 
the same time as recourse to “forms of dramaturgical protest.”219 GroundWork 
Director Bobby Peek explained that “in terms of resistance, the process is 
multifaceted”, and “being able to link the Friends of the Earth International … with 
the much more community based organisations, link the Greenpeaces, the WWFs, to 
hardcore struggles on the ground – I would like to say that that is where our success 
lies.”220 A similar attitude was articulated by Earthlife Africa’s Richard Worthington, 
who noted that “we’ve always been comfortable with an inside-outside strategy, 
whereby we work with groups who find the formal process inadequate, while at the 
same time trying to influence the formal process.”221 
Overall, therefore, the WSSD constructed sustainable development in terms of 
partnerships and consensus and legitimate political actors were expected to participate 
responsibly, balancing this with the need to employ “the repertoires of adversarial 
activism” in order to perform their legitimacy to local communities.222 Whilst some 
groups “proved themselves to be quite agile”, others became locked into an 
oppositional stance which eventually threatened their political existence.223 The 
proliferation of protest at the WSSD contributed to a growing suspicion and 
impatience with civil society organisations within the ANC and the South African 
state, and according to Richard Worthington, 
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I think government has become more dismissive of civil society ... I don’t know if 
WSSD was the main thing about it, but I suspect that it played a role, in that civil 
society didn’t play a supportive role around WSSD, or even one that could be seen to 
be critically constructive – it was just a mess. So I think a lot more of the public 
participation processes are going through the motions.224 
 
In 2006 DEAT acknowledged that “since the 1994 transition in South Africa, the 
relationship between the state and civil society, while still complementary, has 
gradually become more confrontational and less complementary.”225 Sustainable 
development in South Africa is increasingly reflecting broader global trends and is 
turning to private sector partners rather than uncooperative and dissenting NGOs. For 
Greenstein, “government’s focus has been on forming partnerships with the business 
sector, and civil society organisations have been relegated to the role of potential 
training providers or watchdogs, rather than partners in service delivery.”226 In a study 
of development partnerships in the rural water sector in South Africa, Galvin and 
Habib note that “local government officials argue that they prefer to use the private 
sector as a conduit for delivery.”227  
The increasing preference for private sector partners is in part a reflection of 
their greater willingness to act as cooperative and technically proficient partners. 
Reflecting their new-found prominence, as David Fig has noted, South African firms 
have “used important global moments (Rio, WSSD) to set up irresistible notions of 
partnership, accommodation, win–win situations, synthesis and compromise.”228 The 
experience of protest at the WSSD suggests that legitimate political actors are 
required to engage in these discourses of responsible partnership. Engaging can create 
spaces for more creative forms of protest and adversarial activism, but those who find 
this balance impossible or unpalatable are likely to be marginalised, repressed and 
excluded from sustainable development. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Most accounts of summits concentrate on the diplomatic negotiations or the 
conduct of official participants. As the previous chapters have shown, these are both 
important elements of the way sustainable development is governed. Yet summits are 
also increasingly the sites of protests or counter-conducts against dominant ways of 
governing global politics. As Lipschutz notes, “in recent years, the annual gatherings 
of Western political leaders, global corporate executives, and international financial 
institutions have not been complete without a crowd in the streets and a parallel 
conference down the road.”229 Rather than writing such protests off as marginal or 
merely theatrical, this chapter has argued that they are both important subversions and 
challenges to existing modes of rule, as well as a central element of the theatre of 
modern summitry.230  
Without the protests and clashes at the WSSD it is possible that the Summit 
outcomes would have been even more thoroughly committed to voluntary 
partnerships rather than negotiated multilateral regulations. The protests were an 
encouragement to delegates who wanted to press for stronger targets and timeframes, 
and worked to discourage businesses from trumpeting new partnerships too 
enthusiastically. As such they disrupted and destabilised the discourses of partnership, 
unity and consensus which the Summit organisers, hosts and participants sought to 
create. The WSSD itself was represented as a space ‘above politics’ in which the 
global community could join in partnership to achieve sustainable development, and 
in so doing learn from the example of South Africa and the miracle of its peaceful 
transition and reconciliation. By drawing attention to examples of extreme poverty, 
environmental degradation, social inequality and injustice – in short, to unsustainable 
development – protestors at the Summit contested these representations, re-
articulating the relationship between the global and the local in innovative ways. 
Whilst scientific forms of knowledge were both affirmed and contested through 
protests on issues like climate change and biodiversity, similar communicative forms 
of knowledge relying on advertising and branding were mobilised by the protestors as 
were employed by the Summit participants and organisers. Although many protestors 
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at the WSSD demanded more interventionist government and tougher targets and 
multilateral agreements, others chose to reject these mechanisms by marching on the 
streets and attempting to construct a binary, confrontational view of politics which 
contested dominant discourses of partnership and consensus.  
Approaching these protests from a Foucauldian governmentality perspective 
resists accepting these stark divisions between reformists and revolutionaries 
however. Rather it shows how the protests can be seen as ‘counter-conducts’, deeply 
implicated in the techniques and strategies of government whilst also critiquing and 
subverting governmental rationalities. As such, whilst refusing to see the WSSD 
protests as ‘pure resistance’, this perspective highlights the ways in which they 
consciously politicised sustainable development and summitry. By refusing to 
participate in peaceful, deliberative politics, instead choosing to march on the streets 
of Johannesburg and disrupt the WSSD, these protests represented more conflictual 
and agonistic rationalities which stressed the importance of dissent and conflict in 
democratic politics.231 They contested the boundaries of what counted as politics at 
the Summit, and demonstrated that the streets of Johannesburg were just as important 
political spaces as those inside the Sandton Convention Centre. The effects of the 
protests cannot be limited to the influence they had on the negotiators. Rather, as 
Desai notes with respect to South African community movements, they “challenged 
the very boundaries of what for a short while after the demise of the apartheid state 
was seen exclusively as ‘politics’.”232 
In so doing, however, many of the movements who protested in Johannesburg 
came up against a dominant discourse with a strongly consensual view of sustainable 
development. In the context of a Summit held in South Africa by a government with 
particularly centrist and authoritarian attitudes, many of the counter-conducts found 
themselves excluded from the domain of ‘legitimate’ politics. The challenge they 
posed to discourses of partnership, unity and consensus resulted in the limits to 
techniques of government through freedom and at a distance being exposed, as the 
sovereign and disciplinary power of the South African state intervened. For groups 
like the Landless People’s Movement, the EJNF and the SMI, the WSSD legacy was 
one of organisational turmoil. The message the WSSD promoted was that there is no 
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role in the politics of sustainable development for those who refuse to engage in 
cooperative partnerships. 
On the other hand, groups like Greenpeace, Earthlife Africa, GroundWork and 
WESSA were able to negotiate the balance between critique and cooperation at the 
WSSD more successfully. Their conduct confirms the resilience of forms of advanced 
liberal government. These actors are not passive objects of rule and they assert their 
freedom in actively shaping and manipulating the forms, languages and techniques of 
sustainable development. Ultimately however, they are prepared to engage with 
cooperative and exemplary forms of government through partnership, since if they 
refuse their very existence as political actors is placed in doubt. 
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Conclusion: 
 
Sustainable Development in the twenty-first century 
 
 
 
 
For the real summit … keep climbing.  
 
Printed on T-shirts during the WSSD  
 
 
 
 
 
 The 2002 WSSD came ten years after Rio and fifteen after the Brundtland 
Report, and stands as a landmark in the evolution of the discourse of sustainable 
development. This thesis has used the Johannesburg Summit as a lens through which 
to consider the status and role of sustainable development discourse at the start of the 
twenty-first century. Yet it has also sought to broaden conventional discussions of the 
concept which have largely remained rooted in liberal institutionalist frameworks in 
order to question the role which summits themselves play in global politics, and how 
sustainable development is implicated in contemporary formations of advanced liberal 
rule. Drawing attention to the theatricality and performative dimension of the WSSD 
also focuses the analysis on the importance of protests and dissent. Highlighting these 
conflicts and the ways in which they subverted and reinforced power relationships, 
and their ramifications for the organisations involved, is part of an explicit project of 
re-politicising understandings of sustainable development and summitry. 
 This ethos of politicisation emerges from a Foucauldian perspective on power, 
discourse and government. By regarding power and knowledge as intimately 
connected, freedom as a technique of modern government, and rule as being exercised 
through extensive sites and actors, Foucault argued that ‘the political’ extends beyond 
the state and formal institutions to include the multiplicity of techniques by which the 
conduct of conduct is attempted.1 Sustainable development therefore is not simply an 
objective or instrumental concept for reconciling human development with 
environmental limits, but is a constellation of rationalities and practices which have 
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political effects. Likewise summits are not merely neutral institutional techniques for 
facilitating consensus, nor only sites of material conflict and inter-state realpolitik. 
They are also assemblages of power and knowledge which work to govern global 
politics in particular ways. 
 A Foucauldian perspective also seeks to avoid some of the pitfalls of an 
ideological interpretation of sustainable development which, although being more 
explicitly politicised in terms of focussing on power relations, ultimately reduces an 
understanding of sustainable development to a legitimising or mystifying veneer for 
‘business-as-normal’ and the capitalist exploitation of people and nature for profit. 
Whilst this is an important corrective to seeing sustainable development as a neutral 
and technical concept, understanding it as a Foucauldian discourse draws attention to 
many political effects which cannot be reduced to material exploitation by pre-
constituted actors and interests. The discourse of sustainable development has 
changed the way we think about environment and development, shifted 
understandings of the role and nature of business, and restructured the division of 
responsibilities between states, international institutions and civil society. It is more 
than just “polite meaningless words.”2 
 Viewing sustainable development from a governmentality perspective 
highlights the productive effects of the discourse as it works to establish certain fields 
of visibility, authorises and deploys particular regimes of knowledge, is manifested in 
specific practices and techniques, and produces certain political actors, agents and 
subjects. As constituted through texts, actors and moments like Our Common Future, 
the Rio Earth Summit and Agenda 21, sustainable development inaugurated a global 
vision of government in which all aspects of social, economic and environmental life 
were to be brought under the explicit government of authorised experts and 
managers.3 Environmental scientists, resource conservationists, security experts and 
‘green’ economists were empowered as legitimate and necessary authorities for the 
implementation of sustainable development. The discourse was manifested in a 
diversity of techniques and technologies, but particularly prominent were the 
mobilisation of monitoring and surveillance technologies; public participation 
techniques which facilitated the insertion of major groups into the practice of 
sustainable development; and the negotiation of international conventions, regimes 
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 Middleton and O’Keefe, Redefining Sustainable Development, chapter two. 
3
 Brundtland, Our Common Future; UN, Agenda 21. 
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and declarations through multilateral processes of diplomacy at UN summits. The 
disciplinary and managerial rationality of these articulations of sustainable 
development has been highlighted by Luke, who argues that the discourse has brought 
the whole of human and natural life under the governmentalising ambit of states and 
world-watching NGOs who have pacified the radical environmental critique in the 
interests of stabilising and reproducing the capitalist mode of production.4 
 Yet, important as they are, such interpretations of sustainable development as 
managerial, technocratic and disciplinary forms of eco-governmentality have 
nevertheless underestimated its productive and participatory dimensions, and the ways 
in which ‘sustainable subjects’ have been produced.5 These dimensions have been 
present since Our Common Future and Agenda 21, yet it was at the WSSD that 
sustainable development became most clearly re-orientated towards partnerships and 
advanced liberal governmentality. Chapter three of the thesis demonstrated how the 
negotiations at the WSSD can be interpreted in terms of competing rationalities of 
government: specifically the disciplinary government of the Global Deal proposals 
versus the advanced liberal government of the Type II partnerships. The Danish and 
South African proposals for a new Global Deal were located firmly within the 
Brundtland vision of sustainable development as a global project in which states, 
aided by a chorus of supporting actors and coordinated by the UN, would actively 
manage social, environmental and economic issues in order to secure a more 
equitable, secure and sustainable planetary future. In contrast, the US and their allies 
advocated a partnership-based model of sustainable development which relied upon 
voluntary partnerships agreed bilaterally between equal partners with the capacity to 
implement them, including states, businesses, civil society actors and international 
institutions. These techniques of power have not replaced sovereign or disciplinary 
forms, but rather re-articulated them within constellations of advanced liberal 
government. Whilst the specific future of CSD-accredited Type II partnerships is 
unclear, as a broader rationality of government the partnership approach is 
increasingly dominant and the WSSD inaugurated what Kofi Annan has called “an era 
of partnerships” in sustainable development discourse.6  
                                                 
4
 Luke, ‘Environmentality as Green Governmentality’; Luke, ‘On Environmentality’. 
5
 Agrawal, Environmentality; Goldman, ‘Constructing an Environmental State’; Oels, ‘Rendering 
Climate Change Governable’. 
6
 Annan, Press Conference by UN Secretary-General. 
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 The particular way sustainable development was framed at the WSSD had a 
number of effects. By forcefully asserting that the primary challenge for achieving 
sustainable development was the eradication of poverty, the WSSD placed the 
economic pillar at the heart of sustainable development to an unprecedented degree. 
However, whilst the Global Deal approach took a broad view of poverty as economic 
inequality and social disempowerment and highlighted their structural causes, the 
partnerships approach was based on the assumption that compartmentalised action on 
specific and individual issues was sufficient for the implementation of sustainable 
development. Social, environmental and economic issues were increasingly regarded 
separately, with discussions on common but differentiated responsibilities and the 
precautionary principle limited to environmental issues. ‘Global’ issues such as the 
Iraq war, climate change and international trade were deferred to other bodies and 
forums. This threatened segregation of the sustainable development agenda is 
dangerous to the degree it suggests that isolated action on environmental issues can 
ignore social, economic, and political considerations. 
This compartmentalisation is most evident in the rise of “supply driven rather 
than demand driven” partnerships.7 Such ad hoc instruments risk the marginalisation 
of vulnerable issues and regions, particular those that are less amenable to 
technological and measurable ‘solutions’. The need to demonstrate auditable success 
militates against complex structural problems (such as climate change, poverty and 
gender inequality) in favour of isolated technical solutions (such as carbon credits and 
trading, technology transfers and quotas for major group participation). This 
rationality of government prioritises actors with particular instrumental resources, 
expertise and willingness to cooperate, as opposed to more democratic, equitable or 
sustainable attributes.  
 Perhaps the greatest danger posed by a market-driven, voluntary approach to 
sustainable development however is its potential for de-politicisation. Whereas Our 
Common Future recognised that “there are usually winners and losers” when it comes 
to solving environment and development problems, the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation instead stressed that “the outcomes of the Summit should benefit all, 
particularly women, youth, children and vulnerable groups.”8 The Political 
Declaration committed delegates “to act together, united by a common determination 
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 Andonova and Levy, ‘Franchising Global Governance’, p. 19. 
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 Brundtland, Our Common Future, p. 48; UN, Plan of Implementation, #3. 
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to save our planet, promote human development and achieve universal prosperity and 
peace.”9 By framing the discourse in terms of cooperation, consensus and partnership 
the WSSD worked to marginalise the importance of democratic debate, dissent and 
conflict in determining which interests and values would be prioritised in 
implementing sustainable development. Indeed a voluntary approach which allows the 
market to determine partnerships for sustainable development seemingly undermines 
the need for multilateral summits in which policies are debated and decided. As such, 
the Johannesburg Summit was marked by an ebbing of faith in the necessity or 
importance of summitry as a political tool, and in 2004 the UN Cardoso Report 
pronounced that “the era of global conferences is largely over.”10 
 To assume, however, that summitry has little or no place in an era of 
partnerships and advanced liberal government is to underestimate how its role goes 
beyond merely formal negotiations on a text. Dismissing the WSSD as empty theatre 
or a meaningless ‘talkfest’ underestimates the importance of ritual, symbolic and 
performative dimensions of power.11 It represents an important technique of advanced 
liberal government which performed sustainable development to a global audience, 
seeking to inspire broader changes in the conduct of conduct. 
 The discourse of summitry constructed the WSSD as a space ‘above’ normal 
politics, superior to and with a more extensive field of vision than that of day-to-day 
politics. Summit participants were constantly reminded that the eyes of the world 
were upon them, and they were urged to rise to the occasion. As such, successful 
communication strategies and public relations were as important for participants as 
diplomatic and technical knowledge. Summits provide a stage on which particular 
parts are performed and advertised, and those who flourished at the WSSD were those 
most skilled in managing and communicating their brand. The techniques of summit 
diplomacy were mobilised in order to produce the most convincing performance and 
to ensure consensus would be reached, rather than to ensure the optimum negotiated 
outcome. Disciplinary and sovereign techniques of power – for example in the 
accreditation and participation of non-state actors – ensured a smooth and consensual 
performance. Finally, particular characteristics were established as essential for 
political actors, namely inspirational leadership and consensual partnership. Whilst 
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states have traditionally fulfilled the role of leaders at international summits, in 
Johannesburg they were also asked to play the role of partners as other actors were 
invited onto the stage in order to perform exemplary leadership. Through schemes 
like the Johannesburg Climate Legacy businesses were urged to take the lead and 
inspire broader action on sustainable development. Within the international 
community of states it was the South African hosts who used the theatre of the 
Summit to best effect to construct their national brand as the negotiating capital of the 
world and as the custodians of sustainable development. 
 As implicated within forms of advanced liberal government, summits have 
therefore become almost as important for their value as visible sites for the 
advertising and communication of particular brands and identities as they are for the 
negotiation of multilateral texts and outcomes. It is easy to write-off this dimension of 
politics as ‘spin’ and ‘greenwash’, yet to do so underestimates the importance of how 
summits manage the conduct of conduct through practices of rule at a distance. Rather 
than coercive or disciplinary power relationships, summits function through 
exemplary forms of power where norms are established and ‘proper’ standards of 
behaviour are communicated through the politics of inspiration and visibility. This 
interpretation of summitry draws its inspiration from Clifford Geertz who highlighted 
“the power of grandeur to organize the world.”12 
 The way in which summits function as sites of exemplary government within 
forms of advanced liberal rule is not one-sided however, since just as they can 
function in order to communicate responsible forms of conduct and exemplary 
leadership, they also provide a stage and visibility for protest and dissent. The 
conflicts and tensions within sustainable development politics are often neglected, and 
chapter five argued that an understanding of the WSSD requires an appreciation of 
how the protests in Johannesburg both subverted and reinforced forms of advanced 
liberal government. 
 These protests contested mainstream discourses of sustainable development by 
establishing their own fields of visibility, forms of knowledge, techniques and 
technologies, and identities. Protestors contested the Summit construction of a space 
‘above politics’, instead arguing it represented the globalised reach of a particular set 
of Northern and capitalist interests. They drew attention to examples of unsustainable 
                                                 
12
 Geertz, Negara, p. 102. 
 227 
development and hypocrisy, yet also represented their own campaigns as more global 
and representative of the most marginalised sections of society. Whilst some 
protestors urged greater respect for scientific evidence in support of demands for 
action on climate change, for example, many others rejected the instrumental and 
economistic logic which dominates mainstream sustainable development, instead 
turning to communicative rationalities of protest, display and carnival. Whilst some 
protestors demanded more interventionist government and tougher targets and 
multilateral agreements, many others chose to disrupt these technocratic mechanisms 
by marching on the streets. Rather than the consensual unity of the WSSD these 
protestors sought to represent politics as a struggle between good and evil, with the 
WSSD, global capital, the South African government and the UN representing an axis 
that must be resisted. The success of this construction was however always only 
limited and partial and many protestors continued to regard the ANC and the UN as 
potentially progressive forces and possible partners in sustainable development. 
Rather than ‘pure resistance’ therefore, this thesis views the protests at the 
WSSD as Foucauldian “counter-conducts” which problematise and contest dominant 
forms of government, but also depend upon them and often reinforce existing modes 
of rule.13 This was shown in the way a number of groups at the WSSD negotiated the 
boundary between resistance and cooperation flexibly, including Greenpeace, 
WESSA, Earthlife Africa and GroundWork. The exercise of their freedom to dissent, 
together with their engagement in debates over the proper standards of responsible 
corporate behaviour and sustainable partnerships, paradoxically confirmed the 
dominance of advanced liberal forms of government. In many ways their protests 
heightened the visibility of the Summit and sustainable development discourse. 
Rather than a complete rejection of government, these counter-conducts were calls to 
be governed differently, by different actors, and according to different values. Many 
of those protesting at the WSSD were in fact demanding to be governed more: in that 
they called for stronger targets, more binding regulations, and more interventionist 
state rule. 
Yet for those who rejected the notions of partnership and consensus most 
vociferously and unambiguously, the reaction of the ANC and the South African State 
revealed the limits of advanced liberal forms of rule. The iron fist of the South 
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African police and security forces fell upon organisations like the Landless People’s 
Movement, the EJNF and the SMI, and their marginalisation by the ANC, 
international donors and the media have placed their continued political existence in 
doubt. The violence with which the South African State responded to the protests at 
the WSSD was alarming and rightly condemned. Yet, as Foucault observed, “those 
who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to denounce 
violence or criticise an institution. Nor is it enough to cast the blame on reason in 
general. What has to be questioned is the form of rationality at stake.”14 The 
rationality of rule which produced this reaction was one in which the politics of 
sustainable development are envisaged in terms of the construction of consensus for 
the most efficient and effective implementation of sustainable development. Civil 
society, according to this rationality, is made up of those organisations who conduct 
themselves responsibly and cooperatively in the pursuit of sustainable development – 
“a united reconstruction and development brigade” as Mbeki phrased it – and have the 
technical expertise and managerial capacity to do so.15 Those who are unable to act as 
partners in this enterprise are represented as peripheral to the politics of sustainable 
development, and those who are unwilling to engage cooperatively are excluded from 
responsible ‘civil’ society. 
This thesis has avoided automatically valorising ‘resistance’ against ‘power’, 
or ‘freedom’ against ‘government’, since a Foucauldian governmentality perspective 
shows how tightly these concepts are interrelated and mutually dependent. As such 
we must refuse to pronounce the WSSD or sustainable development as ‘good’ or 
‘evil’. As Foucault made clear, “everything is dangerous … the ethical political 
choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger.”16 The 
argument made here is that the particular political rationality of partnership and 
consensus that predominated at the WSSD is dangerous because it acts as a form of 
de-politicisation, since it constructs conflict and dissent as peripheral to, and as a 
distraction from, the central business of implementing sustainable development. A 
Foucauldian ethos of politicisation argues that an awareness of the necessity of 
conflict and dissent are integral to democratic and progressive politics, since “politics 
is no more or less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the first 
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uprising, the first confrontation.”17 Thus the protests at the WSSD worked to politicise 
sustainable development by challenging “established accounts of where and what 
politics must be.”18 The streets of Johannesburg became political sites in 2002 just as 
much as the Sandton Convention Centre. Such an account follows Warren 
Magnusson’s discussion of ecological politics in Clayoquot Sound in putting 
“traditional distinctions between local and global, small and large, domestic and 
international – and much else – into serious question.”19 
 The original contribution of this research therefore lies in three principal areas. 
First, by approaching sustainable development from a Foucauldian governmentality 
perspective, the thesis argues that the WSSD marked the evolution of sustainable 
development discourse toward forms of advanced liberal government, encapsulated 
by the success of the Type II partnerships ahead of the Global Deal proposals. 
Secondly, it contributes the notion of exemplary governmentality to Foucauldian 
political theory, and shows how the theatre of the WSSD functioned as a translation 
mechanism for global power relations. Based on a rationality of inspiration and 
example, actors such as the South African government and the business community 
(though mechanisms like the Johannesburg Climate Legacy partnership) sought the 
conduct of conduct from the Summit stage. Thirdly, it argues that the protests at the 
WSSD are better understood as counter-conducts rather than ‘pure’ resistance. The 
concept of counter-conduct has the potential to advance often rather stale debates over 
whether resistance is revolutionary or reformist, and shows that protests can both 
undermine and reinforce different aspects of dominant power relations. How these 
counter-conducts are played out can also often have serious consequences for the 
actors involved, as was shown by the fortunes of the various protestors at the WSSD. 
The original contribution of this thesis is therefore both theoretical and empirical: it 
contributes to academic analyses of the WSSD as a historical event and the politics of 
sustainable development, as well as contributing to the literature on governmentality 
and Foucauldian political theory. As such it refuses to subscribe to a clear-cut 
separation between theory and practice. This is itself a key element of a Foucauldian 
ethos of continual criticism, politicisation and engagement with ‘real life’ issues and 
problems. 
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The Politics of Environment and Development 
 
The mutual interdependence of theory and practice mean it is possible to 
return to the questions of environment, development and global power relationships 
which motivated this research. This thesis set out to account for the role played by 
sustainable development within global politics, using the WSSD as a lens through 
which to examine the discourse. The conclusion it has reached is that sustainable 
development has become firmly implicated within forms of advanced liberal 
government, and is dominated by a neo-liberal discourse which prioritises voluntary 
partnerships and the ordering power of the market. Summits like the WSSD work as 
moments of exemplary government in which responsible businesses, NGOs and states 
communicate the proper conduct required for sustainable development to a global 
audience. Whilst resistance is possible at such moments – indeed it is inevitable and 
integral to the theatre of summitry – the most radical and confrontational protestors 
provoked sovereign and disciplinary forms of power which ensured their exclusion 
from the domain of legitimate politics. 
This conclusion provokes us to ask whether and how a more radical, 
democratic and politicised form of sustainable development could be imagined and 
practiced. This is a question which has preoccupied recent debates over the “death of 
environmentalism” and the advent of “post-ecologism.”20 In an influential and 
provocative essay, Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus argued that the US 
environmental movement has become a narrow special interest group focussed on 
technical policy proposals and has failed to engage with broader political debates over 
values and ideas. They argue that “environmentalists need to tap into the creative 
worlds of myth-making, even religion, not to better sell narrow and technical policy 
proposals but rather to figure out who we are and who we need to be.”21 The debates 
sparked by their contribution have been heated, with critics noting that whilst their 
premise – the need to re-radicalise environmentalism – is valid, their proposal to 
replace legislation with public-private partnerships and technological innovation is 
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neither radical nor indeed political.22 Indeed it echoes the partnership approach 
articulated at the WSSD. 
Asking similar questions, but in a European context and reaching different 
answers, Yoram Levy and Marc Wissenburg have noted that the “successful 
integration of environmental movements, issues and ideas in mainstream politics 
raises the question whether there is a future for what was once a counter-movement 
and counter-ideology.”23 Blühdorn and Welsh argue that we have entered “an era in 
which the historically radical and transformative elements of environmental 
movements and eco-political thought are blunted through mainstreaming and have 
been reconfigured by comprehensive cultural change.”24 This taming of the radical 
and political impact of the environmental agenda is regarded by many as the central 
achievement of the sustainable development discourse, which at its extreme, “has 
become a convenient slogan to signal political correctness without the corresponding 
commitment to change.”25 This thesis has shown how the WSSD furthered this trend, 
with the environmental agenda being re-fashioned in terms of poverty eradication 
(narrowly and economically conceived) and public-private partnerships. 
Compartmentalised approaches to environment and development threatened to re-
emerge both within the official Summit negotiations and in tensions between greens, 
reds and browns in the civil society processes. 
For Wapner, the lesson of the WSSD was that in trying to include the full 
scope of social justice and economic development issues that come with the terrain of 
sustainable development, “environmentalism might have too much on its plate right 
now.”26 Whilst he accepts the necessity of working towards social justice, peace and 
democracy, he wonders whether the environmental movement might do better 
concentrating on what it has historically done best: “wasteful and unmindful 
affluence, inappropriate technology, accelerated population growth and worldviews 
that see nature as a realm separate from human life to be forever exploited in the name 
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of satisfying human desires.”27 These are important questions for the tactics and 
strategy of environmental and sustainable development activists, although this thesis 
has not sought to answer them. What it has argued is that the partnerships approach 
has diluted the radicalism of the environmental agenda by detaching and subsuming it 
under mainstream economic and technological perspectives and ad hoc voluntary 
partnerships. In this respect one of the lessons drawn from the WSSD is not, as 
Wapner argues, that environmentalists should retreat onto safer ‘green’ territory, but 
rather that strengthening understanding of the links between environmental 
degradation and social and economic inequalities, and highlighting their shared 
causes, is one way of re-politicising sustainable development. Brundtland’s central 
insight, that “it is impossible to separate economic development issues from 
environmental issues”, and the environmental justice movement’s assertion that ‘the 
environment’ is ‘where we all live’, are politically challenging and worth defending.28 
Such holistic formulations are now standard within UN and academic discourses, yet 
have frequently failed to impact upon the actual structure or policies of national 
governments.29 The politics of sustainable development needs re-politicising and re-
radicalising, especially in terms of implementation, not a further segregation of 
demands for social justice and global democracy. 
As such, a Foucauldian perspective on governmentality and counter-conduct 
warns against rejecting the politics of UN summitry and sustainable development in 
favour of a search for supposedly ‘purer’ forms of ecological resistance. As Foucault 
suggested, one should stand upright and face-to-face, “work with and be intransigent 
at the same time.”30 This implies both engaging with and critiquing dominant 
discourses of sustainable development, corporate responsibility and partnership. 
Summits like the WSSD provide opportunities for theatrical politics at which neither 
states nor businesses; neither the UN nor civil society groups are entirely dominant. 
The WSSD ended with one particular balance between social, economic and 
environmental issues, but these can be re-contested and re-politicised. Exemplary 
                                                 
27
 Ibid, p. 10. 
28
 Brundtland, Our Common Future, p. 3, and McDonald, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. See also Baker, 
‘Sustainable Development as Symbolic Commitment’, p. 302. 
29
 Interview with Judy Beaumont, DEAT, (Pretoria, 29/09/2006); P. Chasek, ‘The Negotiating System 
of Environment and Development: A Ten-Year Review’, in Kalhauge et al, Global Challenges, p. 100; 
interview with Arend Hoogervoorst, environmental consultant with Eagle Environmental, (Durban, 
13/12/2006). 
30
 Foucault, ‘So it is important to think?’, pp. 455 – 456. 
 233 
forms of government may be used to foster political acquiescence and economic 
rationality, but they can also be used to encourage more socially just and ecologically 
sustainable forms of behaviour. The willingness of advanced liberal forms of 
government to tolerate dissent – within certain limits – is both its greatest strength and 
provides the opportunity for creative struggle against it. The limits which it 
establishes are not permanently fixed, and theatrical moments like the WSSD provide 
spaces in which these limits can be exposed, resisted and politicised. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
 
“Once upon a time the leopard who had been trying for a long time to 
catch the tortoise finally chanced upon him on a solitary road. Aha, he 
said; at long last! Prepare to die. And the tortoise said: Can I ask one 
favour before you kill me? The leopard saw no harm in that and agreed. 
Give me a few moments to prepare my mind, the tortoise said. Again the 
leopard saw no harm in that and granted it. But instead of standing still as 
the leopard had expected the tortoise went into strange action on the road, 
scratching with hands and feet and throwing sand furiously in all 
directions. Why are you doing that? asked the puzzled leopard. The 
tortoise replied: Because even after I am dead I would want anyone 
passing by this spot to say, yes, a fellow and his match struggled here.”1 
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